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ABSTRACT	
	
CLASHING	IDEALS	OF	CITIZENSHIP:	
NORMS	OF	INCLUSION	AND	THE	MIDDLE	EAST	
	
by	
	
D.J.	Wolover	
	
	
The	University	of	Wisconsin—Milwaukee,	2017	
Under	the	Supervision	of	Professor	Aneesh	Aneesh	
	
	
Modern	conceptions	of	citizenship	are	in	a	state	of	flux,	and,	as	such,	so	are	our	ideas	about	
belonging.	Ascriptive	norms	of	membership	based	on	the	location	of	one’s	birth—jus	soli—or	
familial	lineage—jus	sanguinis—have	provided	the	groundwork	for	membership	where	being	
designated	a	“citizen”	can	provide	significant	legal,	economic,	and	social	advantages	over	those	
outside	the	status.	Naturalization,	dual	citizenships,	and	citizenship-by-investment	programs	
(CIPs)	have	made	citizenship	more	inclusive,	less	tied	to	a	specific	group,	and	more	responsive	
to	the	needs	of	the	individual.	Further,	instead	of	a	citizen’s	rights	stopping	at	the	border	of	the	
nation-state,	liberal	citizenship	norms	constructed	around	the	cornerstone	of	universal	human	
rights	are	gaining	momentum.	This	research	examines	the	spread	of	these	liberal	citizenship	
norms	and	their	relations	to	political	regime,	inequality,	and	territory.	A	qualitative	content	
analysis	of	citizenship	laws	from	198	countries	was	performed.	The	results	suggest	that	while	
liberal	citizenship	norms	have	gained	momentum	in	recent	history,	the	adoption	is	not	
universal,	with	non-authoritarian	regimes	tending	to	utilize	these	norms	at	higher	rates	than	
their	authoritarian	counterparts.	Further,	there	is	on-going	caution	surrounding	dual	citizenship	
and	CIPs.	To	examine	these	concerns,	this	study	outlines	the	spread	of	dual	citizenship	regimes	
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and	creates	a	log	of	extant	CIPs.	Finally,	a	case	study	of	liberal	norm	non-adoption	is	outlined	
using	the	citizenship	laws	of	the	Gulf	Cooperation	Council	(GCC)	countries.		The	results	from	this	
example	highlight	the	complex	set	of	variables	affecting	transnational	norm	adoption,	where	a	
region’s	history,	economic	relationships,	culture,	and	attitudes	toward	immigrant	groups	all	
play	a	role	in	the	decision-making	process.	
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Chapter	1	
Unequal	Protection	Under	the	Law	
	
 
In	2005,	Nour	Miyati	was	a	newly	relocated	Indonesian	domestic	worker	in	Saudi	Arabia,	
joining	the	other	approximately	1.5	million	domestic	laborers	from	South	East	Asia,	including	Sri	
Lanka,	the	Philippines,	and	her	home	country	(Human	Rights	Watch	&	Varia	2008).	She	had	
come	to	Riyadh,	after	previously	fruitful	employs	in	other	households	in	Medina	and	Ta’if.	
While	in	those	positions,	she	noted	that	her	employers	“were	good	and	provided	my	full	salary”	
(Human	Rights	Watch	&	Varia	2008:35),	traits	all	guestworkers—generally	defined	as	foreign	
born	workers	who	have	immigrated	to	another	country	to	fill	a	specific	job	title—hope	to	
encounter.	However,	in	Riyadh	she	faced	a	different	situation	while	serving	a	new	family.	She	
was	frequently	beaten	by	both	of	her	employers—a	husband	and	wife—and	in	a	2008	Human	
Rights	Watch	report	outlining	domestic	worker	abuse	in	Saudi	Arabia,	graphically	recounted	
being	repeatedly	struck	on	the	head	and	face,	hit	on	the	feet	with	sharp	high	heeled	shoes,	
losing	a	tooth	from	being	punched	in	the	mouth,	and	having	her	fingers	repeatedly	pounded	
until	they	swelled.	After	a	particularly	harsh	beating,	her	employers	forced	her	to	wash	her	
hands	with	a	full	cup	of	bleach,	presumably	to	disinfect	the	numerous	injuries	and	prevent	
infection	from	setting	in.	
Miyati’s	abuse	was	not	limited	to	the	physical	pain.	She	endured	excessive	periods	of	
work	where	she	“…never	got	a	chance	to	rest,	I	woke	up	at	4	a.m.,	made	breakfast	and	worked	
all	day	without	rest.	I	went	to	sleep	at	3	a.m.”	(Human	Rights	Watch	&	Varia	2008:35).	Her	
employers	frequently	locked	her	in	the	house,	preventing	her	from	even	leaving	to	throw	out	
household	garbage.	They	withheld	her	pay	and	confiscated	her	passport	to	limit	her	
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movements	if	she	attempted	escape,	as	guestworkers	caught	without	proper	identification	
could	be	immediately	returned	to	their	employers,	jailed,	or	deported	(Human	Rights	Watch	&	
Varia	2008).	On	one	occasion,	Miyati	managed	to	escape	and	took	a	taxi	to	a	local	police	
station,	seeking	asylum.	She	was	met	there	by	her	male	employer,	who	was	a	police	officer.	
When	she	attempted	to	resist	removal	from	the	station,	he	forcefully	took	her	home	saying	
that	she	hadn’t	“finished	[her	employment]	contract	yet,	it	should	be	two	years.”	(Human	
Rights	Watch	&	Varia	2008:35).	
As	punishment	for	her	escape	attempt	Miyati	was	severely	beaten,	bound	and	locked	in	
the	house’s	bathroom,	and	went	unfed	for	long	periods	of	time	(BBC	2008;	Human	Rights	
Watch	&	Varia	2008).	To	prevent	attempts	to	communicate	with	their	neighbors,	her	employers	
taped	her	mouth	shut.	After	almost	a	month	of	this	treatment,	Miyati	convinced	her	employers	
to	take	her	to	a	doctor	to	receive	treatment	for	her	numerous	injuries.	Her	examination	
revealed	that	she	had	contracted	gangrene	during	her	lengthy	restraint;	a	condition	that	led	to	
the	amputation	of	multiple	fingers	and	toes.		
While	being	examined,	her	doctor	reported	the	abuse	to	the	proper	authorities,	who	
proceeded	to	investigate	the	claims	against	her	employers.	The	criminal	proceedings	for	the	
case	stretched	over	three	years,	during	which	time	Miyati	languished	in	the	Indonesian	
embassy	shelter	for	displaced	guestworkers.	Initially,	a	Riyadh	court	convicted	her	of	making	
false	allegations	against	her	employers,	sentencing	her	to	79	lashes;	a	decision	that	was	later	
overturned	(Human	Rights	Watch	&	Varia	2008).	Her	female	employer	initially	pleaded	guilty	to	
the	abuse	charges,	receiving	a	sentence	of	35	lashes;	a	sentence	that	was,	too,	later	overturned	
(BBC	2008).	All	charges	against	her	male	employer	were	dismissed.	In	the	end,	Miyati	was	
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awarded	2,500	riyals	(approximately	$668.00	US)	compensation	for	her	injuries.	Both	the	
Indonesian	embassy	and	Human	Rights	Watch	have	sought	an	appeal	of	the	verdict,	but	as	of	
this	writing,	the	case	has	not	been	reexamined	(BBC	2008;	Human	Rights	Watch	&	Varia	2008).	
Instead,	it	has	left	a	“dangerous”	precedent	“that	they	[Saudi	employers]	can	beat	domestic	
workers	with	impunity	and	that	victims	have	little	hope	of	justice.”	(BBC	2008).	
One	can	interpret	Miyati’s	experiences	with	her	employers	as	an	individual	case	of	
abuse,	or	worse,	as	part	of	a	larger	pattern	of	abuse	that	many	domestic	workers	might	be	
facing	in	Saudi	Arabia.	Both	would	be	valid	concerns.	However,	this	dissertation	focuses,	not	on	
the	abuse,	but	on	an	underlying	factor	that	acts	as	a	condition	of	possibility	for	abuse:	
citizenship	status.	First,	Miyati’s	legal	options	for	recourse	were	limited	as	she	was	not	deemed	
a	citizen.	As	such,	she	did	not	have	access	to	the	same	sets	of	protections	that	a	Saudi	citizen	
would	under	similar	circumstances.	Her	attempts	to	get	help	were	not	taken	seriously	until	she	
had	suffered	significant	injuries.	In	addition,	the	legal	recourse	to	her	employers’	wrongdoing	
was	virtually	non-existent.	Second,	the	local	culture	and	its	orientation	toward	the	immigrant	
status	of	guestworkers	played	a	role.	Her	employers	viewed	her	as	an	indentured	servant,	and	
as	discussed	further	throughout,	guestworkers	are	largely	viewed	as	an	expendable	population	
that	can	be	hired	and	fired	at	will.	While	their	presence	is	necessary	to	perform	the	jobs	
nationals	do	not	want	to	do—such	as	manual	labor	or	domestic	work	–they	are	deemed	an	
unclean	group	(Kanna	2011).	The	presence	of	guestworkers	and	non-nationals	is	tolerated	due	
to	their	need,	as	long	as	they	stay	in	“their”	neighborhoods.	Any	incorporation	into	the	larger,	
national	body	is	barred	as	admitting	them	might	somehow	tarnish	the	rest	of	the	citizenry	
(Douglas	1994;	Kanna	2011).	The	third	main	area	that	affected	Miyati’s	experiences	is	within	
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the	economic	realm.	She	did	not	receive	the	pay	she	was	contracted	to	earn	from	her	
employers,	as	have	numerous	other	guestworkers.	As	with	her	lack	of	recourse	against	physical	
abuse,	she	was	similarly	limited	in	her	efforts	to	secure	her	earnings.		
Despite	numerous	elements	at	play,	a	single	larger	issue	underlying	the	possibility	of	
Miyati’s,	and	other	guestworkers’,	experiences	are	their	citizenship	status.	As	a	member	of	the	
national	group,	one	gains	legal	protections	that	prevent	the	sorts	of	described	abuses,	while	
also	ensuring	that	employers	who	refuse	to	treat	their	employees	fairly	are	penalized.	For	most	
of	us,	one’s	birth	status	determines	one’s	access	to	political,	social,	and	economic	rights,	but	
the	breadth	of	those	rights	is	limited	by	national	jurisdictions.	Our	rights	are	only	applicable	
within	a	specific	realm.	If	someone	chooses	to	cross	a	national	border,	their	rights	may	stop,	or	
be	truncated,	at	that	point.	In	this	way,	citizenship	is	still	tied	to	the	nation-state.	As	such,	one’s	
rights	are	dependent	on	their	location,	but	also	on	the	legitimacy	of	those	who	guarantee	them.		
For	guestworkers	and	refugees,	this	can	become	a	significant	issue	as	they	traverse	
borders	for	work	or	to	flee	violence.	Once	they	leave	their	homeland,	their	basket	of	rights	
shrinks.	What	this	means	is	that	their	options	in	their	current	country	are	severely	limited	
according	to	how	they	are	seen	by	the	government.	One’s	rights	are	only	extant	in	a	specific	
area,	once	they	leave	the	area,	they	forfeit	those	protections.	While	this	state	based	rights	
regime	has	been	relied	upon	since	the	foundation	of	the	institution	of	citizenship,	there	has	
been	a	push	to	rethink	what	it	means	to	belong.	Soysal	(1994)	and	others	have	highlighted	the	
development	of	citizenship	regimes	based	on	the	concept	of	universal	human	rights.	As	such,	
one’s	location	of	birth	should	not	limit	the	types	of	protections	they	have,	but	the	mere	fact	
that	they	are	human	should	act	as	a	safeguard	against	potential	abuses.	Many	European	states	
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have	tailored	their	rights	regime	to	the	United	Nations	human	rights	regime.		These	human	
rights	based	approaches	would,	ideally,	prevent	employee	abuse	since	they	would	have	the	
same	protections	as	native-born	citizens.	While	these	approaches	are	becoming	more	popular	
with	governments,	scholars,	and	advocates,	they	are	not	yet	universally	accepted.	This	
dissertation	highlights	the	world-wide	institutional	shifts	in	citizenship,	and	their	links	to	
inequality.	
The	tragic	case	of	Ms.	Miyati	may	appear	to	be	an	aberration,	but	her	situation	is	
illustrative	of	numerous	ethical,	structural,	and	economic	issues	in	the	domestic	labor	market	of	
wealthy	nations	in	general,	and	its	practice	in	the	Gulf	Cooperation	Council	(GCC)	countries,	in	
particular.	The	breadth	of	domestic	guestworker	abuse	in	Saudi	Arabia	is	unknown,	but	
believed	to	be	widespread.	
No	data	exists	to	calculate	accurately	the	number	of	women	migrant	domestic	workers	
who	confront	violations	of	 labor	rights	and	other	human	rights…gaps	in	the	labor	code	
and	restrictive	immigration	practices	heighten	domestic	workers’	risk	of	abuse.	(Human	
Rights	Watch	&	Varia	2008:2;	italics	mine)		
	
Questions	arise	regarding	what	legal	protections	foreign	workers	(both	female	and	male)	have	
access	to,	what	organizations	ensure	proper	monetary	compensation	for	their	labor,	and	who	
guarantees	their	safe	passage	to-and-from	their	home	countries?		
It	is	within	these	uncertainties	of	rights	that	I	seat	this	research.	The	precariousness	of	
guestworkers’	statuses	are	emblematic	of	the	inconsistencies	within	existing	citizenship	rights	
regimes.	The	rights	one	receives	in	one	nation-state	are	not	guaranteed	once	they	cross	the	
national	boundary.	As	such,	different	protections	and	opportunities	are	available	to	different	
groups,	resulting	in	different	opportunities	or	life	choices.	Traditionally,	the	status	of	“citizen”	
was	a	sign	of	a	relationship	between	the	individual	and	the	state,	which	was	passed	onto	future	
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generations	either	by	birth	within	the	national	borders	or	by	inheriting	the	status	from	one’s	
parents.	It	showed	that	the	individual	was	“one	of	us”	and	had	legal	access	to	various	sets	of	
rights.	More	recently,	there	has	been	an	international	push	towards	liberal	citizenship	norms,	
which	espouse	a	more	inclusive	form	of	citizenship.	These	norms	push	away	from	the	ascriptive	
rights	of	birth	and	blood,	and	instead	suggest	that	citizenship	is	a	more	fluid	state	where	
individuals	can	access	other	sets	of	rights	by	joining	groups	they	were	not	born	into.		
This	task	of	grouping	is	increasingly	accomplished	via	naturalization,	dual	citizenship,	
and	citizenship-by-investment	programs	(CIPs).	What	this	research	shows,	is	that	these	norms	
are	becoming	increasingly	common	on	the	national	stage,	with	most	countries	adopting	not	
only	naturalization	policies	(however	limited),	but	also	legally	allowing	their	citizens	to	hold	
citizenships	in	other	countries;	effectively	legalizing	individuals	holding	multiple	sets	of	rights.	
The	extreme	approach	to	these	expansions,	and	potentially	exploitation	of	dual	citizenship,	can	
be	found	in	the	rise	of	CIPs,	where	individuals	of	economic	means	can	purchase	additional	
citizenships,	thereby	purchasing	additional	sets	of	rights.	
Further,	this	work	questions	the	spread	of	these	liberal	citizenship	norms.	Not	only	by	
tracing	the	rise	of	the	norms	themselves,	but	also	by	examining	who	can	get	access	to	them	and	
what	types	of	political	regimes	are	employing	these	scripts	of	membership.	As	such,	issues	of	
inequality	are	fundamental	here.	Global	economic	inequality	can	be	seen	in	the	choices	that	
guestworkers	make	when	deciding	to	enter	potentially	dangerous	work	agreements.	Further,	
those	who	can	afford	to	purchase	CIPs	buy	rights	others	cannot	afford,	thus	giving	themselves	a	
variety	of	advantages.	A	similar	inequity	can	also	be	seen	at	the	national	level	when	looking	at	
which	countries	participate	in	CIPs.	Who	is	selling	documents	and	who	is	buying	access	can	be	a	
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signal	of	globalization’s	“winners,”	or	those	who	are	benefitting	the	most	from	transnational	
agreements.	Within	the	context	of	“winners”	and	“losers,”	the	importance	of	status	is	essential.	
Guestworkers	are	left	outside	of	citizenship	in	most	cases,	thereby	forcing	many	to	endure	the	
hardships	outlined	in	the	previous	example	without	the	option	of	legal	recourse.	Within	the	
legal	realm	they	are	non-persons.	
Further,	guestworkers	employed	as	domestic	labor	occupy	a	conflicted	position.	As	they	
emigrate	from	their	homelands	in	search	of	work,	these	workers	become	part	of	the	household,	
and	important	agents	of	social	reproduction.	They	are	the	primary	source	of	childcare,	and	
actively	maintain	a	clean	household	while	providing	daily	meals	for	the	family.	In	this	sense,	
domestic	guestworkers	are	sources	of	social	reproduction	for	their	employers	(Glenn	1992;	
Maher	2004).	They	are	the	ones	who	take	on	the	female	gender-typical	role	of	raising	children	
and	taking	care	of	the	household.	While	they	are	tasked	with	such	important	work,	they	are	
also	institutionally	marginalized	in	many	places	(Parreñas	2001;	Vora	2013).	
Here,	the	conflict	inherent	in	their	position	is	on	display.	Despite	being	perceived	a	
necessary	source	of	labor,	they	are	viewed	as	disposable	or	interchangeable	parts	of	the	
system.	Families	employing	domestic	laborers	use	those	workers	as	a	sign	of	prestige,	and,	
thereby,	a	physical	symbol	of	wealth	and	importance.	Being	able	to	employ	a	guestworker	
shows	that	employers	can	not	only	afford	to	pay	the	worker,	but	are	knowledgeable	enough	to	
navigate	the	legal	processes	required	for	acquiring	the	worker,	in	the	first	place.	Employers	
know	which	forms	to	file	to	“import”	their	employees,	provide	housing	and	sustenance	to	
workers,	and,	in	some	cases,	pay	for	their	workers’	travel	back	to	their	home	country	(Maher	
2004).	As	such,	there	is	a	significant	economic	burden	associated	with	employing	a	
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guestworker,	but	the	reward	to	the	employer	includes	both	functional	and	conspicuous	
consumption	of	their	labor.	
The	physical	and	mental	abuse	noted	previously	may	be	the	most	apparent	forms	of	
danger	confronting	workers,	but	they	are	also	expected	to	make	additional	sacrifices	in	less	
obvious	areas	of	their	lives.	Traveling	to	a	new	country	for	employment	requires	a	considerable	
commitment.	The	individual	must	brave	the	uncertainty	of	their	future	work	environment,	
unpredictability	of	their	travel	arrangements,	and	suffer	the	emotional	toll	of	long-term	
separation	from	their	friends,	family,	and	home.	These	sacrifices	hide	many	risks	confronting	all	
guestworkers.	First,	their	travel	from	the	sending	country	to	the	receiving	country	is	often	
fraught	with	dangers.	If	the	guestworker	has	not	been	represented	by	a	company	that	deals	in	
the	logistics	of	foreign	work—for	example,	an	employment	agency—the	process	of	getting	to	
the	foreign	region	may	be	the	worker’s	responsibility.	That	said,	the	hiring	family	may	be	
financially	responsible	for	all	travel	or	the	worker	may	be	forced	to	rely	on	illegal	means	to	
cross	borders,	such	as	coyotes	or	other	human	traffickers	(Human	Rights	Watch	&	Varia	2008;	
Maher	2004).	Putting	one’s	life	in	the	hands	of	traffickers	significantly	increases	the	risk	for	the	
individual	as	they	risk	being	swept	into	sex	trafficking	rings,	or	simply	deserted	in	a	foreign	land	
(Maher	2004).	
Once	the	guestworker	has	reached	their	destination,	they	now	must	endure	the	
contradictions	of	her	position,	especially	if	working	in	the	domestic	realm.	In	many	cases,	part	
of	the	work	a	domestic	guestworker	undertakes	is	childcare.	As	such,	she	acts	as	a	“live-in”	
nanny	who	provides	primary	care	to	the	children	in	the	household.	This	causes	a	conflict	
between	her	public	and	private	roles.	In	the	public	sphere,	or	her	work	life,	the	guestworker	
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devotes	her	time	to	seeing	to	the	needs	of	her	employers’	family.	However,	the	conflict	
develops	in	that	she	may	have	left	her	own	children	and	family	back	in	the	home	country	to	
gain	employment.	This	discord	highlights	the	sacrifices	of	domestic	guestworkers	(Human	
Rights	Watch	&	Varia	2008;	Parreñas	2001).	Given	the	patriarchal	normative	systems	from	
which	many	guestworkers	emerge,	the	decision	to	leave	home	casts	the	woman	as	someone	
shirking	her	responsibilities.	What	she	has	left	behind	is	a	situation	where	her	children	and	
other	dependent	family	members	are	now	in	the	care	of	family	members,	relatives,	friends,	or	
paid	caretakers.		
Once	in	the	receiving	country,	domestic	guestworkers	may	have	their	movements	
limited	by	their	employer	or	national	policies.	As	noted	in	the	case	of	Miyati’s	confinement	and	
abuse,	such	an	extreme	level	of	control	can	have	significant	negative	effects	on	guestworkers.	
In	the	case	of	the	GCC	countries—Saudi	Arabia	(KSA),	Kuwait,	Bahrain,	Qatar,	the	United	Arab	
Emirates	(UAE),	and	Oman—a	formal	system	of	employer	sponsorship	has	been	developed.	
Called	the	kafala	system,	the	process	requires	potential	employers	to	“vouch”	for	the	foreign	
worker	prior	to	their	arrival.	This	means	that	the	employer	is	responsible	for	the	economic	and	
legal	well-being	of	the	worker	during	their	contractual	period,	and	the	employer	is	responsible	
for	at	least	a	portion	of	the	repatriation	costs	at	the	contract’s	conclusion	(Gardner	2011;	
Longva	1999).	The	system’s	intended	purpose	was	to	create	“a	relationship	that	functioned	as	a	
mechanism	for	hosting	foreigners	in	the	close	and	genealogically	framed	societies	typical	of	the	
Arabian	Peninsula”	(Gardner	2011:8).	GCC	countries	needed	foreign	labor	to	fill	low-wage	and	
low-skill	occupations,	and	the	kafala	system	was	used	to	expedite	the	hiring	process.	
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However,	the	system	brought	with	it	some	troubling	attributes.	One	of	the	legal	
structures	enabling	the	possibility	of	abuse	I	outlined	earlier	pertained	to	the	requirement	that	
sponsors	must	approve	of	an	employee’s	departure	from	the	country	or	for	them	to	change	
employers	(Human	Rights	Watch	&	Varia	2008;	Gardner	2011;	Longva	1999;	Shemeena	2015).	
Given	that	the	employer	has	the	“final	say”	regarding	their	employee’s	travel	and	whereabouts,	
a	situation	of	vast	inequity	is	created.	The	employer	can,	effectively,	dictate	every	aspect	of	the	
employee’s	life	while	under	contract,	and	the	employee	has	little	power	to	hamper	abusive	
relationships.	As	shown	in	the	opening	example,	even	if	an	employee	is	being	severely	abused,	
the	local	authorities	give	credence	to	the	employer’s	claims.	Related	to	this	direct	control,	
employees	are	often	required	to	surrender	their	identification	documents—including	
identification	cards	and	passport—as	part	of	the	employment	process	(Longva	1999).	Failure	to	
do	so	could	result	in	the	termination	of	their	work	contract,	and,	in	turn,	deportation	back	to	
their	home	country.	
	 Such	control	of	workers’	employment	outcomes	is	not	limited	to	their	contracted	time,	
as	the	reaches	of	employer	influence	extend	past	their	documented	sponsorship	period.	As	part	
of	the	kafala	system,	employer-sponsors	hold	the	right	to	approve	future	in-state	contracts	for	
the	worker	(Human	Rights	Watch	&	Varia	2008;	Gardner	2011).	For	example,	consider	a	
hypothetical	case	of	an	Indonesian	domestic	guestworker	finishing	her	contractual	period	with	
a	family	in	Dubai.	She	has	had	a,	comparatively,	good	experience	with	the	family;	they	have	
paid	her	on	time	and	adequately	provided	her	with	safe	shelter	and	food.	Based	on	this	positive	
experience,	she	seeks	employment	with	a	new	family	in	another	region	of	the	UAE.	Prior	to	
being	transferred	to	this	new	family,	her	previous	employer	is	required	to	approve	her	staying	
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in	the	country,	and	her	transfer.	Now,	if	she	had	a	positive	experience	with	her	previous	
employer,	they	may	be	likely	to	approve	the	transfer,	and,	thereby,	terminate	their	
responsibility	and	control	over	her.	However,	if	she	had	a	negative	experience—or	even	an	
unremarkable	experience—with	her	previous	employer,	they	could	elect	to	deny	her	transfer;	
effectively	forcing	her	to	return	to	her	homeland.	Once	she	has	been	deported,	she	is	free	to	
reapply	to	an	employment	agency	in	her	home	country,	and	be	hired	out	to	a	new	job	in	any	
country	they	service,	even	to	the	UAE.		
Essentially,	what	the	approval/disapproval	of	new	jobs	reiterates	are	the	differences	
inherent	in	the	statuses	of	employers	and	guestworkers.	Between	citizens	and	non-citizens.	The	
noted	Human	Rights	Watch	conclusion	that	abuse	directed	towards	foreign	born	domestic	
workers	helps	to	show	the	protections	guaranteed	for	citizens,	in	many	nations.	Further,	this	
finding	highlights	the	different	protections	extended	to	workers	in	differing	regions.	While	the	
protections	to	a	worker	in	the	Middle	East	may	be	limited,	a	worker	in	the	United	States	or	
Europe	can	access	a	different	set	of	rights	simply	due	to	the	nation-state	they	are	employed	in.	
For	example,	a	guestworker	in	a	European	Union	(EU)	member	country	must	be	provided	a	
pathway	to	citizenship	after	five	years	of	lawful	residence	and	employment	(Papademetriou	
2013),	thus	making	an	EU	job,	potentially,	more	valuable	to	workers	than	one	based	in	the	
Middle	East,	regardless	of	their	monetary	compensation.	Citizens	may	be	able	to	seek	recourse	
for	any	injuries	they	have	sustained	during	work,	while	non-citizens	may	be	forced	to	endure	
their	wounds	while	on-the-job,	at	risk	of	losing	their	position.	Reporting	unsafe	working	
conditions,	personal	injury,	or	an	employer’s	failure	to	compensate	their	workers	may	not	be	an	
option	for	non-citizen.	Citizens	have	the	freedom	to	report	their	troubles	to	the	police,	and	in	
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most	cases,	the	police	will	hear	the	complaints	and	begin	an	investigation,	where	warranted.	
However,	as	noted	previously,	this	is	not	an	option	for	many	non-citizens.	Instead	of	receiving	
support	from	the	authorities,	non-citizens—much	like	other	marginalized	groups—may	face	
personal	harm	in	simply	reporting	transgressions	(e.g.	threats	of	violence,	loss	of	employment,	
or	deportation).	In	addition,	if	such	reports	and	statements	are	collected	by	authority	figures,	
that	does	not	mean	that	each	report	is	treated	equally.	Non-citizens’	reports	may	be	viewed	
with	an	air	of	skepticism	due	to	the	complainant	being	a	member	of	the	outgroup.	This	
distinction	between	“us”	and	“them,”	or	the	“other,”	is	one	that	will	come	up	again	during	
discussions	of	citizenship,	and	acts	as	a	central	theme	in	the	questions	posed	here.	
The	issues	surrounding	guestworkers’	relationships	with	the	state	do	not	just	end	with	
the	workers,	themselves.	Instead,	the	status	of	a	guestworker’s	family’s	citizenship	status	could	
be	complicated	depending	on	the	national	laws	in	place.	Consider	the	UAE’s	views	on	the	
subject.	According	to	The	Law	Library	of	Congress’	(Saliba	2013)	examination	of	extant	
guestworker	programs,	the	UAE’s	program	is	not	a	path	to	citizenship,	but	one	leading	solely	to	
work.	“Residency	permits	granted	to	migrant	workers	are	for	a	limited	period	of	time	and	
cannot	lead,	regardless	of	the	length	of	residence	to	citizenship	or	permanent	residency”	(Saliba	
2013;	italics	mine).	As	such,	foreign	born	workers	are	immediately	seen	as	a	separate	group.	A	
group	that	cannot	be	assimilated	into	the	dominant	culture,	and	is	thereby	not	the	same	as—or	
equal	to—a	UAE	citizen.	
As	an	illustration	of	this	point,	I	recount	a	second	example	of	a	state’s	view	of	
guestworkers	as	disposable,	and	the	differences	in	protections	offered	to	citizens	and	withheld	
from	non-citizens:	the	bidoon	living	in	the	UAE.	Roughly	translated	from	Arabic	to	mean	
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“without,”	the	term	has	been	applied	to	stateless	people	in	the	Middle	East	(Abrahamian	2015;	
Sloan	2015).	Essentially,	the	bidoon	are	without	a	legal	homeland.	An	individual	may	be	born	in	
the	UAE	to	a	documented	Pakistani	guestworker,	but	that	does	not	guarantee	UAE	citizenship.	
Given	the	heavily	restrictive	citizenship	requirements	utilized	by	much	of	the	Middle	East—
including	the	GCC	countries	discussed	in	Chapter	6—citizenship	is	a	status	inherited	from	one’s	
birth	father,	while	there	are	current	popular	pushes	toward	allowing	citizenship	to	pass	from	
mother	to	child.	Citizenship	is,	thereby,	passed	on	to	a	father’s	children,	comparable	to	passing	
on	genetic	material.		
Abrahamian	(2015)	also	notes	the	marginalizing	approach	toward	the	bidoon	used	by	
high	ranking	Emirati.	Many	individuals	directly	depend	on	the	daily	contributions	of	
guestworkers,	and	would	be	negatively	impacted	by	the	complete	dissolution	of	the	status.	
However,	these	workers	are	viewed	as	a	potential	source	of	local	economic	drain.	UAE	citizens	
can	draw	substantial	economic	benefits	from	the	state’s	existence	as	a	rentier	state.	Individuals	
receive	a	no-strings-attached	$55,000	stipend,	free	land	to	build	a	house—which	can	be	
financed	with	a	no-interest	loan—,	and	access	socialized	healthcare	and	education,	based	
purely	on	their	status	as	citizen	(Abrahamian	2015).	This	money	is	sourced	from	the	earnings	
the	UAE	government	acquires	by	“renting	out”	land	access	to	companies	searching	for	oil.	Some	
scholars	(Abrahamian	2015;	Beblawi	1987)	suggest	that	these	annual	payments	are	a	useful	
mechanism	to	maintain	the	status	quo.	Popular	uprisings	are	less	likely	to	take	hold	if	citizens	
are	kept,	relatively,	placated.	These	monetary	allowances	further	help	minimize	the	popularity	
of	more	inclusive	citizenship	policies,	as	discussed	in	Chapter	6.	Providing	pathways	to	
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citizenship	means	there	will	be	more	citizens	to	split	the	rentier	profits	between,	thus	lowering	
the	amount	everyone	receives.	
The	lack	of	jus	soli	citizenship	law	and	severely	restricted	naturalization	opportunities	in	
the	UAE	create	a	troublesome	situation	for	guestworkers	and	their	families.	The	workers	are	
heavily	incorporated	into	the	daily	lives	of	their	employers	and	urban	areas,	but	are	considered	
what	Vora	(2013)	termed	“impossible	citizens.”	Workers	bring	their	home	cultures	with	them	
when	they	migrate	to	a	new	area.	As	such,	their	beliefs	and	daily	practices	are	brought	to	their	
new	geographic	home.	To	better	serve	the	worker	populations,	local	businesses	may	start	
catering	to	their	needs	by	carrying	foods	and	clothing	from	their	homelands.	It	is	through	this	
availability	of	material	and	cultural	goods	that	guestworkers’	practices	can	have	an	influence	on	
the	region’s	dominant	culture.	Citizens	may	start	consuming	workers’	traditional	foods	at	
restaurants	and	street	carts.	Further,	cities	may	take	on	an	international	“feel”	by	having	
districts	devoted	to	different	working	groups—i.e.	an	Indonesian	neighborhood	or	a	Filipino	
one.	Despite	being	institutionally	kept	out	of	the	citizenship	process,	guestworkers	can	have	a	
significant	lasting	impact	on	their	locale	(Vora	2013;	Vora	&	Koch	2015).	
Further,	citizenship	has	also	been	an	indicator	of	worth,	a	worth	that	is	measured	in	
terms	of	the	rights	members	could	access	(Aneesh	&	Wolover	manuscript;	Bosniak	2006;	
Marshall	2006).	Initially,	the	status	of	citizen	was	an	indicator	of	social	and	economic	status.	
Holding	the	title	in	the	United	States	and	Europe	often	meant	that	an	individual	was	a	property-
owning	(white)	male,	who	could	actively	participate	in	the	local	government	(Ignatieff	1987;	
Mann	1987).	Citizenship,	then,	was	a	way	to	identify	groups	who	deserved	the	status	(Joppke	
2010).	Groups	who	had	the	highest	social	and/or	socioeconomic	status,	seen	as	contributing	to	
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the	wealth	of	the	nation,	and	whose	work	was	valued,	became	citizenships	since	they	had	
“worked	hard”	to	gain	the	right	to	be	included	(Davidson	2000;	Hobson	2005).	As	Hobson	
(2005)	notes	when	discussing	Pateman’s	development	of	Wollestenscraft’s	Dilemma	on	gender	
and	access	to	citizenship,	those	whose	work	was	economically	valued	(i.e.	work	taking	place	
outside	of	the	private	sphere	of	the	family	and	household)	were	repaid	with	citizen’s	rights.	
Extending	the	idea	of	worth	across	gendered	lines,	Joppke	(2010)	applies	a	similar	examination	
when	accounting	for	historical	status	and	access	to	citizenship.	Within	this	scope,	the	dominant	
group’s	view	of	the	individuals	in	question—be	they	ethnically	or	racially	disparate,	or	foreign-
born—is	instrumental	in	their	likelihood	toward	inclusion.	Individuals	originating	from	groups	
who	were	viewed	as	lazy	were	barred	from	gaining	citizenship,	while	those	belonging	to	“hard	
working”	groups	gained	access	to	the	rights	(Joppke	2010).		
The	republican	form	of	government	arose	from	this	particularistic	process.	Citizens,	
essentially,	created	the	laws	they	followed	(Leydet	2014;	Marshall	2006;	Marshall	&	Bottomore	
1992;	Mouffe	1992).	Individuals	took	turns	holding	office,	thereby	giving	all	citizens	the	
opportunity	to	enact	policy	addressing	their	concerns.	Ultimately,	what	citizens	gained	under	
this	regime	was	the	duty	to	participate	in	the	political	system.	By	doing	so,	it	called	for	citizens	
to	put	their	personal	goals	and	desires	aside,	for	the	betterment	of	the	state	(Joppke	1998;	
Marshall	2006).	Their	duty	was,	then,	paid	for	by	the	rights	they	enjoyed.	While	republican	
citizenship	never	existed	in	its	true	form,	early	Greek	city	states	came	close	to	this	ideal.	
Liberal	citizenship	added	the	idea	of	protection	to	the	republican	typology.	Within	this	
form,	citizens	could	not	only	participate	in	the	political	process,	as	in	the	republican	system,	but	
also	gained	the	right	to	be	protected	by,	and	in	some	cases	from,	the	state	(Arendt	1973).	
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However,	within	the	liberal	form,	political	participation	was	limited	to	those	citizens	who	chose	
to	participate,	as	opposed	to	participation	as	a	“duty”	that	was	present	in	the	republican	
system.	A	tripartite	of	citizens’	rights	also	developed.	In	Marshallian	(2006)	terms,	liberal	rights	
expanded	from	the	solely	political	to	include	civil	and	social	rights.	Civil	rights	provided	the	
freedom	of	speech,	thought	and	faith,	property,	legal	contracts	and	the	freedom	for	citizens	to	
choose	their	own	work	and	pursue	it	freely,	while	being	paid	to	do	so.	It	is	from	this	ability	to	
pursue	one’s	own	goals	that	allowed	one	the	opportunity	to	become	active	in	politics.	Political	
rights	afforded	the	citizen	in	liberal	systems	to	participate	in	the	political	process	and	run	for	
political	office	and	hold	that	position,	if	so	desired.	The	final	prong	of	rights	Marshall	proposed	
is	more	indeterminate:	social	rights.	These	rights	outline	the	relationship	between	the	state	and	
citizenry,	and	vary	according	to	where	one	resides.	In	some	areas,	social	rights	include	access	to	
a	guaranteed	minimum	income.	In	others,	it	can	mean	access	to	state-funded	public	education.	
Some	states	assure	that	citizens	will	have	access	to	healthcare.	The	aim	of	social	rights	was	to	
make	sure	that	citizens	were	kept	in	safe	environments	and	had	access	to	the	tools	necessary	
for	them	to	become	full	citizens,	and	able	to	utilize	all	the	opportunities	the	state	accorded	
(Marshall	2006).		
A	final	characteristic	of	Marshall’s	plan	was	the	increasingly	inclusive	nature	of	
citizenship.	As	the	idea	of	citizen	evolved,	it	has,	generally,	been	a	status	offered	to	more	and	
more	people.	Early	forms	of	national	citizenship	were	restricted	to	those	born	within	the	
country’s	geographic	boundaries—jus	soli—or	those	who	inherited	the	status	from	their	
parents	via	birth—jus	sanguinis.	Both	methods	sought	to	extend	citizenship	to	a	uniform	group	
of	individuals	who	met	some	basic	requirement.	The	“blood	or	soil”	approach	also	distinguishes	
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between	those	who	belong	and	those	deemed	“outsiders.”	Our	people	become	those	born	in	
the	same	place	and	have	some	ties	to	the	land.	Alternatively,	as	with	Anderson’s	(2006)	
concept	of	the	imagined	community,	group	members	can	rally	around	a	shared	national	history	
and	cultural	signals	that	allow	us	to	empathize	with	other	citizens	they	have	never	met,	or	may	
never	meet.	
While	the	“blood	and	soil”	method	creates	a	straight-forward	method	of	categorizing	
individuals	(e.g.	People	are	either	born	here,	or	not.	Were	their	parents	citizens?),	it	ignores	a	
world	where	migration	occurs.	As	a	method	to	deal	with	the	mass	movements	of	people,	
citizenship	processes	were	becoming	increasingly	liberal,	developing	procedures	for	
“naturalization.”	No	longer	solely	a	lottery	of	birth	(Shachar	2009),	citizenship	was	something	
that	could	be	gained,	lost,	or	traded	depending	on	personal	needs.	Institutional	processes	were	
developed	to	account	for	this	flexibility.	Individuals	and	families	could	undertake	processes	of	
naturalization	to	gain	citizenship	in	their	adopted	country.	In	some	cases,	individuals	held	
multiple	citizenships,	thereby	helping	them	travel	more	easily.	While	these	events	and	
possibilities	will	be	discussed	at	greater	length	in	future	chapters,	it	is	worth	noting	here	that	
citizenship,	and	many	national	conceptions	of	the	status,	came	to	reflect	a	changing,	
transnational	world.	As	individuals,	money,	and	goods	found	it	easier	to	traverse	national	
borders,	our	definitions	of	belonging	shifted.	Ideas	and	everyday	practices	have	also	found	the	
journey	between	countries	to	be	aided	by	our	increased	connections	to	one	another.	Within	
the	context	of	this	work,	the	spread	and	adoption	of	liberal	citizenship	forms	(e.g.	
naturalization	and	dual	citizenship)	around	the	world	become	a	marker	of	this	connectivity,	and	
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willingness	to	adhere	to	transnational	liberal	citizenship	scripts	(Aneesh	&	Wolover	
manuscript).	
Running	counter	to	this	liberal	approach	to	citizenship	is	what	I	call	ascribed	citizenship.	
This	model	primarily	relies	on	historical	models	of	kinship,	land,	and	culture.	To	be	a	citizen,	in	
this	model,	one	would	have	to	be	born	within	a	nation’s	borders,	be	a	blood	descendant	of	a	
citizen,	or	align	oneself	with	the	dominant	ideology—religious,	economic,	or	cultural.	The	
opportunity	for	outsiders	to	gain	citizenship	in	these	states	is	largely	closed	unless	individuals	
meet	the	characteristics	outlined	by	the	individual	citizenship	policy.	Counter	to	the	inclusive	
nature	of	liberal	citizenship	policies,	the	ascriptive	model	is	an	exclusive	one.	Immigrant	groups	
are	legally	barred	from	gaining	citizenship,	as	in	the	case	of	GCC	countries	mentioned	above,	
and	in	many	cases	a	class	system	is	developed	based	on	the	rights	one	has	access	to.	
Both	examples	detailing	the	legal	statuses	of	guestworkers	and	members	of	the	bidoon	
populations	address	a	fundamental	quandary	in	this	research:	who	belongs	and	who	does	not?	
Who	is	a	welcome	addition	to	the	local	culture,	and	who	is	viewed	as	incommensurable?	It	is	
within	this	vein	that	I	introduce	the	primary	focus	of	this	work:	citizenship	as	a	marker	of	
identity	and	the	rights	that	are	paired	with	the	status.	At	its	heart,	this	focus	can	be	further	
reduced	to	three	pairs	of	conflicts,	each	of	which	will	be	the	focus	of	future	chapters.	First,	
there	is	a	clash	between	the	acceptance	of	the	“foreigner”	via	assimilation	or	multicultural	
processes,	and	the	de	facto	separation	between	“foreign”	and	“native”	populations.	I	identify	
this	first	area	of	friction	in	the	adoption	or	refusal	of	various	liberal	citizenship	norms,	
particularly	when	considering	the	political	regime	used	in	the	given	nation-state.	As	such,	
Chapters	4	and	5	address	the	relationship	between	citizenship	policy	and	politics.	Are	
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authoritarian	or	non-authoritarian	regimes	more	likely	to	utilize	liberal	citizenship	norms?	What	
do	liberal	citizenship	norms	look	like	and	how	do	they	fit	into	the	history	of	citizenship,	as	a	
category?	
This	first	“in-or-out”	clash	is	linked	to	the	second	area	of	concern	in	this:	level	of	
membership.	Here	the	focus	goes	beyond	the	basic	question	of	“who	can	join”	to	consider	how	
the	mechanisms	to	gain	citizenship	differ	according	to	how	one’s	social	class.	In	Chapter	5,	I	will	
discuss	how	the	traditional	mechanisms	of	intrastate	inequality	have	taken	on	a	global	tone.	
Whether	the	measured	inequality	exists	between	the	types	of	ascriptive	rights	one	has	access	
due	to	the	country	of	their	birth	(Shachar	2009)	or	due	to	the	economic	opportunities	afforded	
by	their	country’s	incorporation	into	the	global	economy	(Walsh	2011;	2012).	What	has	become	
increasingly	evident	is	that	not	all	citizenships	are	equal.	The	documents	an	individual	has	can	
dictate	whether	they	can	leave	a	troubled	country,	invest	in	business	ventures,	or	maintain	
property	in	another	nation.	Similarly,	having	the	“wrong”	documents	can	trap	individuals	in	
precarious	regions.	As	Syrian	refugee	Mohamed	Zaza	remarked	in	a	recent	podcast	interview:		
If	you	ask	anybody	on	the	street,	everybody	having	an	American	passport,	what	does	it	
mean	for	you?	Nothing!	It’s	just	some	paper	where	[sic]	you	can	travel	with.	For	us	it’s	
life!	It’s	everything!	(Higgins	2017)	
	
The	final	site	of	conflict	that	will	be	taken	up	in	this	work	deals	with	the	cultural	
components	involved	in	determining	which	groups	can	be	brought	into	the	citizenship	fold,	and	
which	are	barred	from	joining.	While	globalization	has	forced	us	to	rely	on	other	countries	for	
raw	materials,	manufacturing,	and	commerce,	it	has	also	increased	the	ease	with	which	one	can	
communicate	with	others	abroad	and	traverse	national	boundaries.	Economic	and	political	
agreements	have	attempted	to	expedite	such	travels	by	creating	opportunities	for	individuals	
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from	member	countries	to	enter	other	member	locales	without	gaining	additional	
documentation,	such	as	a	visa	(Benhabib	2006;	Sassen	1999).	Also,	members	of	a	given	
diaspora	can	gain	easier	access	to	their	birth	countries	to	visit	family	and	friends,	or	send	
remittances	to	those	living	with	their	borders	(Brand	2006).	The	picture	developed,	at	least	in	
these	examples,	is	one	where	geography	is	less	influential	than	it	once	was.	People	who	have	
moved	abroad	can	keep	in	contact	with	those	from	their	birth-nation	and	keep	abreast	of	
political	changes	and	other	regional	news	via	the	Internet	and	similar	tools.	Those	abroad	are	
brought	together,	and	remain	connected	to	their	birthplaces,	via	technology.	
However,	what	happens	when	countries	that	are	heavily	integrated	into	the	
international	economy	do	not	adopt	the	norms	held	by	many	of	the	countries	they	are	in	
contact	with?	Within	the	context	of	citizenship,	what	may	influence	policy	makers	in	certain	
countries	to	hold	fast	to	the	ascriptive	norms	of	citizenship,	despite	the	increased	use	of	liberal	
norms?	To	address	these	questions,	I	will	use	an	in-depth	textual	analysis	of	extant	national	
citizenship	policies.	National	legal	documents	outlining	various	citizenship	policies	were	
gathered	via	Internet	searches	and	inquiries	to	the	appropriate	embassies.	Once	collected,	the	
laws	were	coded	for	the	type	of	citizenship	norms	being	used	and	who	could	access	them,	using	
qualitative	content	analysis	(QCA),	and	the	countries’	political	regime	type	was	noted,	allowing	
for	a	comparison	of	norm	use	within	authoritarian	and	non-authoritarian	regimes.	These	
findings	not	only	allow	me	to	note	the	predominance	of	a	specific	norm-type,	but	also	to	
examine	some	of	the	reasoning	influencing	norm	adoption.	(For	a	complete	discussion	of	this	
study’s	methodology,	refer	to	Chapter	3.)	
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In	the	case	of	the	GCC,	these	countries	have	adopted	similar	restrictive	policies	that	
consider	who	can,	or	more	frequently	cannot,	become	a	citizen.	These	adoptions	are	not	only	
rooted	in	the	cultural	differences	between	the	“traditional”	sites	of	citizenship	research	(Europe	
and	the	United	States)	and	the	GCC	countries,	but	must	also	be	considered	within	the	holistic	
scope	of	economic,	political,	and	historical	experiences.	It	is	by	using	a	multifactorial	approach	
that	I	can	avoid	the	common	complaints	of	Orientalism	and	the	ubiquitous	“incommensurability	
of	disparate	cultures”	arguments	(such	as	in	Huntington	1993).	The	decisions	made	by	policy	
makers	in	GCC	countries	make	sense	to	them,	and	thereby,	researchers	must	use	their	
sociological	imaginations	to	gain	better	insight	into	these	motivations	(Mills	2000).	
However,	before	embarking	on	our	investigation	of	how	citizenship	has	fueled	global	
inequality,	one	must	first	look	at	the	origins	of	the	status.	Chapter	2	provides	an	overview	of	
how	citizenship	has	developed	as	a	status,	but,	perhaps,	more	importantly,	the	sites	of	
inequality	that	have	typified	the	status	begin	to	become	visible.	Expanding	on	the	republican-
liberal	discussion	above,	this	chapter	asserts	that	citizenship	is	a	valuable	commodity	that	has	a	
significant	impact	on	one’s	life	chances.	Over	time,	our	definitions	of	“who	is	in”	and	“who	is	
out”	have	shifted,	but	modernity	has,	largely,	seen	the	development	of	a	more	inclusive	system,	
based	on	cosmopolitan	and	world-citizen	norms	that	value	human	rights	as	the	main	
characteristic	that	all	citizenship	regimes	aspire	to.	
Chapter	3	turns	our	attention	toward	the	political	regime	question	of	this	piece:	Do	
authoritarian	regimes	rely	on	ascriptive	norms	of	citizenship?	To	begin	the	investigation,	the	
purported	link	between	liberal	citizenship	norms	and	democracy	will	be	addressed.	Embedded	
in	this	examination	is	an	inquiry	into	a	culture’s	seeming	predisposition	toward	a	given	political	
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regime.	While	recounting	Huntington’s	(1993)	controversial	work	describing	the	“clash	of	
civilizations”	that	makes	a	truly	liberal	nation-state	nearly	impossible	to	form,	the	results	of	this	
study	posit	that,	in	support	of	Said’s	(2001)	and	Appadurai’s	(2006)	criticisms	of	Huntington,	
there	is	a	mutability	within	the	nature	of	the	state.	Further,	the	human	rights	regimes	that	
many	nation-states	employ	are	signals	suggesting	human	rights	transcend	beyond	national	
boundaries,	with	rights	extended	to	non-citizen	groups	in	many	areas.	Further,	one	cannot	
completely	disregard	social	context	when	discussing	policy	adoption.	
While	Soysal	(1994),	Benhabib	(2004),	and	others	have	argued	for	an	internationally	
recognized	human	rights-based	policy	for	citizens,	social	and	economic	class	still	hold	a	strong	
influence	on	“who	can	do	what.”	Chapter	4	begins	to	address	this	spread	of	liberal	citizenship	
norms.	Within	this	scope,	this	chapter	focuses	on	the	most	fundamental	sign	of	liberal	
citizenship	norms,	naturalization.	In	addition,	the	rationale	behind	using	the	nation-state	as	an	
empirical	focus	in	a,	seemingly,	transnational	discussion	of	rights	is	addressed	within	the	
context	of	past	research.	The	methodology	that	allowed	this	study’s	qualitative	findings	is	
outlined,	as	well.	
Chapter	5	expands	the	scope	of	liberal	citizenship	to	examine	the	increasingly	popular	
processes	of	dual	citizenship	and	purchasing	citizenship.	Linking	classical	Marxism	to	citizenship	
policy,	I	show	that	countries	that	receive	greater	amounts	of	remittances	from	foreign-based	
workers	have	more	lenient	travel	laws	for	those	seeking	work	abroad.	Further,	these	policies	
are	extended	to	the	sending	of	foreign-earned	wages	home,	with	streamlined	processes	of	
international	monetary	exchanges	taking	place	formally—local	financial	institution	to	home	
financial	institution—and	informally—funds	being	transferred	from	worker	to	family,	directly.		
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CIPs	allow	those	with	the	economic	means	to	gain	faster	access	to	passports	and	other	
documents	from	non-birth	countries,	thereby	giving	them	additional	access	to	the	rights	of	
those	regions.	Importantly,	while	the	ethics	of	countries	having	the	right	to	sell	citizenships	has	
widely	and	actively	discussed	in	academia—for	example,	a	European	Union	Democracy	
Observatory	on	Citizenship	(EUDO)	collection	of	essays	debating	the	pros	and	cons	of	the	
process	(Shachar	and	Bauböck	2014)—there	has	been	little	work	to	outline	which	countries	
have	implemented	these	“pay	to	play”	processes.	As	part	of	my	examination,	a	list	of	all	extant	
countries	implementing	CIPs	has	been	compiled.	Further,	I	posit	that	these	programs	reinforce	
the	inherent	inequalities	associated	with	citizenship;	pulling	it	further	away	from	the	liberal	
human	rights	regimes	and	emphasizing	economic	class	over	humanity.	
While	the	theoretical,	and	legal,	bases	of	citizenship	policies	can	be	traced	through	the	
legal	documentation	discussed	throughout	this	work,	what	happens	when	a	set	of	countries	
dependent	on	foreign	labor	strictly	enforces	the	ascriptive	forms	of	citizenship?	To	address	this	
question,	I	provide	a	case	study	into	the	citizenship	policies	of	the	GCC	in	Chapter	6.	GCC	
members	have	effectively	exploited	their	positions	as	oil-rich	nations	for	their	economic	
benefit.	Developing	an	economic	system	known	as	the	rentier	state,	governments	can	profit	
from	allowing	foreign	businesses	access	to	their	lands.	These	profits	are	then	disseminated	to	
the	citizenry.	Further,	this	system	relies	on	the	incorporation	of	large	populations	of	foreign-
born	guestworkers.	However,	given	this	reliance	on	foreign	investment,	and	the	liberal	
citizenship	norms	employed	by	those	countries,	GCC	members	elect	to	rely	on	ascriptive	norms	
of	citizenship—blood	and	soil.	Further,	I	outline	how	political	elites	have	effectively	wielded	
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religion,	linguistic	difference,	and	fear	to	not	only	maintain	their	autocratic	positions,	but	to	
severely	limit	citizenship	membership.		
The	final	chapter	of	this	work	provides	some	avenues	into	where	citizenship	may	be	
heading.	While	the	human	rights	based	approach	to	citizenship	is	compelling,	individuals	are	
not	fully	free	of	the	existing	nation-state	system.	As	such,	and	as	the	intermediating	chapters	
make	clear,	the	nation-state	is	alive,	well,	and	influential	in	our	global	age.	That	said,	one	must	
also	be	conscious	of	the	benefits	of	our	individual	statuses.	As	the	preceding	examples	
highlight,	our	opportunities	for	social	protections,	and	thusly	our	options	for	personal	
improvements,	are	entwined	with	the	statuses	one	holds.	The	rights	associated	with	
citizenships	are	not	universal,	but	vary	according	to	where	one’s	citizenship	is	from,	and	if	they	
have	access	to	others.	Within	this	inequity,	those	who	can	afford	to	undertake	the	necessary	
steps	can,	oftentimes,	improve	their	current	situation.	However,	as	with	other	frequently	
examined	sites	of	inequality	(i.e.	gender,	socioeconomic	status,	and	race	&	ethnicity),	
citizenship	presupposes	our	life	choices.	As	illustrated	in	the	Miyati	case,	one	cannot	hope	to	
move	away	from	an	abusive	work	situation	if	there	is	significant	risk	in	them	crossing	a	national	
border,	or	even	leaving	the	site	of	their	abuse.	Finally,	I	close	by	outlining	some	spaces	for	
future	research,	including	a	regionally	based	survey	examining	how	GCC	citizens	view	
guestworkers	and	the	need	for	better	tracking	on	who	is	using	CIPs	and,	thereby,	benefitting	
from	the	legal	fissures	in	the	system.		
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Chapter	2	
State	of	Acceptance:	The	Development	of	the	Modern	Citizen	
	
	
The	concept	of	“citizen”	is	in	a	state	of	flux.	In	the	Westphalian	tradition,	national	
citizenship	had	been	distinctly	tied	to	one’s	legal	belonging	exclusively	to	a	single	nation-state	
(Brand	2006;	Linklater	1998).	Be	the	link	via	ascriptive	methods—blood	(jus	sanguinis)	or	one’s	
location	of	birth	(jus	soli)—or	based	on	a	shared	ideology—similar	cultural	traits,	such	as	
religion—formal	dichotomies	were	constructed	to	delineate	who	was	eligible	to	receive	the	
rights	bestowed	on	the	citizen	from	the	state,	and	who	was	excluded.	In	some	cases,	the	
provision	of	rights	was	conditional	on	an	individual	providing	some	sort	of	civic	or	military	
service	in	exchange	for	this	legally	protected	status	(Brubaker	1992).	However,	citizenship	has	
begun	to	deviate	from	this	historical	basis.	As	national	borders	have	become	increasingly	
porous,	allowing	capital	and	information	to	cross	with	relative	ease,	the	scholarship	on	
citizenship	has	taken	on	a	multifaceted	appearance	where	some	see	the	beginnings	of	a	global	
system	of	citizenship	based	on	shared	human	rights	(Soysal	1994;	Schierup,	Hansen,	&	Castles	
2006),	the	quantification	of	individual	merit	and	credentials	(Walsh	2011,	2012),	or	potential	
economic	contribution	by	potential	citizens	via	remittances	from	the	diaspora	or	government	
contributions	to	the	receiving	state	(Davidson,	2000;	Ong	1999;	Somers	2010).	Despite	
ideological	differences	in	how	citizenship	is	tied	to	the	nation-state	in	modern	times,	these	
approaches	note	an	increasing	fluidity	to	one’s	status	as	a	citizen.	As	such,	citizenship	is	
increasingly	seen	as	a	mutable	status,	not	one	of	absolute	fixity	within	this	new	landscape.	
	 Before	discussing	how	citizenship	appears	to	become	less	ascriptive	and	more	inclusive,	
its	construction	must	be	examine.	As	noted	in	Chapter	1,	the	nature	of	citizen	has	essentially	
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been	a	dichotomy:	individuals	are	considered	either	part	of	the	in-group	(us)	or	part	of	the	out-
group	(them).	Being	one	of	“us”	meant	that	group	members	could	reap	the	benefits	of	the	
state;	among	which	could	include	access	to	public	services	and	benefits,	in	the	Marshallian	
sense,	as	I	discuss	in	further	detail	below.	Simultaneously,	being	designated	a	citizen	allowed	
members	lawful	access	to	unlimited	residence	within	the	nation-state	(Brubaker	1992).	To	be	
one	of	“them,”	in	most	cases	meant	the	opposite.	Being	one	of	“them”	limited	one’s	abilities	in	
an	area	including	limits	to	how	long	they	could	stay	in	the	region,	where	they	could	go	while	
there,	and	the	requirements	they	needed	to	complete	to	enter	or	exit	the	realm	(Hampshire	
2013).	
	 While	a	complete	history	of	citizenship	and	its	expansion	is	beyond	the	scope	of	this	
work,	it	is	still	worthwhile	to	examine	some	significant	developments	in	the	status	that	were	
products	of	their	given	era	and	location.	The	early	concept	of	the	citizen	was	developed	to	
identify	those	deemed	worthy	of	developing	and	enacting	local	laws.	Referred	to	as	the	
republican	form	of	citizenship,	this	conception,	arose	in	the	ancient	Greek	city-states,	had	
citizens	taking	an	active	role	in	local	politics	by	holding	office,	developing	laws,	and	ensuring	
they	were	enforced	(Ignatieff	1987;	Leydet	2014).	It	is	within	these	law-making	processes	
where	citizens	separated	themselves	from	subjects.	Instead	of	only	being	ruled	by	the	decree	of	
a	ruler,	citizens	collaboratively	decided	what	should	be	made	law	and	how	it	should	be	
enforced.	Further,	it	is	through	this	community	process	where	laws	gained	the	authority	to	
become	binding	(Rousseau	&	Betts	2008).		
Given	the	power	tied	to	the	title	of	citizen,	one	should	not	be	surprised	to	learn	that	it	
was	a	status	given	sparingly.	Initially,	the	status	was	limited	to	those	who	owned	property,	be	
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that	property	classified	as	land	or	human,	in	the	case	of	slavery	(Marshall	2006).	As	such,	a	fixed	
division	was	created	in	the	republican	model	between	those	who	belonged	(citizens)	and	those	
who	did	not	(non-citizens).	However,	this	established	division	was	not	conducive	to	territorial	
expansion	or	colonization	(Leydet	2014;	Walzer	1989).	The	Roman	Empire	developed	a	new	
definition	of	citizen	based	in	the	need	for	inclusion	and	pacification.	As	population	numbers	
rose,	the	republican	ideal	of	political	participation	was	no	longer	feasible;	there	were	too	many	
people	to	be	able	for	everyone	to	hold	office	during	their	lifetimes.	In	addition,	an	overly	
inclusive	system	could	result	in	politically	undesirable	outcomes	for	national	elites	as	the	
population	of	an	empire	looked	increasingly	different	from	its	original	population.	Citizenship,	
then,	was	a	way	to	minimally	include	and	pacify	colonized	groups.	
Instead	of	the	primary	characteristics	of	a	citizen	revolving	around	the	locally	born	
property	owning	class,	the	Roman	Empire	expanded	it	to	include	elite	individuals	among	
conquered	groups.	This	change	allowed	for	those	in	newly	expanded	geographies	to	be	subject	
to	the	law	of	the	ruling	empire,	while	not	having	a	direct	impact	on	its	formulation.	Further,	this	
tactic	helped	create,	relative,	stability	in	the	Empire	by	placating	local	elites	(Leydet	2014).	The	
elites	gained	the	benefit	of	support	from	Rome	and	became	Roman	citizens,	thereby	lowering	
the	likelihoods	that	they	would	seek	independence	from	the	Empire.	They	became	invested	in	
maintaining	the	existing	status	quo.	In	this	sense,	creating	a	more	inclusive	citizenry	helped	
minimize	the	possibilities	of	revolution.	This	more	flexible	system	has	become	designated	as	
liberal	citizenship	and	shifted	the	role	of	citizen	from	an	“important	occasional	identity,	[to]	a	
legal	status	rather	than	a	fact	of	everyday	life”	(Walzer	1989:215).	Citizenship	was	now	
something	that	could	provide	protection	for	its	members	in	exchange	for	a	few	services.		
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It	is	this	liberal	model	that	formed	the	basis	for	our	modern	conception	of	citizen.	Most	
modern	world	governments	view	citizenship	as	this	“occasional	status”	(Leydet	2014)	where	
individuals	can	enjoy	the	associated	rights	when	convenient,	and	are	encouraged	to	participate	
in	political	realm,	instead	of	taking	turns	holding	political	office.	As	opposed	to	citizenship	being	
limited	by	the	rigid	boundaries	of	us	and	them,	citizenship	is	“potentially	inclusive	and	
indefinitely	extensible”	(Leydet	2014).	However,	this	also	meant	that	an	increasingly	diverse	
group	of	individuals	fell	under	the	category	of	citizen	in	ethnically	pluralistic	societies;	a	group	
that	noticed	numerous	dissimilarities	between	other	citizens,	be	those	differences	racial,	
ethnic,	religious,	or	otherwise	in	terms.	The	question,	then,	is	in	how	to	foster	group	solidarity	
amid	such	difference.	How	can	a	nebulous	and	flexible	category	convince	members	that	they	
are	all	fundamentally	connected?	
Anderson	(2006),	suggested	that	diverse	groups	could	be	brought	together	via	the	
symbols	exchanged	by	the	citizens	themselves.	Unified	through	modern	media	from	print,	
radio,	and	television,	national	citizens	are	referred	to	as	part	of	the	“imagined	community”	
(Anderson	2006).	National	communities	are	formed	around	symbolic	media,	despite	group	
members	appearing	too	dissimilar	to	create	unions.	Influential	group	members	created	stories	
that	inextricably	linked	their	people	to	their	homelands	thereby	creating	a	justification	for	
occupying	the	land.	A	national	system	tends	to	bring	different	ethnic	groups	together	under	the	
same	umbrella	by	highlighting	the	naturalness	of	shared	interactions;	instead	of	highlighting	
difference,	similarities	and	connectedness	is	illuminated.	Such	connectedness	to	the	land,	and	
the	people	within	it,	gets	established	using	national	symbols	that	were	developed	and	
distributed	to	maintain	camaraderie.	Smith	(1991)	notes	that	these	unifying	symbols	did	not	
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have	to	take	on	a	written	form,	but	could	exist	as	songs,	a	flag,	shared	stories	about	influential	
founders,	or	other	national	symbols.	Using	the	United	States	as	an	example,	such	tools	of	
cohesion	exist	as	“patriotic”	items:	The	Pledge	of	Allegiance,	the	national	anthem,	the	legend	of	
George	Washington	throwing	a	silver	dollar	across	the	Potomac	River,	the	American	flag,	and	
bald	eagle,	among	others.		
Regardless	of	the	type,	origin,	or	appearance	of	such	symbols,	the	goal	is	the	same:	
knowing	what	the	symbols	were	and	what	they	represented	meant	that	one	was	with	“us,”	
while	an	aversion	to	the	symbols	or	an	allegiance	to	an	alternative	set	of	symbols	meant	they	
were	with	“them.”	While	the	construction	of	these	two	groups	has	been	normalized,	it	was	a	
necessary	stepping	stone	toward	the	formation	of	the	modern	nation-state	(Anderson	2006;	
Brubaker	1996;	Joppke	2010).	With	the	rise	of	this	new	form	of	unification,	group	members	
could	cling	to	something	beyond	shared	geographic	location	of	residence	when	talking	about	
their	compatriots.	Cultural,	ethnic,	and	ideological	characteristics	were	employed	to	bring	
individuals	closer	together	(Anderson	2006;	Smith	1991).	Similarly,	these	characteristics	were	
the	means	through	which	the	status	was	gained.	It	is	toward	this	status	that	I	now	direct	our	
attention,	whether	the	status	be	an	entitlement	or	right.	
Further,	it	should	be	noted	that	examples	from	numerous	countries	will	be	used	
throughout	this	research.	Like	the	concept	of	the	“imagined	community”	that	sought	to	unify	
populations	within	national	territories,	many	of	the	laws	surrounding	citizenship,	naturalization,	
dual	citizenship,	and	CIPs	have	taken	on	a	transnational	tone,	in	that	seemingly	disparate	
countries	utilize	strikingly	similar	legal	language.	While	the	causal	factors	of	such	isomorphism	
are	beyond	the	scope	of	this	work,	the	institutionalization	of	citizenship,	and	the	characteristics	
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of	who	can	become	a	citizen,	have	become,	largely,	universal.	As	such,	the	examples	employed	
here	are	representative	of	other	similar	nations’	laws,	and	the	selected	nations	are	used	to	
illustrate	the	breadth	of	existing	legal	statuses	and	opportunities.	
	 Shared	identities	and	similarities	of	cultural	constructions	set	the	foundation	for	two	
methods	used	in	the	ascriptive	process	of	acquiring	national	citizenship.	These	methods	meant	
that	citizenship	was,	initially,	something	that	was	bestowed	upon	those	individuals	who	were	
viewed	as	belonging.	The	first	method	to	gain	citizenship	focused	on	citizenship	via	one’s	
bloodline,	referred	to	as	the	jus	sanguinis	method.	Within	this	method,	individuals	are	granted	
national	citizenship	based	on	the	citizenship	of	their	parents.	As	such,	citizenship	is	viewed	as	
something	passed	on	to	future	generations.	Thereby,	if	one’s	father	possessed	Saudi	
citizenship,	his	offspring,	too,	would	gain	Saudi	citizenship	due	solely	to	descent.		
Two	main	characteristics	of	the	nation-state	are	at	play	in	countries	relying	solely	on	the	jus		
sanguinis	approach.	First,	it	is	a	method	that	emphasizes	the	ethnic	membership	portion	of	
citizenship	(Castles	&	Davidson	2000).	Ethnicity	and	citizenship	are	comparable	in	that	they	are	
attributes	kept	alive	through	intergenerational	transmission.	The	practices	and	beliefs	(i.e.	
culture)	of	the	group	are	taught	to	future	generations	via	socialization,	and	are	thus	maintained	
in	a	similar	way.	Within	the	jus	sanguinis	approach,	the	same	transmission	is	visible.	The	ethnic	
blueprint	of	the	groups	is	transmitted	from	aging	generations	to	younger	generations	to	
maintain	their	belief	systems.	As	noted	above,	this	cultural	knowledge	is	a	marker	used	to	
determine	who	belongs	and	who	does	not,	who	is	one	of	“us”	versus	who	is	one	of	“them,”	
and,	finally,	who	is	a	citizen	and	who	is	not.	From	the	jus	sanguinis	perspective,	those	who	can	
document	a	blood-link	to	the	culture,	and	thus	the	nation-state,	qualify	for	citizenship.		
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Examples	of	this	approach	include	the	Israeli	Law	of	Return	and	the	German	
Kulturnation	(Castles	&	Davidson	2000).	In	both	processes,	citizenship	is	extended	to	those	born	
in	foreign	nations	who	can	trace	their	ancestry	to	their	respective	nations.	Those	who	can	
accomplish	this	task,	are	free	to	file	for	citizenship	and	gain	the	rights	associated	with	that	
status.	The	“Law	of	Return”	(Israel	1950)	notes:	
1.	Every	Jew	has	the	right	to	come	to	this	country	as	an	oleh.	
2.	(a)	Aliyah	shall	be	by	oleh’s	visa.	
				(b)	An	oleh’s	visa	shall	be	granted	to	every	Jew	who	has	expressed	his	desire	to		
settle	in	Israel…	
4A.	(a)	The	rights	of	a	Jew	under	this	Law	and	the	rights	of	an	oleh	under	the		
Nationality	Law…are	also	vested	in	a	child	and	grandchild	of	a	Jew,	the	spouse	of	
a	 Jew,	 the	spouse	of	a	child	of	a	 Jew	and	the	spouse	of	a	grandchild	of	a	 Jew,	
except	for	a	person	who	has	been	a	Jew	and	has	voluntarily	changed	his	religion…	
	
The	German	example	has	its	roots	in	the	events	of	World	War	II,	like	the	“Law	of	
Return.”	Article	116	of	the	Basic	Law	for	the	Federal	Republic	of	Germany	(Germany	2014)	
provides	a	definition	of	“German”	regarding	restoring	citizenship.	This	process	is	only	open	to		
Former	German	citizens	who	between	30	January	1933	and	8	May	1945	were	deprived	of	
their	citizenship	on	political,	racial	or	religious	grounds,	and	their	descendants,	shall	on	
application	have	 their	 citizenship	 restored.	 They	 shall	 be	 deemed	never	 to	 have	been	
deprived	of	their	citizenship	 if	 they	have	established	their	domicile	 in	Germany	after	8	
May	1945	and	have	not	expressed	a	contrary	intention.	(Germany	2014)	
		
Because	of	the	country’s	emphasis	on	the	familial	transmission	of	citizenship,	Spiro	(2008)	has	
suggested	that	Germany	is	the	last	“stronghold”	(18)	of	jus	sanguinis	based	citizenship	in	
modern	Europe,	as	the	nation	has	made	policy	distinctions	between	Turkish	guestworkers	and	
German	nationals.	By	employing	the	just	sanguinis	method,	Germany	has	effectively	shut-off	
citizenship	to	those	outside	the	dominant	culture.	This	action	will	be	discussed	in	further	depth	
in	Chapters	4	and	5,	but	a	summary	of	the	countries	using	this	method	can	be	found	in	
Appendix	A.	
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The	second	fundamental	method	used	to	classify	citizens	was	via	jus	soli	(complete	list	
also	in	Appendix	A).	This	method	grants	citizenship	to	any	child	born	within	a	nation-state’s	
borders,	regardless	of	parentage,	which	suggests	that	countries	using	jus	soli	are	less	concerned	
with	an	individual’s	ethnic	heritage,	but	more	concerned	with	expanding	their	population,	and	
as	a	by-product,	creating	an	increasingly	cultural	diverse	society	(Brand	2006).	As	the	jus	soli	
approach	produces	a	more	diverse	populous,	it	is	viewed	as	a,	generally,	more	inclusive	
citizenship	model.	Ethnicity	is	not	a	deciding	factor,	only	one’s	geography.	In	some	cases,	a	
modified	form	of	jus	soli	is	used	to	restrict	citizenship	to	children	born	in	the	region	whose	
parents	have	resided	there	for	a	given	amount	of	time,	thereby	minimizing	the	possibility	that	
individuals	temporarily	immigrate	to	an	area,	or	simply	visit,	to	give	birth	there,	thereby	
guaranteeing	citizenship	rights	to	their	child.	The	United	States	is	a	commonly	used	example	of	
this	system,	as	it	grants	citizenship	to	any	child	born	within	its	borders,	even	to	those	whose	
parents	are	somehow	left	outside	of	the	legal	citizenship	system.	That	said,	it	is	worth	
remembering	that	what	is	at	stake	in	either	of	the	ascriptive	methods	of	inclusion	is	a	status	
that	provides	access	to	certain	rights.	Rights,	to	which	I	direct	our	attention	now.	
While	these	ascriptive	types	of	citizenship	outline	who	can	receive	the	benefits	of	group	
membership,	they	also	delineate	who	can	be	excluded	from	the	system.	Therefore,	these	
methods	are	equally	important	for	the	hard	boundaries	they	create	(Bosniak	2006).	If	one	is	not	
born	to	the	right	parents	or	in	the	correct	region,	they	will	not	gain	the	benefits	of	citizenship	in	
the	nation-state.	Among	the	costs	of	exclusion	is	the	loss	of	civil,	political,	and	social	rights	
(Marshall	&	Bottomore	1992;	Marshall	2006;	Reiter	2013).	The	details	of	these	rights	were	
outlined	in	Chapter	1,	but	it	is	worth	recalling	that	while	these	rights	are	taken	as	a	given	in	
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many	modern	societies,	they	were	initially	only	available	to	a	select	group	of	individuals—
known	as	“full	citizens”—such	as	white	landowning	males	(Ignatieff	1987;	Marshall	2006).	
Ignatieff	(1987)	suggests	that	the	Aristotelian	conception	of	citizen	was	based	on	dependency,	
and	one	must	be	independent	to	rule	properly.	As	such,		
Dependent	creatures	could	not	be	citizens:	slaves,	those	who	worked	for	wages,	women	
and	children	who	were	both	subject	to	the	authority	of	the	domestic	oeconomia	were	
excluded	from	citizenship.	(Ignatieff	1987:402)	
	
The	fear	was	that	if	someone	depended	on	others	for	their	protection,	wage,	or	survival,	their	
decisions	would	be	based	on	maintaining	their	own	wellbeing,	not	the	wellbeing	of	the	group.	
Despite	the	preliminary	restrictions	associated	with	citizenship	status,	as	rights	systems	
developed,	the	development	and	expansion	of	the	welfare	state	could	take	place.	The	state	was	
expected	to	provide	basic	support	to	its	citizens.	However,	it	is	important	to	note	that	while	the	
full	set	of	these	rights	were	initially	limited,	as	the	concept	of	citizenship	became	more	liberal,	
the	citizenry	grew.	Thus,	formerly	marginalized	or	excluded	groups	could	now	become	“full	
citizens,”	themselves.	
These	basic	benefits	associated	with	national	membership	become	confounded	as	
global	connectivity	between	nation-states	increases.	With	more	individuals	crossing	borders	to	
seek	work	in	both	the	historical	and	modern	contexts,	the	question	of	“What	to	do	with	these	
people?”	takes	center-stage	(Hampshire	2013;	Joppke	1998,	2010;	Sassen	1999;	Shachar	2009;	
Soysal	1994;	Weiner	1995).	Further,	the	receiving	nation’s	treatment	of	immigrant	groups	could	
come	under	the	scrutiny	of	other	nations	who	may	use	such	conduct	as	the	basis	for	future	
relationships.	For	example,	if	the	government	had	treated	immigrant	groups	poorly	in	the	past,	
past	trade	partners	may	elect	to	do	business	elsewhere,	as	an	informal	sanction.	With	the	
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intensifying	processes	of	globalization,	the	strict	ascriptive	bases	of	citizenship	begin	to	falter.	
Nation-states	were	forced	into	a	quandary	when	foreign-born	workers	want	to	become	citizens	
(Joppke	1998;	Sassen	1999).	Simply	denying	immigrants	inclusion	could,	potentially,	discourage	
foreign	talent	from	coming	to	the	country,	further	limiting	the	economic	prosperity	of	the	
receiving	nation	(Brand	2006;	Hampshire	2013).	In	short,	it	is	natural	to	ask:	Why	should	
immigrants	travel	to	regions	for	work	when	their	path	to	inclusion	is	blocked?	Given	our	
increasingly	connected	world,	it	appears	that	the	traditional	ascriptive	methods	of	inclusion	are	
no	longer	adequate	to	deal	with	our	new	realities	(Hutchings	1995;	Sassen	1999;	Soysal	1994).		
For	many	states,	the	question	now	becomes	one	of	how	to	include	new	foreign-born	
individuals,	to	benefit	the	nation-state;	a	question	that	ascriptive	methods	of	citizenship	cannot	
answer	due	to	their	strict	membership	requirements.	In	response	to	this	changing	landscape,	
nation-states	are	increasingly	adopting	more	liberal	methods	of	inclusion	(see	Joppke	2010,	
Ong	1999,	and	Shachar	2009,	among	numerous	other	scholars).	While	the	ascriptive	bases	of	
citizenship	are	still	used	as	the	foundation	towards	group	membership,	there	are	now	other	
opportunities	to	gain	citizenship	in	non-native	countries.	The	first	of	these	has	been	through	
the	general	process	of	naturalization.	Broadly	speaking,	naturalization	requires	immigrants	to	
follow	a	set	of	state	mandated	guidelines	to	attain	citizenship	status	in	the	receiving	country	
(Sassen	1999;	Spiro	2008).	However,	there	is	wide	variation	in	the	sets	of	expectations	states	
employ	during	the	process.	In	nearly	all	cases,	a	period	of	residency	in	the	receiving	country	is	
required	prior	to	any	required	applications	be	submitted.	Further,	individuals	are	often	
expected	to	be	in	good	health,	to	not	have	committed	any	crimes,	and	speak	the	dominant	
language	of	the	receiving	country.	Regardless	of	the	compulsory	requirements	involved	in	the	
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process,	they	all	show	levels	of	physical	and	cultural	commitment	to	the	applicant’s	new	
country	(Joppke	2010;	Sassen	1999;	Spiro	2008).	
Belgium’s	(2013)	recently	updated	Declaration	of	Nationality	(article	12bis)	contains	
many	of	the	characteristics	that	other	nations	have	employed	to	admit	new	citizens.	To	gain	
citizenship,	applicants	must	have	“knowledge	of	at	least	one	of	the	3	national	languages,”	and	
have	attained	“social	integration	through	a	diploma,	a	training	session	or	a	professional	
experience	(5	years’	uninterrupted	work)	or	attendance	at	an	officially	recognized	integration	
programme…”	(Belgium	2013).	Further,	the	length	of	the	applicant’s	residency	can	have	an	
impact	on	their	chances	at	gaining	citizenship	with	those	living	under	10	years	in	the	country	
attaining	“economic	participation	through	work	(minimum	468	days)	or	through	payment	of	
social	security	contributions	(minimum	6	trimesters)”	while	those	living	in	the	country	for	over	
10	years	are	required	to	have	some	“participation	to	community	life”	(Belgium	2013).	In	
addition	to	these	specific	requirements,	candidates	are	expected	to	not	have	any	“serious	
personal	facts”	which	can	take	the	form	of	committing	crimes	or	being	a	member	of	groups	
seeking	to	overthrow	the	national	government.	Again,	while	I	use	Belgium	as	an	example	here,	
all	states	in	this	study	have	similar	requirements	for	those	seeking	naturalization.	
Despite	naturalization	being	painted	as	an	opportunity	for	anyone	to	gain	citizenship	in	
a	new	region,	other	processes	have	adopted	a	decidedly	class-based	tone.	Some	countries	have	
introduced	point-based	naturalization	processes	to	“fast	track”	certain	individuals	through	the	
citizenship	process	(Walsh	2011,	2012).	Applicants	earn	points	for	various	benefits	they	bring	to	
the	receiving	country.	Among	these	traits	are	having	an	advanced	degree,	a	business	plan	in	
place	that	will	hire	a	given	number	of	individuals	from	the	receiving	country,	or	even	having	
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provided	a	“great	service”	to	the	receiving	country	in	the	past.	While	this	is	a	brief	list	of	the	
potential	ways	an	applicant	could	gain	an	advantage	over	others,	what	these	characteristics	
indicate	is	that	the	naturalization	process	is	not	as	open	as	one	would	suspect.		
For	example,	Canada	provides	an	online	calculator	for	naturalization	applicants	to	find	
out	their	score,	and	thereby	their	likelihood,	to	be	granted	citizenship.	The	“Comprehensive	
Ranking	System	(CRS)	Tool:	Skilled	Immigrants	(Express	Entry)”	(Canada	2017)	is	designed	to	
help	expedite	the	naturalization	process	for	immigrants	from	valuable	groups.	The	questions	
used	in	the	tool	include	some	basic	demographic	questions,	such	as	the	applicant’s	marital	
status	and	whether	their	spouse	or	significant	other	will	be	moving	to	Canada	with	them,	and	
the	applicant’s	age—with	younger	applicants	scoring	higher.	However,	educational	level	and	
command	of	French	and	English	are	considered,	as	well.	Those	with	more	advanced	
professional	degrees	and	higher	language	assessment	scores	are	more	likely	to	be	“fast	
tracked”	than	those	with	a	lower	ranking	degree	and	average	language	scores	(Canada	2017).	
From	a	bureaucratic	viewpoint,	the	point	system	may	make	identifying	ideal	applicants	simpler	
for	the	government	agencies	involved,	thereby	allowing	for	shorter	wait	times	for	valued	
immigrants.	However,	it	also	creates	a	system	where	only	a	select	few	will	prosper	(Walsh	
2011).	
A	class	based	naturalization	process	can	be	observed	when	considering	the	financial	
contributions	of	the	applicant.	In	some	cases—e.g.	Antigua	&	Barbuda	or	Malta—citizenship	
may	be	for	sale.	In	these	situations,	citizenship	is	offered	to	potential	buyers	in	similar	fashion	
to	other	products	one	can	buy.	Once	purchased,	holders	of	these	citizenships	can	utilize	the	benefits	of	each	nation-
state’s	citizenship	system	(Abrahamian	2015;	Hidalgo	2015;	Joppke	1998;	Ong	1999).	In	many	of	these	
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cases,	the	citizenship	statuses	offered	by	the	receiving	countries	provide	tax	loopholes	and	
lower	local	tax	rates,	thus	letting	the	“financial	immigrant”	place	their	money	in	a	different	
location	than	their	primary	residence.	As	an	added	incentive	for	purchasing	citizenship,	
applicants	oftentimes	experience	an	increased	ease	of	travel	due	to	holding	multiple	passports	
and	avoiding	lengthy	waits	for	business	related	visas.	Within	this	system,	it	is	not	hard	to	
envision	higher	socioeconomic	groups	gaining	significant	advantages	compared	to	lower	
ranking	groups.	Citizenships	could	become	social	capital,	where	those	who	hold	more	are	more	
successful	(Hidalgo	2015;	Ong	1999;	Shachar	&	Bauböck	2014;	Webb	2014).	
Abrahamian	(2015)	outlined	an	interesting	case	in	which	the	UAE	government	sought	to	
remove	various	non-national	groups—labeled	bidoon—from	the	country	by	purchasing	
Comorian	citizenship	for	them.	While	related	to	the	CIPs,	examined	in	more	detail	in	Chapter	5,	
this	“pay	to	play”	method	of	citizenship	provided	an	outlet	for	Dubai.	While	purchasing	
Comorian	citizenship	for	thousands	of	non-nationals	was	expensive	up-front,	the	plan	was	
viewed	as	an	acceptable	alternative	to	integrating	the	bidoon	into	the	dominant	Emirati	culture.	
Not	only,	would	Dubai	export	“foreign”	cultural	groups,	Comoros	could	financially	benefit	from	
the	deal.	Ultimately,	rough	estimates	suggest	that	somewhere	between	60,000	and	100,000	
Comorian	passports	were	printed	and	sold,	(supposedly)	netting	the	government	approximately	
360	million	dollars	(Abrahamian	2015).	However,	the	Comorian	government	states	that	it	did	
not	receive	close	to	that	amount	of	money,	and	International	Monetary	Fund	inquiries	have	
supported	their	claims	(Abrahamian	2015).	
The	previous	two	examples	of	purchasing	citizenship	add	to	the	suggestion	that	
citizenship	and	class	go	together.	Most	notably,	in	the	example	of	“financial	immigrants”	and	
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CIPs,	those	who	can	afford	additional	statuses	can	free	themselves	from	the	limitations	of	their	
birth	status.	As	will	be	noted	further	in	Chapter	5,	members	of	higher	socioeconomic	classes	
can	limit	the	impacts	of	a	weak	set	of	rights;	they	can	increase	the	ease	of	moving—both	
physical	and	of	business	interests—by	buying	the	opportunities	that	competitors	may	not	have.	
Further,	when	addressing	the	bidoon	“problem”	in	Dubai,	political	elites	negotiated	the	move	of	
tens-of-thousands	of	stateless	individuals,	many	of	whom	were	born	within	their	borders.	
Those	in	positions	of	power	could	dictate	the	life	outcomes	of	legally	unprotected	individuals	by	
moving	them	somewhere	else,	and	in	this	case,	somewhere	that	many	bidoon	had	never	seen.	
From	a	class	perspective,	not	only	does	one	see	the	values	of	legal	protection	in	citizenship	
here,	but	there	is	an	added	benefit	to	being	in	a	higher-ranking	status	as	one	can,	potentially,	
dictate	with	whom	one	shares	space.	From	a	Marxist	perspective,	if	the	stateless	person	is	
doing	a	job	that	cannot	directly	benefit	the	elites—whether	in	business,	physical	labor,	or	
service—,	they	are	not	contributing	to	the	economic	system,	and	can	be	targeted	for	
deportation.	In	this	case,	socioeconomic	status	gave	one	control	over	their	living	space	and	
future.	
The	third	example	of	the	liberalizing	citizenship	process	can	be	seen	when	considering	a	
country’s	diaspora.	In	this	case,	one	sees	the	ongoing	relationship	that	immigrants	maintain	
with	their	initial	countries;	it	is	essential	to	remember	that	immigrants	remain	in	contact	with	
their	families	“at	home”	and,	many	times,	have	a	significant	interest	in	the	region’s	events	
(Brand	2006;	Davidson	2000).	Along	with	such	concern,	many	immigrants	send	remittances	to	
families	in	the	sending	country.	Such	connections—both	monetary	and	familial—are	simplified	
by	offering	unique	citizenships	to	those	in	the	diaspora.	Doing	so	not	only	eases	travel,	but	can	
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also	foster	greater	concern	with	local	events.	In	India’s	case,	holding	a	certain	level	of	diasporic	
citizenship	allows	the	individual	to	hold	property	while	simultaneously	offering	increased	rights	
to	their	foreign	spouse	and	any	foreign-born	offspring	(Aneesh	2015).	
In	an	effort	to	appeal	to	members	of	the	diaspora,	the	Irish	Naturalisation	and	
Immigration	Service	has	provided	a	statement	to	encourage	a	new	state-of-being,	“Irish	citizens	
may	also	be	citizens	of	another	country”	(Ireland	2017).	Referred	to	as	dual	or	multiple	
citizenships,	these	situations	shed	light	on	the	bureaucratic	issues	that	can	arise	with	classifying	
individuals.	For	example,	Spiro	(2008)	notes	an	increasingly	common	situation	where	children	
could	be	born	into	multiple	citizenships	depending	on	their	parentage	and	their	birth	locale.	His	
example	notes	that	a	child	of	an	Italian	immigrant	in	the	United	States	could	be	born	with	
citizenship	in	both	countries,	due	to	their	prevailing	ascriptive	laws:	Italy’s	system	is	based	on	
blood,	while	the	United	States	employs	a	system	that	gives	citizens	to	children	born	within	its	
borders.	As	such,	this	child	poses	a	bureaucratic	conundrum	for	the	Italian	and	American	
governments.	Ireland’s	statement	on	dual	citizenship	also	accounts	for	this	situation,	as	Irish	
nationality	is	transmitted	via	jus	sanguinis	and	not	guaranteed	to	everyone	born	within	the	
national	borders	(Ireland	2004).	As	discussed	further	in	Chapter	5,	Italy	and	Ireland	are	part	of	a	
growing	number	of	countries	offering	a	set	of	options	to	citizens	living	abroad.	
What	one	sees	across	all	three	of	these	liberalized	approaches	to	inclusion	is	a	
weakening	of	the	state’s	hard	boundaries	of	exclusion,	inherent	in	ascriptive	approaches	to	
citizenship	(Bosniak	2006).	Within	these	weakening	ideological	borders	citizenship	regimes	are	
becoming	more	open	to	the	non-citizen,	allowing	different	groups	from	distant	regions	to	
access	the	mechanisms	to	become	a	citizen.	However,	this	discussion	is	very	different	than	one	
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of	a	“weak	state	versus	strong	state”	discussion.	I	do	not	mean	to	imply	that	the	state	
apparatuses	of	each	nation	are	withering,	but	instead	the	hard	exclusivity	of	citizenship—a	
status	initially	defined	by	the	state	with	the	intent	to	keep	“others”	out—has	begun	to	weaken.	
As	such,	the	state	still	plays	an	essential	role	in	the	creation	of	law	and	that	the	guarantee	of	
rights	is	provided	to	citizen-like	members.	Within	this	scope,	the	state	is	still	a	significant	and	
strong	actor.	However,	it	is	still	worth	asking,	as	others	have	done	(for	example	Habermas	
1998,	Sassen	2006,	and	Somers	2010,	among	others):	what	is	the	state’s	role	in	this	changing	
world?	In	the	following	paragraphs,	I	will	briefly	introduce	two	conflicting	stances	on	the	
condition	of	the	state’s	participation	in	citizenship	rights,	and	outline	a	mediating	approach	
seeking	to	reconcile	them.	
The	first	proposition	is	that	the	state	is	becoming	outdated	because	of	the	globalization	
process.	Simultaneously,	it	is	losing	power	to	enforce	its	sovereignty,	and	is,	thus,	in	decline	as	
an	institution	(Habermas	1998;	Isin	2000;	Moeller	2008).	More	specifically,	national	policy	
decisions	are	considered	within	its	regional	ecology.	What	other	countries	are	doing	matters	as	
those	decisions	influence	how	political	decisions	are	made	in	nearby	countries	(Isin	2000;	
Sassen	1998;	Somers	2000).	Coinciding	with	the	increased	rates	of	transnational	economic	
transactions,	communication,	and	travel,	is	the	call	for	a	universal	concept	of	human	rights	
(Bosniak	2006;	Soysal	1994;	Turner	2000).	This	shifting	definition	of	rights	expands	on	
Marshall’s	basic	state-based	typology	by	seeking	to	suggest	that	all	humans	inherently	have	a	
“right	to	education”	and	“right	to	freedom,”	among	others.	The	United	Nations’	(UN)	Universal	
Declaration	of	Human	Rights	has	already	provided	a	basis	for	the	move	towards	a	universal	
rights	regime	(Benhabib	2005;	United	Nations	1948).	One	potential	benefit	of	a	push	for	
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universal	rights	is	that	“at	risk”	groups,	such	as	refugees	and	others	seeking	asylum	from	
violence,	will	be	protected	while	simultaneously	providing	protection	for	foreign	workers	
(Benhabib	2004;	Brand	2006;	Somers	2010).	Ideally,	a	universal	rights	system	would	negate	the	
needs	for	different	citizens’	rights	regimes;	providing	a	uniform	system	of	guidelines	that	all	
nations	would	follow.	
Despite	the	appeal	of	this	cosmopolitan	approach	to	citizenship	(Appiah	2006),	it	begs	
the	question,	“Who	is	responsible	for	providing	these	rights”	(Benhabib	2005;	Somers	2010).	
Here,	the	state’s	role	designating	who	gets	rights	is	mediated	by	intergovernmental	
organizations	(IGOs)	or	international	non-governmental	organizations	(INGOs).	As	previously	
mentioned,	the	UN	has	proposed	a	blueprint	for	how	nation-less	citizenship	should	look,	but	
the	organization	lacks	the	authority	to	enforce	any	real	policy.	Thus,	reaffirming	that	the	
nation-state	is	still	required	and	influential.	Humanity	is	living	in	an	era	where	transnational	
norms	are	taking	hold,	but	is	still	expecting	the	nation-state	to	enforce	these	norms.	
Within	this	line	of	thinking,	nation-states	are	becoming	stronger,	in	the	sense	that	they	
are	creating	citizenship	norms,	while	designating	who	can	gain	the	rights	accompanying	the	
status	(Blau	&	Meyer	1971;	Isin	2000;	Shachar	2009).	Further,	these	memberships	may	be	
increasingly	important	to	individuals,	as	they	are	a	method	to	form	personal	identity	and	show	
loyalty	(Isin	2000;	Ong	1999).	Group	identity	is	important	from	an	organizational	standpoint	as	
well	since	it	helps	the	state	identify	who	should	receive	rights-based	benefits.	Further,	a	visibly	
strong	group	identity	creates	a	convincing	case	to	policy	makers	that	they	should	be	a	
legitimate	recipient	of	rights	(Bosniak	2006).	Ultimately,	the	burden	of	recognizing	and	
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enforcing	compliance	to	citizenship	rights	and	the	provision	of	benefits	falls	on	the	shoulders	of	
the	nation-state,	further	reinforcing	the	claim	that	the	state	remains	central	to	the	discussion.	
As	an	extension	of	the	ongoing	strength	of	the	state,	Saskia	Sassen’s	work	can	provide	
insight	into	how	state	apparatuses	can	develop	to	influence,	and	drive	transnational	
organization	behavior.	Sassen	(1998,	1999,	2006)	posits	that	world	scripts	and	transnational	
norms,	now	increasingly	common	across	national	boundaries,	have	their	origins	in	the	history	
of	various	regions.	As	such,	our	modern,	global	institutions	and	norms	originated	as	entities	
within	the	national	apparatus.	Initially,	the	nationalizing	process	begins	as	local	actors—e.g.	
rulers	or	ministries—enact	various	policies	or	rules	using	a	given	type	of	language.	Over	time,	
more	large-scale	ruling	bodies,	such	as	the	state,	transfer	the	local	policies	and	actors	to	the	
national	level.	What	were	once	local	rulers	and	rules	become	national	cabinet	officials	and	
federal	laws.	Finally,	national	policies	are	brought	to	the	transnational	stage	when	they	are	
adopted	by	IGOs	and	INGOs	(Sassen	2006).		
In	short,	the	scope	of	a	modern	policy’s	influence	can	become	transnational,	but	the	
origins	of	the	idea	can	be	traced	to	earlier	local	forms	of	social	interaction.	This	process	of	
policy	dispersion	directly	benefits	from	increased	rates	of	globalization.	While	nations	are	
becoming	increasingly	dependent	on	international	trade	and	their	citizens	and	capital	are	
traversing	international	borders,	the	citizenship	and	rights	processes	researchers	observe	are	
being	incorporated	onto	the	transnational	stage.	Similarly,	trade	agreements	between	nations	
are	built	on	the	assumption	that	the	involved	countries	share	similar	economic	systems.	
Barriers	to	the	import	or	export	of	goods	are	reduced	to	increase	the	flow	of	products	between	
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the	nations.	Further,	the	flow	of	capital	to	fund	these	expenditures	increases	to	maintain	a	
positive	business	environment	(Sassen	2006).	
Now	that	the	historical	and	theoretical	bases	of	citizenship	have	been	laid	out,	what	
does	this	ideological	shift	look	like	in	the	“real	world?”	While	my	examination	is	based	on	
authoritarian	and	non-authoritarian	political	regimes,	it	is	worth	remembering	that	neither	
category	is	uniformly	pro-ascriptive	methods	or	pro-liberal	methods.	Instead,	each	nation-state	
holds	sway	over	its	own	policies.	Chapter	3	will	begin	to	address	this	disparity	in	liberal	
citizenship	norm	adoption	by	discussing	how	the	countries	used	in	this	study	were	classified	
along	political	lines.	In	addition,	the	methodological	process	of	data	gathering	and	analysis	will	
be	outlined.	Lastly,	the	indicators	of	liberal	norms—naturalization,	dual	citizenship,	and	CIPs—
are	defined	as	their	links	to	the	existing	state	apparatus	are	identified.	
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Chapter	3	
Implied	Incommensurability	
	
While	the	previous	chapter	outlined	the	historical	bases	for	citizenship	and	described	
the	norm	regimes	used	by	the	world’s	nation-states	and	the	areas	scholars,	this	chapter	
provides	some	context	into	why	the	nation-state	has	remained	the	focus	of	citizenship	
research,	despite	the	push	towards	liberal	citizenship	norms.	Further,	I	provide	a	contextual	
elaboration	of	the	central	research	problem:	do	authoritarian	and	non-authoritarian	nations	
employ	inherently	different	citizenship	norms.	I	start	with	a	brief	examination	of	three	
influential,	modern	studies	of	citizenship	that	illustrate	the	loosening	of	the	ties	between	the	
nation-state	and	the	citizens	who	inhabit	it.	From	this	discussion,	the	focus	of	these	studies,	
liberal	citizenship	as	practiced	in	the	west,	becomes	clear	and	provides	intellectual	space	for	
this	work’s	case	study	of	the	GCC.	As	part	of	this	elucidation,	Huntington’s	(1993)	argument	
that	disparate	cultures	are	destined	to	remain	in	contention	is	addressed	in	light	of	inclusive,	
liberal,	humans-rights	based	citizenship	plans.	Lastly,	the	methodology	used	in	this	study	to	
address	the	research	problem.	The	process	of	collecting	and	coding	the	numerous	national	legal	
documents	allowed	me	to	explore	how	closely	citizenship	is	linked	with	political	regime—
authoritarian	and	non-authoritarian.	While	one	would	expect	to	find	that	non-authoritarian	
regimes	employ	liberal	norms	and	authoritarian	regimes	rely	on	ascriptive	processes,	as	one	
recent	publication	(Mirilovic	2015)	suggests,	I	find	that	there	is	significant	variation	within	each	
category.	
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The	Liberal	Horizon	
Soysal’s	(1994),	Shachar’s	(2009),	and	Bosniak’s	(2006,	2009)	works	have	been	
influential	in	their	analysis	of	human-rights	based	citizenship	norms.	Whether	those	norms	be	
centered	around	the	inherent	humanness	of	us	all	in	accordance	with	the	world	society	scripts	
of	human	rights	(Soysal	1994),	the	inequality	connected	to	the	location	of	birth	(Shachar	2009),	
or	in	the	nation-state’s	continued	role	of	choosing	who	is	eligible	for	rights	(Bosniak	2009),	each	
work	has	built	upon	the	contributions	of	the	prior.	However,	the	strict	focus	on	the	West	as	the	
exemplar	of	citizenship	rights	and	affordances	limits	our	assessments.	In	what	follows,	I	will	
provide	brief	summaries	of	each	work,	their	relationships	with	one	another,	but	also	how	they	
have	led	to	the	formation	of	this	research	project.	
Soysal	(1994),	provides	a	valuable	analysis	of	liberal	citizenship	norms	by	suggesting	that	
postnational	citizenship	in	Europe	increasingly	derives	its	legitimacy	from	world	level	models	of	
human	rights,	allowing	guestworker	populations	to	enjoy	many	rights	that	were	earlier	
available	only	to	European	citizens.	Within	her	formulation,	membership	in	the	dominant	
culture	is	not	a	necessary	component	of	group	membership,	but	one’s	status	as	a	human	actor	
warrants	access	to	basic	rights.	What	this	means	is	that	guestworkers	and	other	non-nationals	
would	gain	access	to	sets	of	rights	in	the	country	they	are	working	and	living	in,	simply	because	
they	are	human,	not	based	on	gaining	citizenship	in	that	locale.	Substantively,	the	postnational	
system	would	guarantee	guestworkers	and	other	non-citizen	groups	“…the	right	and	duty	of	
participation	in	the	authority	structures	and	public	life	of	a	polity,	regardless	of	their	historical	
or	cultural	ties	to	that	community”	(Soysal	1994:3).	As	such,	citizens’	rights	become	a	
transnational	issue	as	individuals’	rights	would	not	only	come	with	them	when	they	cross	
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national	borders,	but	the	rights	regimes	in	place	would	be	similar	regardless	of	the	border	one	
crosses.	In	essence	guestworkers	and	other	non-nationals	would	be	provided	a	political	voice	in	
the	country	where	they	already	making	significant	economic	contributions.	
	 In	contrast	to	Soysal,	Shachar	(2009)	argues	that	citizenship	is	still	tied	to	place	and	
person,	despite	the	spread	of	liberal	citizenship	norms.	Currently,	one	gains	citizenship	via	the	
blood-and-soil	mechanisms	discussed	previously,	leading	to	situations	of	inequality	based	on	
one’s	place	of	birth.	All	citizenships	are	not	equal.	An	individual	born	in	a	rich	country	inherits,	
like	property,	rather	than	earn,	political	and	economic	benefits.	For	example,	French	citizenship	
automatically	guarantees	the	holder	unimpeded	travel	to	other	European	Union	member-
states,	an	opportunity	that	is	not	extended	to	those	born	in	China.	Further,	citizenship	can	also	
provide	entitlements,	solely	based	on	holding	the	status;	such	situations	are	outlined	within	the	
context	of	the	GCC	in	Chapter	6.	To	remedy	these	inherent	inequalities,	Shachar	suggests	two	
potential	solutions.	First,	that	those	holding	citizenship	in	a	richer	country	pay	a	sort	of	
inheritance	tax	on	their	citizenship	status;	the	balance,	of	which,	is	then	transferred	to	poorer	
nations.	Her	second	solution	is	that	nations	lessen	the	restrictions	tied	to	immigration.	
Lowering	these	barriers	will	allow	those	from	poor	countries	to	gain	access	to	richer	nations,	
thereby	also	gaining	access	to	the	larger	sets	of	rights	(Aneesh	&	Wolover	2017;	Shachar	2009).		
A	second	site	of	contention	with	Soysal’s	postnational	plan	comes	from	the	ongoing	role	
of	the	state	in	rights	coverage.	Bosniak	(2006,	2009)	contends	that	citizenship	not	only	
identifies	who	can	or	cannot	receive	rights,	but	also	how	one’s	status	can	be	linked	to	their	
place	in	society.	Within	these	situations,	the	state	values	those	considered	citizens	more	than	
non-citizens,	and	provides	rights	to	the	“deserving”	group.	As	such,	the	nation-state	acts	as	the	
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guarantor	of	rights,	and	as	Bourdieu	(2014)	notes,	a	“citizen	is	a	person	who	is	recognized	as	
such	by	the	constitution,	and	there	is	nothing	more	to	say	about	him”	(p.351).	Further,	the	
state’s	role	is	to	ensure	that	every	national	citizen	has	access	to	the	same	rights	as	any	other	
national	citizen.	In	this	way,	rights	are	equally	distributed	among	the	“deserving,”	while	the	
“undeserving”	do	not	have	access	to	the	same	entitlements.		
	 Within	this	context	of	the	“haves”	and	“have	nots,”	the	state	provides	a	second	
function,	that	of	a	firm	barrier	demarking	where	the	guarantee	of	rights	end	(Bosniak	2006).	
The	borders	of	each	state	are	not	only	signs	of	political	sovereignty,	but	also	act	as	the	edges	of	
the	citizens’	basket	of	rights.	Once	a	citizen	traverses	the	border,	they	cannot	be	guaranteed	
the	same	protections	since	they	are,	now,	within	another	state’s	domain.	However,	reverse	
course	back	to	their	nation	of	origin,	and	the	citizen	can	enjoy	the	same	rights	as	their	
compatriots.	
Despite	philosophical	differences	between	Soysal’s	(1994)	postnational	citizenship,	
Shachar’s	(2009)	conception	of	citizenship	as	the	prize	from	a	“birthright	lottery”	everyone	
plays	at	birth,	and	Bosniak’s	(2006:4)	“hard	on	the	outside	and	soft	on	the	inside”	
understanding	of	citizenship	as	something	guaranteed	and	limited	by	the	state,	there	are	two	
significant	similarities	among	their	works.	The	first	is	geographic.	All	three	of	these	researchers	
focused	their	empirical	lenses	on	how	citizenship	functioned	and	changed	within	Western	
cultures.	Both	Soysal	and	Shachar	examined	the	experiences	of	the	broad	swath	of	the	West	in	
considering	both	US	citizenship	and,	by	extension,	its	European	roots.	Soysal	turned	her	focus	
to	the	experiences	of	migrants	and	guestworkers	on	the	European	continent.	Further,	her	
conclusions	are	based	within	the	seeming	“naturalness”	of	migration	in	the	region.	History	is	
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filled	with	examples	of	groups	crossing	boundaries	for	not	only	the	economic	benefits	that	
garner	much	of	current	literature’s	focus,	but	also	as	part	of	religious	pilgrimage	and	the	
spreading	of	those	beliefs	(Soysal	1994).		What	this	created	was	a	situation	where	the	
peculiarities	of	citizenship	were	also	examined	within	the	context	of	a	specific	governmental	
body:	non-authoritarianism’s	liberal	norms.	How	I	define	a	liberal	regime	in	this	study—versus	a	
non-liberal	or	authoritarian	one—is	outlined	in	further	detail	in	what	follows,	but,	in	general,	
these	regimes	are	characterized	by	their	adherence	to	the	democratic	political	goal	of	
participation,	and	citizens	have	a	degree	of	freedom	of	speech,	etc.	In	short,	Marshall’s	(2006;	
Marshall	&	Bottomore	1992)	triumvirate	of	rights	can	be	observed	in	liberal	regimes.	
Governmental	type	is	also	tied	to	a	second	similarity	between	these	influential	studies:	
their	empirical	focus.	All	three	of	these	works	find	the	nation-state	as	important	actors.	For	
Soysal,	the	inequalities	in	opportunities	she	observed	between	European	citizens	and	migrant	
populations	were	enforced	by	state-level	policies.	Shachar	contends	that	the	differences	in	
rights	groups	possess	are	based	on	our	national	memberships;	the	nation-state	one	is	born	into	
is	the	one	that	dictates	our	chances.	Finally,	Bosniak,	too,	identifies	the	nation-state,	not	only,	
as	the	body	granting	rights	to	its	citizens,	but	also	in	determining	who	can	be	a	citizen.		
This	empirical	emphasis	on	the	liberal	European	experience	brings	us	back	to	the	
primary	research	question	of	this	work:	are	there	differences	between	the	citizenship	norms	
employed	by	liberal	and	authoritarian	regimes?	Is	there	something	about	liberal	regimes	that	
cause	them	to	employ	the	more	inclusive,	non-ascriptive	forms	of	citizenship?	Further,	is	there	
something	about	the	authoritarian	systems	that	are	“predisposed”	to	adopting	a	more	
restrictive	view	of	membership?	
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While	Chapters	4	and	5	provide	a	geography	of	the	current	citizenship	landscape,	
Chapter	6,	a	case	study	of	the	GCC,	provides	a	closer	look	at	the	final	research	question	above.	
The	case	of	the	GCC	is	an	exemplar	of	the	complexities	associated	with	citizenship	regimes.	
Politically,	the	GCC	countries	are	classified	as	authoritarian,	yet	they	are	heavily	integrated	into	
the	world	economy.	Their	national	economies	are	dependent	on	their	trade	relationships	with	
numerous	other	countries,	including	many	non-authoritarian	states.	What	this	implies	is	that	
the	leaders	of	GCC	countries	have	been	exposed	to	the	norms	that	their	non-authoritarian	
trade	partners	employ,	but	have	actively	decided	to	adhere	to	ascriptive	forms	of	citizenship.	
The	bases	for	these	decisions	will	be	discussed	at	greater	length	later,	but	it	is	important	to	take	
note	of	variation.	
Generally,	while	the	liberal	forms	of	citizenship	emphasize	a	universality	of	rights	that	
transcends	locale	and	nationality,	the	ascriptive	forms	of	citizenship	highlight	difference	and	
exclusivity.	Such	“out-group”	fear	or	skepticism	has	formed	the	foundation	of	a	“clash	of	
cultures”	argument	that	suggests	an	inherent	incompatibility	between	groups.	Instead	of	
countries	practicing	liberal	citizenship	norms	becoming	pluralistic	nations	where	difference	is	
embraced,	these	countries	are	somehow	doomed	to	endure	conflict	as	the	result	of	numerous	
cultures	seeking	to	become	dominant.	Huntington	(1993)	suggested	that	these	observable	
differences	between	cultures	would	be	the	fuel	of	future	international	conflict,	and,	ultimately,	
inhibit	any	out-group	unity.	Our	differences	in	history,	language,	identity,	religion,	and	cultural	
items	would	cause	groups	to	cling	tightly	to	the	main	pieces	of	their	identity,	while	
simultaneously	pushing	away	individuals	who	did	not	hold	those	views;	thereby	making	
postnational	citizenship	and	inclusive	nations	impossible.	
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However,	Huntington’s	assertions	have	been	met	with	widespread	criticism.	First,	he	
treats	civilizations	as	a	primordial	source	of	identity.	While	it	is	true,	as	he	notes,	that	
civilizations	are	large-scale	collections	of	people	with	similar	cultural	practices	and	long-held	
beliefs.	Writing	his	piece	in	1993,	Huntington	did	not	have	the	benefit	of	seeing	the	direct	effect	
of	“everyday”	information	and	communication	technologies	(ICTs).	The	daily	life	of	a	citizen	has	
changed	drastically	in	the	almost	25	years	since	his	publication.	The	dependence	of	much	of	the	
world’s	population	on	the	internet’s	information	trove,	and	the	ICTs	used	to	connect	us	to	it,	
have	been	effective	at	increasing	our	exposure	to	foreign	cultural	practices	and	beliefs.	
However,	I	do	not	suggest	that	McLuhan’s	(2003)	hope	for	a	global	village	constructed	from	our	
use	of	communication	media	has	materialized,	thereby	eliminating	any-and-all	misconceptions,	
but	these	tools	are	much	more	accessible	than	ever	before.	Further,	such	availability	does	not	
equal	accessibility	since	one	still	needs	to	be	able	to	afford	the	technological	tools	and	speak	
the	dominant	online	language.	Also,	I	do	not	discount	the	impact	of	cultural	identity,	and	the	
perception	of	difference	between	groups.	One	only	need	look	to	numerous	genocide	and	ethnic	
cleansing	events	in	recent	history	to	gauge	identity’s	importance.	However,	contrary	to	
Huntington’s	argument,	seemingly	primordial	clashes	many	times	occur	within	civilizations	
rather	than	between	them	(Appadurai	2006).	For	example,	the	long-running	war	between	Iran	
and	Iraq	was	between	the	conflicting	viewpoints	between	Sunni	and	Shia	tenets	of	Islam,	not	a	
battle	of	Western	and	Eastern	civilizations.	
	 Similar	intra-ideological	rifts	also	exist	when	considering	liberal	regimes’	differing	uses	
of	citizenship	norms.	While	these	countries	espouse	the	values	of	democratic	systems—open	
elections,	free	speech,	etc.—there	is	a	distinct	turn	away	from	the	inclusive	nature	of	pure	
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democracies;	some	groups	may	be	kept	out	of	the	political	system,	barred	from	receiving	
specific	sets	of	rights,	or	not	allowed	access	to	the	processes	of	naturalization	(Zakaria	1997).	
One	previously	mentioned	example	can	be	found	in	the	case	of	Germany.	Naturalization,	and	
thereby	access	to	citizenship,	is	open	to	a	small	number	of	ethnically	bound	applicants,	but	the	
government	functions	as	a	liberal	democracy	and	holds	open	elections.		
Japan’s	extant	citizenship	policies	also	follow	this	semi-liberal	trend.	Citizenship	by	birth	
is	gained	solely	through	the	jus	sanguinis	method,	where	the	parents’	status	is	passed	onto	any	
children,	regardless	of	the	location	of	birth	(Japan	2017).	The	legal	importance	of	familial	
lineage	is	further	highlighted	when	discussing	foreign-born	children	who	have	been	adopted	by	
Japanese	parents.	Adoption	does	not	grant	the	child	immediate	citizenship,	but	they	must	apply	
for	naturalization	upon	turning	twenty	years	old.	The	basic	requirements	for	the	adoptee	are	
the	same	as	for	any	other	applicant,	in	that	they	are	of	“upright	conduct,”	have	a	reliable	means	
of	income,	and	have	not	“plotted	or	advocated…the	overthrow	of	the	Constitution	of	Japan	or	
the	Government”	(Japan	2017).	However,	an	adoptee	is	only	required	to	have	“domiciled”	in	
Japan	for	three	consecutive	years	prior	to	their	application,	compared	to	a	minimum	of	five	
years	for	other	applicants.	This	adoptee	requirement	is	also	transferred	to	non-national	
spouses	of	Japanese	citizens,	thereby	making	their	paths	to	citizenship	a	bit	shorter	than	
general	applicants.	
Despite	Japanese	citizenship	being	open	to	most	individuals,	currently	there	is	a	distinct	
turn	away	from	the	liberal	norm	of	dual	citizenship.	As	one	of	the	final	requirements	towards	
naturalization,	an	applicant	must	renounce	any	other	citizenships	they	possess.	Similarly,	
Japanese	nationals	who	obtain	citizenship	in	another	country	immediately	lose	their	status	as	
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part	of	the	naturalization	process.	As	such,	dual	citizenship	cannot	be	a	(legal)	reality	for	
Japanese	citizens,	at	this	point.	Nationality	and	citizenship	remain	directly	tied	to	the	sole	
nation-state,	in	this	case,	thereby	eschewing	the	liberal	norms	of	citizenship	discussed	in	
Chapter	2	and	outlined	in	more	detail	in	Chapters	4	and	5.	Substantively,	this	means	that	
despite	Japan’s	status	as	a	liberal	political	regime	(The	Economist	2016),	it	has	maintained	
relatively	restrictive	citizenship	policies	surrounding	who	can	join	the	nation,	and	what	they	
must	do	to	become	a	member	of	the	state.		
	 The	second	main	problem	with	Huntington’s	conclusion	relates	to	his	treatment	of	
religion	as	the	factor	determining	whether	or	not	civilizations	clash.	Instead,	and	as	will	be	
discussed	in	further	detail	in	future	chapters,	race	and	economic	concerns	are	equally	
important	for	citizenship	policymakers.	Further,	Huntington’s	“East	versus	West”	conception	of	
the	clash	of	civilization	paints	a	picture	where	countries	are	cursed	to	engage	in	conflict,	not	
flourish	via	economic	trade	or	the	exchange	of	ideas.	Similarly,	in	a	criticism	of	Huntington’s	
claims,	Edward	Said	(2001)	highlighted	Huntington’s	misconception	of	civilizations	as:	
…shut-down,	sealed-off	entities	that	have	been	purged	of	the	myriad	currents	and	
countercurrents	that	animate	human	history,	and	that	over	centuries	have	made	it	possible	for	
that	history	not	only	to	contain	wars	of	religion	and	imperial	conquest	but	also	to	be	one	of	
exchange,	cross-fertilization	and	sharing.	(p.12)	
	
Instead,	one	needs	to	consider	culture,	and	humanity,	as	a	porous	entity	affected	by	a	variety	of	
factors,	not	only	the	economic,	but	also	one	influenced	by	increased	communication,	increasing	
ease	of	international	travel,	and	the	ability	for	workers	to	find	jobs	outside	of	their	country	of	
origin.	As	such,	while	Huntington’s	clash	of	civilizations	argument	is	in	many	ways	flawed	(see	
Said	2001	for	an	excellent	discussion),	it	still	employs	the	intuitive	measure	that	many	
individuals	use	to	evaluate	their	interactions	with	others.	As	noted	previously,	the	parsing	of	
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individuals	into	“us”	or	“them”	can	be	used	as	a	determination	as	to	who	is	guaranteed	access;	
who	can	become	a	citizen,	and	who	cannot	(Hampshire	2013).		
However,	prior	to	further	analysis,	it	would	be	expedient	to	discuss	the	methods	used	in	
this	study.	The	next	section	will	lay	out	how	this	study’s	dataset	was	created,	how	the	various	
legal	documents	pertaining	to	national	citizenship	laws	were	analyzed,	and	address	how	the	
categories	of	“authoritarian”	and	“non-authoritarian”	political	regimes	were	constructed.	
	
Classification	and	Coding	
	
To	adequately	address	this	study’s	first	concern	of	what	kind	of	political	regime	employs	
which	citizenship	policies,	a	comprehensive	list	of	countries	was	compiled.	This	task	was	
expedited	by	utilizing	the	International	Organization	for	Standardization’s	(ISO)	list	of	country	
codes.	For	this	study’s	purposes,	ISO	3166—the	International	Standard	for	country	codes	and	
codes	for	their	subdivisions	(ISO	2014)—was	referenced,	as	it	is	a	current	list	of	countries	and	is	
frequently	utilized	by	numerous	organizations	focusing	on	transnational	issues.	Ultimately,	
these	codes	provided	a	sense	of	uniformity	in	an	international	context	as	the	names	of	
countries	frequently	change	depending	on	the	language	used	(ISO	2014).		
	 After	compiling	the	list,	the	necessary	documentation	to	address	the	research	questions	
was	collected.	These	documents	were	compiled	from	a	variety	of	sources,	including	
government	websites	of	relevant	departments,	ministries,	embassies,	and	consulates.	In	cases	
of	ambiguity,	the	embassies	and	consulates	for	the	country	in	question	was	contacted	for	
clarification.	In	addition	to	the	appropriate	legal	documentation,	other	demographic	data	was	
gathered.	General	population	figures	and	information	regarding	the	official	language,	religion,	
and	dominant	ethnic	group	was	collected	via	the	2013-2014	CIA	World	Factbook	(Central	
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Intelligence	Agency	2013).	Such	documentation	also	provided	the	necessary	information	to	
determine	the	naturalization	policies	in	place	for	each	country.	
The	Democracy	Index	2015	(The	Economist	2016)—published	by	The	Economist	
magazine’s	Intelligence	Unit—was	used	to	ascertain	the	liberal	or	non-liberal	character	of	a	
political	regime.	The	Democracy	Index	is	an	attempt	to	unify	the	discussions	surrounding	how	a	
democracy	is	defined.	As	the	publication	notes,	“Although	the	terms	of	freedom	and	
democracy	are	often	used	interchangeably,	the	two	are	not	synonymous”	(The	Economist	
2016:42).	This	brief	quote	notes	a	primary	issue	with	studying	political	regimes,	particularly	
democracy,	one	can	identify	what	they	consider	to	be	a	democratic	system,	but	how	do	
researchers	apply	these	generalizations	on	an	international	stage?	What	characteristics	do	all	
democracies	possess?	Finally,	to	address	the	relationship	between	freedom	and	democracy,	the	
Democracy	Index	considers	“electoral	process	and	pluralism;	civil	liberties;	the	functioning	of	
government;	political	participation;	and	political	culture”	(The	Economist	2016:44).	While	there	
may	be	skepticism	over	utilizing	a	mass	publication’s	measurement	system,	Alexander	&	
Welzel’s	(2011)	analysis	of	commonly	available	democracy	measures	suggests	that	The	
Economist’s	measure	displays	“very	strong	correlations	with	empowering	social	contexts”	
(p.283-284).	This	conclusion	holds	true	across	all	contexts	used	in	their	study,	with	the	
Democracy	Index	scoring	in	the	top	three	of	assessed	indices	which	included	economic	
freedoms,	wealth	distributions,	and	levels	of	civic	engagement.	
The	Democracy	Index	uses	ratings	for	60	indicators	spanning	five	categories,	with	a	final	
scaled	score	between	zero	and	ten	being	tallied.	From	this	scale,	four	types	of	regimes	are	
identified	with	full	democracies	scoring	between	8	and	10	on	the	scale,	flawed	democracies	
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receiving	scores	between	6-7.9,	hybrid	regimes	scoring	4-5.9,	and	authoritarian	regimes	scoring	
below	4	(The	Economist	2016).	Full	democracies	hold	characteristics	including	a	political	
culture—supported	by	a	“flourishing”	(The	Economist	2016:45)	democracy—where	civil	
liberties	are	respected,	government	functions	satisfactorily,	media	maintain	a	diverse	and	
independent	existence,	systems	of	checks	and	balances	are	effective,	and	the	judiciary	is	
independent	and	their	decisions	are	enforced	(The	Economist	2016).	At	the	other	end	of	the	
spectrum,	authoritarian	regimes	exhibit	characteristics	against	political	pluralism—with	many	
countries	practicing	outright	dictatorships—characteristics	of	democracy	may	exist	but	may	be	
figureheads,	elections	are	not	free,	civil	rights	are	impinged	upon,	and	the	media	is	typically	
state-owned	or	controlled	by	those	who	are	associated	with	the	ruling	regime	(The	Economist	
2016).	To	create	a	binary	for	this	study,	I	compared	the	citizenship	and	naturalization	processes	
of	authoritarian	regimes	to	those	of	generally	non-authoritarian	regimes,	which	is	a	
combination	of	the	remaining	three	categories.	This	step	sought	to	group	all	of	countries	with	
some	modicum	of	democratic	characteristics	present,	while	delineating	from	those	countries	
where	no	democratic	characteristics	flourish.	
Two	final	sources	were	used	to	understand	the	potential	reasons	why	a	country	may	
wish	to	consider	allowing	formal	dual	citizenship	status	or	not.	First,	to	provide	a	perspective	on	
the	diaspora	that	could	be	affected	by	citizenship	law	changes,	information	regarding	the	
approximate	diaspora	population	for	the	countries	in	the	study	was	gathered	via	the	
Organisation	for	Economic	Cooperation	and	Development’s	(OECD)	(OECD	2012).	The	OECD’s	
research	provided	information	outlining	the	size	of	each	member	country’s	diaspora.	In	other	
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words,	it	created	a	picture	as	to	how	many	former	nationals	of	a	country	were	now	living	
abroad.		
Information	in	respect	to	the	countries’	foreign	direct	investment	(FDI)	was	obtained	via	
The	Heritage	Foundation’s	2014	Index	of	Economic	Freedom	(Heritage	Foundation	2014).	This	
data	is	important	to	this	study,	as	it	can	be	an	indicator	of	a	country’s	stature	in	the	global	
economy.	As	such,	a	country	with	a	higher	FDI	may	institute	more	liberal	naturalization	policies	
in	the	interest	of	expanding	its	citizenship	base	to	increase	direct	investment.	Further,	a	
national	economy	that	is	more	active	in	the	international	arena	could	lead	to	increased	
remittances	from	the	diaspora.	In	contrast,	regimes	interested	in	insulating	a	region	from	global	
trade	could	move	to	restrict	its	citizenship	requirements.		
Both	the	size	of	a	country’s	diaspora	and	its	FDI	can	help	lend	insight	into	how	willing	a	
country	is	to	adopting	liberal	citizenship	policies.	First,	if	a	nation	is	seeing	large	amounts	of	
money	coming	into	the	country,	whether	via	personal	remittances	or	foreign	investment,	it	
would	be	in	their	best	economic	interest	to	ensure	that	the	policies	facilitate	the	inflow	of	
remittances	(Aneesh	2015;	Brand	2006).	The	faster	the	funds	reach	their	recipient,	the	quicker	
it	can	be	injected	into	the	local	economy	in	the	form	of	personal	purchases	or	business	
investments.	Second,	having	a	large	diasporic	population	could	encourage	policy	makers	to	
ease	travel	requirements	for	former	nationals	returning	to	their	birth-nation	to	visit	family,	and,	
in	some	cases,	allow	for	those	residing	abroad	to	maintain	their	participation	in	national	politics	
(Brubaker	2006).	For	example,	in	the	case	of	India,	the	status	of	an	Overseas	Citizenship	of	India	
(OCI)	was	developed	to	allow	former	nationals	to	gain	“…the	right	to	buy	and	sell	property	and	
the	ability	to	enter	and	leave	India	without	a	visa,	but	no	political	rights.”	(Aneesh	2015:14).	As	
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such,	the	status	voids	an	emigrant’s	political	rights,	but	provides	a	legal	advantage	to	access	
that	is	closed	off	from	other	travelers	to	the	country.	
Lastly,	information	regarding	citizenship	by	investment	was	collected.	Data	collection	for	
this	research	arena	followed	the	same	process	as	the	previously	discussed	areas.	However,	in	
the	case	of	investment	based	citizenship,	much	of	the	data	was	not	housed	in	official	sources,	
but	discussed	on	the	websites	of	firms	specializing	in	attaining	these	statuses	for	their	clients.	
As	such,	this	examination	sheds	light	into	the	business	of	citizenship,	along	with	the	changing	
definitions	and	expectations	for	the	status.	
Following	the	collection	of	each	country’s	citizenship	laws	and	basic	demographic	
information,	the	legal	documents	were	coded	using	QCA.	This	method	allows	for	easy	
categorization	of	information	while	maintaining	concise	coding	categories.	While	a	quantitative	
approach	to	my	research	question	would	be	useful	in	assessing	how	similar	countries	
employing	dual	citizenship	laws	are	to	one	another,	researchers	lose	the	general	context	of	
each	case.	Assuredly	there	is	some	similarities	between	countries’	laws,	however,	a	question	
remains	in	explaining	countries	that	do	not	align	with	the	regional	trends?	Here,	QCA	allows	for	
an	investigation	into	regional	variation	and	provides	space	to	question,	“why	is	there	
difference?”	while	providing	the	context	of	such	difference.	
Holsti	(1969)	has	outlined	an	effective	strategy	where	inference	can	be	made	“on	the	
appearance	or	nonappearance	of	attributes	in	messages”	(p.10).	Within	this	framework,	
researchers	can	assess	the	effectiveness	of	a	given	language	pattern	(Weare	and	Lin	2000).	This	
thought	process	was	utilized	in	two	distinct	areas	of	this	project.	First,	recurring	themes	in	how	
citizenship	statuses	are	labeled	can	be	identified.	Second,	the	types	of	rights	and	opportunities	
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for	differing	statuses	were	evaluated	and	compared	to	those	of	other	nations	to	determine	
whether	a	weaker	form	of	citizenship—such	as	dual	citizenship	and	naturalization—is	present.	
Qualitative	research	allows	us	to	identify	this	gap	between	policy	and	practice.	Further,	such	
insight	could	help	explain	the	situations	of	countries	without	documented	dual	citizenship	
policies,	but	having	informal	expectations	or	requirements.	
Following	the	identification	of	the	in	vivo	codes—or	“literal	terms”	of	investigation	(Berg	
2004:271)—present	in	the	legal	documentation	and	media	accounts,	the	documents	were	
processed	via	open	coding.	During	this	process,	researchers	ask	a	specific	set	of	questions	of	
every	document.	These	questions	are	meant	to	probe	deeper	into	the	source	material	and	will	
center	around	how	was	citizenship	gained—jus	sanguinis,	jus	soli,	or	some	combination—,	is	
there	any	mention	of	dual	citizenship,	and	are	individuals	who	gain	this	status	afforded	
different	rights	than	those	holding	sole	citizenship	in	a	region?	Further,	who	can	or	cannot	
apply	for	citizenship?	
A	second	intensive	wave	of	coding	was	then	begun.	During	this	undertaking,	it	was	
essential	for	me	to	frequently	note	potentially	important	theoretical	points	derived	from	the	
texts.	Each	document	was	evaluated	for	the	presence	or	absence	of	a	specific	theme	or	
characteristic.	By	providing	a	more	in-depth	look	at	these	topics,	one	can	begin	to	look	for	
patterns	present	in	the	legal	documents.	[For	a	complete	list	of	codes	employed	in	this	
research,	see	Appendix	B]	
To	aid	in	coding,	Dedoose	qualitative	analysis	software	was	utilized.	This	cloud-based	
tool	allows	for	a	single	database	to	be	created	where	coders	can	upload	general	data	about	the	
countries	in	the	study,	but	also	link	legal	documentation	and	other	appropriate	media	content	
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to	each	entry.	Once	the	documentation	is	linked	in	the	database,	coders	can	apply	specific	
research	codes	to	each	item.	Coding	within	the	system	allows	for	easy	analysis	of	each	
document,	as	each	code	was	shown	as	a	specific	color.	Further,	this	visualization	helps	ensure	
accuracy	as	others	could	verify	the	codes	and	disagreements	surrounding	how	a	passage	was	
coded	were	addressed.	Finally,	the	software	eases	the	process	of	data	analysis	by	allowing	for	
the	quick	coding	of	texts,	compilation	and	visualization	of	data.	
	
Variation	as	the	Norm	
During	the	process	of	coding	I	identified	three	main	arcs	of	adoption,	which	I	will,	
briefly,	describe	here	and	will	form	the	foundation	of	the	next	two	chapters’	discussions.	At	the	
foundational	level,	I	coded	each	country’s	legal	documents	to	assess	their	naturalization	
policies.	As	noted	in	the	previous	chapter,	naturalization	was	one	of	the	central	elements	
countries	implemented	to	overcome	the	limitations	imposed	by	the	exclusivity	of	ascriptive	
norms	of	citizenship.	Naturalization	offers	immigrant	groups	access	to	the	citizenship	process,	
and	in	turn	its	political	and	economic	systems.	Completing	the	process	allowed	for	a	complete	
personal	realignment:	leaving	one’s	birthplace	behind	while	adopting	a	new	homeland.	
Naturalization	assumes	that	an	individual	is	not	solely	bound	to	their	birth	citizenship,	but	can,	
instead,	decide	to	move	abroad.	As	such,	it	challenges	the	assumption	of	citizenship’s	
permanence	through	the	accident	of	birth.	One	is	not	only	their	birth	nationality,	status,	or	
identity,	but	they	are	also	free	to	seek	out	other	locales.	At	the	same	time,	this	thinking	begins	
to	show	the	permeability	of	the	national	boundary.	Instead	of	the	border	of	the	nation-state	
being	an	impenetrable	barrier	to	keep	the	others	out	and	ensure	its	citizens’—those	within	the	
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boundary	lines—rights,	the	border	softens	into	a	fluid	region	where	individual	statuses	become	
blurred	(Bauböck	2009;	Janoski	1998).		
The	second	sign	of	a	nation’s	push	toward	liberal	citizenship	policies	is	the	acceptance	of	
citizens	gaining	more	than	one	citizenship.	Within	the	scope	of	this	work,	I	measured	this	level	
of	liberal	citizenship	policy	adoption	by	identifying	countries	that	allow	their	citizens	to	gain	
dual,	or	multiple,	citizenship	or	actively	denounce	the	practice.	In	short,	dual	citizenship	is	a	
situation	where	an	individual	holds	legal	citizenship	in	two	or	more	countries,	and	as	such	has	
access	to,	at	least,	two	distinct	sets	of	rights.	In	the	common	literature	(Sejersen	2008),	dual	
citizenship	is	often	considered	the	product	of	a	conscious	decision	by	a	rational	adult	who	
chooses	to	acquire	a	second	citizenship,	regardless	of	their	individual	motivations.	However,	as	
noted	in	the	previous	chapter’s	hypothetical	case	of	the	child	of	an	Italian	immigrant	who	is	
born	in	the	United	States,	one	can,	literally,	be	born	into	an	ambiguous	status	due	to	regional	
interpretations	of	who	is	a	citizen	(Spiro	2008).	While	this	issue	may	be	more	prevalent	in	
countries	relying	on	the	jus	soli	principle	of	citizenship	(Brubaker	1992),	it	also	highlights	the	
imprecise	nature	of	dual	citizenship.	This	coding	category	was	not	only	restricted	to	the	
“accepting”	and	“denying”	categories,	but	also	included	nations	who	did	not	author	formal	
policy.	In	these	cases,	I	examined	popular	accounts	of	those	trapped	in	this	hazy	status.	
Essentially,	what	were	these	individuals	supposed	to	do?	Were	they	expected	to	formally	
request	citizenship	from	one	country	while	denouncing	the	citizenship	from	the	other?		
Finally,	the	broadest	arc	of	my	research	falls	into	a	relatively	new	and	malleable	
conception	of	citizenship	where	individuals	purchase	citizenships	on	a,	virtually,	open	market.	
Commonly	referred	to	as	CIPs,	flexible	citizenship	(Ong	1999),	or	the	“golden	passport”	(see	an	
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edition	of	special	working	papers	edited	by	Shachar	&	Bauböck	2014	examining	the	ethics	
surrounding	such	sales),	wealthy	individuals	purchase	passports	from	foreign	nations	for	a	
variety	of	reasons	including	easing	their	own	travel	between	nations	(Ong	1999;	Shachar	2014;	
Spiro	2014),	knocking	down	barriers	to	international	trade	(Bauböck	2014;	Dzankic	2014),	or	
removing	guestworkers	and	other	non-nationals	from	the	country	(Abrahamian	2015).	
Regardless	of	the	reason,	this	opportunity	pushes	beyond	the	issues	surrounding	dual	
citizenship.	Now,	instead	of	dealing	with	individual	ties	to	two	nations,	those	with	access	to	
capital	can	gain	rights	in	handfuls	of	countries.	As	will	be	discussed	in	more	detail	in	Chapter	5,	
this	poses	a	significant	issue	for	the	nation-state,	given	the	skepticism	many	have	towards	
dual/multiple	citizenship	holders:	where	do	their	allegiances	really	lie	(Brand	2006;	Davidson	
2000;	Sassen	1999;	Somers	2010;	Spiro	2008)?		
However,	it	is	worth	noting	now	that	this	conception	of	citizenship,	where	one’s	
economic	status	can	direct	their	national	allegiance(s),	adds	to	the	previously	discussed	topic:	
the	rise	of	the	human	rights	regime.	One	the	one	hand,	holders	of	multiple	citizenships	are	
exemplars	of	the	rise	of	the	universality	of	human	rights.	As	such,	countries	accepting	this	
status,	thereby	embracing	these	individuals	and	the	multiplicity	of	statuses	they	embody,	are	
exhibiting	the	most	fluid	state	of	citizenship;	a	citizenship	that	is	free	to	move	across	borders	
and	flexible	enough	to	adapt	to	its	current	state.	As	Aneesh	(2015)	noted,	these	cosmopolites,	
to	borrow	Abrahamian’s	(2015)	designation,	hold	a	basket	of	rights	that	expands	or	contracts	
depending	on	where	they	are	and	what	they	are	doing	in	their	present	location.	However,	one	
should	not	assume	that	just	because	that	human	rights	based	systems	has	been	employed	that	
the	nation-states	are	somehow	in	decline.	Instead,	I	posit,	as	others	have	(Brand	2006;	Dower	
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2005;	Isin	2000;	Joppke	2010;	Linklater	1998;	Sassen	1998),	that	the	state	is	still	a	necessary	
component	of	the	transformation	of	citizenship.	It	is	the	source	for	granting	or	denying	rights,	
while	also	maintaining	the	structures	necessary	to	promote	group	membership.	Further,	as	the	
next	two	chapters	note,	the	state	is	the	institution	responsible	for	enacting	or	discarding	the	
scripts	associated	with	liberal	citizenship	norms.	
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Chapter	4	
Ambiguity	of	Belonging:	Political	Regimes	and	the	Deserving	Few	
	
	
In	the	previous	chapter,	I	briefly	outlined	the	research	processes	used	in	this	study,	
including	how	countries	were	included	or	excluded	from	the	number	evaluated,	the	criteria	
used	to	designate	a	state’s	political	category,	and	elucidated	the	three	interrelated	markers	of	
liberal	citizenship	norms	I	have	used	in	my	analysis:	naturalization,	dual	citizenship	adoption,	
and	CIPs—also	known	as	“golden	passport”	programs.	What	each	of	these	markers	suggest,	is	
that	the	scholarly	literature	examining	citizenship	has	begun	to	identify	ways	in	which	the	
norms	of	belonging	are	becoming	more	flexible.	Instead	of	the	nation-state	holding	a	dictatorial	
hold	over	the	opportunities	of	individuals.	Individuals,	instead,	can	seek	to	gain	rights	
elsewhere,	or	move	abroad	if	they	are	able.	
While	the	desire	to	move	from	one	place	to	another	is	not	new	to	humanity,	how	do	
national	governments	deal	with	the	potential	for	an	increased	demand?	Further,	and	within	the	
scope	of	this	research,	are	different	political	regimes	adopting	various	norms	of	citizenship	
based	on	political	belief?	Do,	in	fact,	authoritarian	regimes	holdfast	to	the	ascriptive	norms	of	
blood	and	soil	while	non-authoritarian	states	liberalize	citizenship,	thereby	encouraging	
populations	to	freely	traverse	borders?	
This	chapter	begins	my	look	at	the	results	of	this	work	by	focusing	on	the	political	
characteristics	of	the	world’s	nation-states.	Determining	how	many	countries	adhere	to	
authoritarian	or	non-authoritarian	governments	allows	us	to,	then,	ask	“What	do	their	
citizenship	norms	look	like?”	Within	this	context,	the	remaining	portion	of	this	chapter	will	
examine	the	first	area	of	inclusion:	naturalization.	I	find	that	there	is	great	policy	variation	
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within	authoritarian	and	non-authoritarian	states.	While	generalizations	can	be	made	about	
which	norms	will	be	in	place	in	each	category,	there	are	notable	exceptions	to	the	rule.	These	
exceptions	provide	the	rich	contextual	discussions	of	norm	expansion.	 	
	
Political	Regime	as	the	Building	Blocks	of	Acceptance	
Prior	to	addressing	examples	of	how	countries	choose	to	apply,	or	eschew	liberal	
citizenship	norms,	the	classifications	system	used	in	this	work	must	be	addressed.	Figure	1	
provides	a	summary	of	the	political	regime	type	for	the	198	countries	involved	in	this	study.	52	
countries	were	classified	as	“authoritarian”	by	the	Democracy	Index	(The	Economist	2016),	
while	the	remainder	fell	into	some	variation	of	non-authoritarian	regime.		
	
Figure	1:	Political	classifications	of	countries	included	in	study	(n=198).	
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This	categorization,	certainly,	eliminates	some	of	the	nuance	highlighted	in	the	Index	
discussed	last	chapter,	but	allows	for	a	straight-forward	metric	for	measuring	various	nation-
states’	adoption,	or	non-adoption,	of	liberal	citizenship	norms.	Further,	my	results	suggest	that	
while	an	adherence	to	a	specific	liberal	political	process	can	influence	a	country’s	inclusive	
approach	to	foreign	groups,	it	is	by	no	means	the	sole	consideration.	As	such,	I	observed	
situations	on	both	sides	of	the	spectrum	where	states	classified	as	democracies	eschewed	
liberal	inclusion	processes,	while	some	authoritarian	states	embraced	such	policies.	Certainly,	
these	states	were	in	the	minority	of	their	given	political	category,	but	their	contrast	with	the	
majority	can	illustrate	the	other	mechanisms	at	play	during	policy	adoption.		
These	conclusions	were	also	identified	while	considering	communist	regimes.	The	
world’s	six	extant	communist	countries—China,	Cuba,	Laos,	North	Korea,	and	Vietnam—all	
have	ascriptive	citizenship	policies	in	place:	citizenship	is	passed	to	the	next	generation	by	
blood	in	each	country,	with	Cuba	extending	birthright	citizenship	to	babies	born	on	the	island.	
Further,	there	is	some	minor	variation	based	on	regional	history	in	these	countries’	dual	
citizenship	policies.	In	2009,	Vietnam	implemented	a	policy	to	legalize	dual	citizenship	for	
former	nationals	who	had	fled	the	country	to	avoid	violence,	but	now	wish	to	reacquire	the	
status	(Vietnam	2009;	Zeller	2008).	The	offer	of	dual	citizenship	was	also	extended	to	their	
descendants	in	the	hopes	of	convincing	those	abroad	to	move	bring	their	knowledge	and	
capital	to	the	country	(Zeller	2008).	By	comparison,	all	the	remaining	communist	regimes	
explicitly	bar	dual	citizenship.	
	 Now	that	the	political	landscape	has	been	mapped,	I	turn	out	attention	to	the	
citizenship	norms	in	each	category.	The	next	section	outlines	the	naturalization	laws	employed	
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by	the	authoritarian	and	non-authoritarian	regimes	in	this	study.	What	becomes	evident,	is	that	
there	is	not	a	strict	rule	in	place	for	either	category,	but	laws	on	a	continuum	of	access	with	one	
end	barring	access	for	a	small	select	few,	while	the	other	end	opens	access	to,	virtually,	any	
interested	party.	
	
Historical	Inclusivity	
	 As	noted	in	Chapter	2,	naturalization	was	a	useful	tool	for	nation-states	that	sought	to	
increase	the	size	of	their	populations.	Further,	citizenship,	and	the	rights	associated	with	it,	
became	a	mechanism	of	control	for	recently	colonized	peoples.	In	this	section,	I	turn	our	
attention	away	from	the	generalities	of	naturalization	laws,	and	toward	the	specific	
requirements	citizenship	candidates	must	fulfill	to	gain	access	to	rights.	Within	this	discussion,	
membership	in	an	ethnic	group,	language	comprehension,	and	regional	history	all	display	their	
influence	on	policy	and	applicants.	
	 Consider	the	wording	used	in	the	citizenship	laws	of	Egypt	and	Italy.	Basic	Egyptian	
requirements	to	be	granted	citizenship,	after	the	adoption	of	their	1975	law,	are	as	follows:	
1.	Those	who	were	born	of	Egyptian	fathers.	
2.	Those	who	were	born	in	Egypt	of	an	Egyptian	mother,	and	a	father	whose	nationality		
																		is	unknown	or	who	is	stateless.	
3.	Those	who	were	born	in	Egypt,	of	an	Egyptian	mother	but	their	kinship	to	the	father		
																		has	not	been	proved	legally.	
4.	Those	who	were	born	in	Egypt	of	unknown	parents.	A	foundling	in	Egypt	shall	be		
																		considered	as	born	in	it,	unless	otherwise	proved.	(Egypt	1975)	
	
Here	is	the	wording	from	the	Italian	citizenship	law	of	1992:	
1.	The	following	shall	be	citizens	by	birth:		
a)	any	person	whose	father	or	mother	are	citizens;		
b)	any	person	who	was	born	in	the	territory	of	the		
					Republic,	either	where	both	parents	are	unknown	or	stateless,	or	where	he	or		
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					she	does	not	acquire	his	or	her	parents’	citizenship	according	to	the	law	of	the					
					State	to	which	the	latter	belong;		
2.	Any	person	who	is	found	in	the	territory	of	the	
					Republic,	whose	parents	are	unknown,	shall	be	deemed	a	citizen	by	birth,		
					where	their	possession	of	any	other	citizenship	cannot	be	proven.	(Italy	1992)	
	
While	there	are	notable	differences	in	the	gendered	nature	of	citizenship	present—
Egyptian	citizenship	being	inherited	from	one’s	father,	specifically,	while	the	status	can	be	
inherited	from	either	parent	in	the	Italian	case—the	general	language	used	in	the	laws	and	their	
structure	is	virtually	identical.	Both	countries	elucidate	who	qualifies	as	a	citizen,	the	way	the	
status	is	garnered;	in	these	cases,	via	jus	sanguinis,	unless	there	are	extenuating	circumstances.	
Later	in	the	documents,	the	rights	associated	with	membership,	the	processes	of	naturalization,	
and	which	offices	and	individuals	are	responsible	for	addressing	citizenship	concerns	are	
outlined.	The	question,	then,	can	be	asked:	Why	do	two	sovereign	and	unrelated	countries	use	
similar	formats	and	language?	From	a	world	society	perspective,	it	is	due	to	the	external	
pressures	of	a	global	system.	Governments	expect	other	governmental	bodies	to	deal	with	this	
topic	in	a	consistent	way.	Questions	like	“Who’s	responsible	for	this	individual?”	and	“Who	can	
I	talk	to	about	becoming	a	citizen?”	are	clearly	answered	in	each	document.	Further	by	
following	the	format	and	wording	of	other	national	laws,	countries	strengthen	their	legitimacy	
in	other	realms.	Other	countries	will	be	more	likely	to	treat	them	as	equals	during	citizenship	
discussions	since	their	laws	are	worded	similarly.	Finally,	transnational	organizations	can	help	
ensure	that	these	countries	take	this	topic	seriously	(Guillén	1984;	Meyer	1987;	Ramirez	&	
Meyer	1998).	
Further,	societal	expectations	drive	a	“bottom-up”	force	of	coercive	isomorphism.	From	
this	angle,	how	the	general	population	thinks	the	organization	should	behave	and	what	policies	
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it	should	put	in	place	direct	organizational	development	(DiMaggio	&	Powell	1983).	In	the	case	
of	citizenship	law,	such	influence	is	couched	in	the	discussion	of	expanding	group	membership.	
The	question	of	“Who	can	join?”	becomes	dependent	on	the	general	population’s	seeming	
acceptance	of	the	group	in	question.	Immigrants	stemming	from	groups	that	are	valuable	
assets—perhaps	by	plying	a	specific	trade,	being	perceived	similarity	to	the	immigrating	group,	
or	benefitting	from	positive	stereotypes—are	more	likely	to	be	viewed	positively	by	the	
populous	(Aktürk	2012;	Brubaker	1992,	1996;	Sassen	2006).	Further,	these	positive	views	make	
it	more	likely	that	the	populous	will,	at	least,	accept	policy	favoring	the	naturalization	of	these	
groups,	or	perhaps	even	push	their	officials	to	create	such	policy.		
Liberal	citizenship	norms	are	heavily	integrated	into	the	processes	of	movement,	
settlement,	and	inclusion.	However,	the	relative	acceptance	and	adoption	of	liberal	citizenship	
norms	are	not	necessarily	conditional	on	a	nation-state’s	practice	of	democracy.	Benhabib	
(2004)	has	noted	that	there	is	an	inherent	conflict	between	the	liberal	democratic	ideal	of	
inclusion	and	a	nation-state’s	right	toward	political	self-determination.	This	type	of	discord—
between	the	ideal	and	the	political—can	place	stress	on	regimes	that	rely	on	the	benefits	of	
having	diverse	societies	to	help	navigate	transnational	relationships	(Benhabib	2004).	Further,	
perceived	ill-treatment	of	foreign	workers	may	hamper	national	efforts	to	lure	them	into	jobs	in	
the	national	economy	(Joppke	1998;	Sassen	1999).	
	 Yet,	our	general	assumptions	that	liberal	state	norms	are	tightly	bound	to	the	
democratic	political	system	may	not	be	borne	out	by	reality.	One	important	aspect	of	the	
democratic	state	is	that	public	opinions	matter	(Hampshire	2013).	Citizens	can	have	a	direct	
effect	on	policy	decisions	by	exercising	their	political	rights,	engaging	in	protest,	or	contacting	
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their	representatives	in	government.	That	said,	it	is	worth	considering	where	“the	people”	tend	
to	fall	in	the	citizenship	conversation.	Are	the	people	overwhelmingly	welcoming	immigrants	
with	open	arms,	or	do	they	think	the	best	course	of	action	is	to	fortify	all	national	boundaries?	
As	with	any	sort	of	public	polling,	the	results	are	mixed.	Hampshire	(2013)	notes	that	there	is	a	
general	opposition	to	immigration	among	those	living	in	democratic	countries.	The	public	tends	
to	think	that	there	are	too	many	of	“them”	here	already	so	steps	should	be	taken	to	stem	the	
flow	of	additional	migrants.	
	 Such	anti-immigration	sentiment	tends	to	fall	along	two	general	lines.	The	first	
highlights	the	economic	concerns	of	the	local	population.	This	is,	in	short,	the	“they’ll	take	our	
jobs”	argument	(Hampshire	2013).	Citizens	born	in	the	region	view	immigrants	as	direct	
competitors	for	work,	thereby	these	foreign-born	groups	are	threats	to	the	citizens’	perceived	
economic	livelihoods.	Keeping	“them”	out	helps	ensure	that	“we”	have	jobs	and	maintain	our	
standard	of	living.	The	second,	and	more	frequently	employed,	line	of	thinking	falls	along	the	
seemingly	incommensurable	nature	of	identities	(Hampshire	2013;	Huntington	1993).	Here,	
citizens	argue	against	admitting	new	immigrants	due	to	“their”	culture	being	too	different	than	
“ours,”	and,	thus,	new	immigrants	will	not	be	able	to	fit	into	the	dominant	culture.	Further,	this	
in-group	favoritism	versus	out-group	hostility	is	thought	to	be	based	in	a	fear	of	diluting	the	
dominant	culture	(Appadurai	2006;	Hampshire	2013).	The	perception	is	that,	somehow,	by	
admitting	those	with	different	beliefs	and	practices	will	pollute	the	nation	and	lead	to	it	being	
irreparably	damaged	(Douglas	1994).	
Despite	concerns	arising	from	the	populace	regarding	the	impending	problems	
immigrants	pose	to	the	nation-state,	democratically	elected	leaders	still	push	for	liberal	
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citizenship	policies.	Hinnebusch	(2000),	Holston	(2008),	Habermas	(1989),	and	others	have	
noted	the	disconnect	between	policy	makers	(political	elites)	and	those	who	must	live	their	
lives	by	the	policy’s	guidelines	(citizens).	Using	Brazil’s	political	history	as	an	example,	Holston	
(2008)	notes	that	increased	rates	of	democratization	and	globalization	have	stimulated	conflicts	
between	citizens	and	rulers.	Within	this	context,	one	of	the	fundamental	disagreements	
between	the	rulers	and	the	ruled	revolves	around	the	use	of	the	term	“citizen,”	itself.	The	
Brazilian	government	has	based	an	individual’s	access	to	rights	on	identifiable	social	markers,	
including	gender,	socioeconomic	status,	education	level,	and	race,	thereby	creating	a	
hierarchical	system	based	on	one’s	level	of	inclusion	(Holston	2008:7).	Like	other	nations’	laws,	
Brazil’s	naturalization	laws	are	generally	open	to	any	applicant	seeking	citizenship.	Anyone	who	
is	of	legal	age	and	able	to	make	their	own	decisions	(mental	competence),	has	registered	as	a	
permanent	resident	and	lived	in	the	country	for	the	four	years	prior	to	filing	their	application,	
has	language	proficiency	in	Portuguese,	has	a	legal	means	of	income,	and	has	not	committed	
any	crimes	can	begin	the	naturalization	process	(Brazil	2017).		
However,	Brazilian	citizens	have	differentiated	between	a	possessor	of	citizenship	and	
one	who	has	ties	to	the	country.	Colloquially,	they	use	the	term	“citizen”	to	indicate	the	
“other,”	or	to	identify	someone	who	does	not	have	an	intimate	connection	to	the	speaker,	via	
friendship,	familial	ties,	etc.	(Holston	2008).	Ultimately,	what	the	Brazilian	account	highlights	
are	situations	where	the	citizenship	process	is	no	longer	based	on	inclusion,	but	is,	instead,	a	
study	in	the	limits	of	liberal	inclusion.	
	 Given	the	described	disagreements	towards	inclusion	and	citizenship	displayed	by	the	
state,	what	many	states	display	is	a	“…Janus	face	towards	immigration…”	(Hampshire	2013:13)	
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where	foreign	workers	are	sought	to	fill	local	labor	needs,	but	denied	inclusion	via	citizenship	so	
they	can	be	deported	when	the	job	is	done.	As	such,	liberal	citizenship	norms—most	commonly	
the	naturalization	process,	in	this	case—allow	the	nation-state	to	exert	its	power	by	creating	
selection	criteria.	Even	in	democratic	regimes,	legal	guidelines	can	be	created	to	identify	who	
can	become	“one	of	us”	and	who	is	left	outside	the	state’s	protection	(Jacobson	1996;	Joppke	
2010;	Somers	2010).	Therefore,	despite	suggestions	that	the	(liberal)	nation-state	is	losing	its	
influence	on	the	world-stage	and	international	organizations	are	driving	the	discussion	on	what	
constitutes	a	citizen	(Benhabib	2004,	2005;	Hampshire	2013;	Joppke	1998;	Kymlicka	1995;	
Sassen	1999,	2006;	Soysal	1994)	increased	attention	to	citizenship	norms	and	the	selection	
criteria	used	for	membership	suggest	that	nation-states	remain	in	power	and	are	driving	the	
adoption	of	citizenship	norms	and	who	can	become	a	member	(Basch,	Schiller,	&	Blanc	1994;	
Bourdieu	2014;	Jacobson	1996;	Meyer	2010,	2010a;	Meyer,	Boli,	Thomas,	&	Ramirez	1997).	
One	can	see	evidence	of	these	pushes	in	the	legal	record.	Naturalization	policies	that	
highlight	that	citizenship	applicants	must	hold	a	specific	ethnic	status,	or	“fit”	with	the	
dominant	group	show	up	frequently.	One	may	suspect	that	ethnic	requirements	for	inclusion,	
are	limited	to	authoritarian	regimes,	but	there	is	evidence	of	these	policies	in	non-authoritarian	
regimes,	as	well.	Within	systems	restricting	ethnicity,	a	culturally	and	ideologically	homogenous	
population	allows	for	some	of	the	basic	components	of	group	unity	to	exist.	Group	membership	
is	strengthened	via	shared	religious	beliefs,	affinity	towards	nationalistic	iconography	(symbols,	
songs,	and	holidays),	and	views	about	“dangerous	outsiders.”	I,	by	no	means,	intend	to	create	
generalizations	about	citizen	populations	by	claiming	that	all	individuals	within	a	nation-state	
think	in	uniform	ways.	Instead,	I	suggest	that	in	these	cases	a	dominant	majority—either	vocally	
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or	silently—supports	what	Aktürk	(2012)	referred	to	as	monoethnic	citizenship	policies	to	
create	an	ethnocultural	state	(Brubaker	1992);	policies	actively	favoring	a	single	ethnicity	while	
actively	discriminating	against	all	others.	As	the	result	of	monoethnic	pursuits,	the	created	
society	looks	culturally	the	same.	
Consider	the	case	of	Germany’s	restrictive	citizenship	policies.	Until	recently,	German	
laws	have	routinely	barred	those	who	could	not	trace	their	familial	heritage	to	an	identifiable	
German	ancestor	from	naturalizing.	Simply	put,	unless	an	applicant	can	show	the	government	
proof,	they	will	not	be	approved.	What	these	policies	created	was	the	very	essence	of	the	
monoethnic	state,	and	the	citizenry,	generally,	accepted	these	processes.	Further,	
naturalization	restriction	meant	that	the	population	of	guestworkers	in	the	country	(mainly	
Turkish	emigrants	or	their	descendants)	could	not	gain	citizenship,	despite	playing	an	active	
role	in	the	national	economy	(Aktürk	2012).	Emphasizing	the	cultural	basis	of	citizenship,	
opposed	to	one’s	location	of	residence,	helps	define	citizenship	within	the	German	way	of	
thinking:	citizenship	is	a	cultural	fact,	not	a	political	one	(Brubaker	1992).	That	said,	Germany	is	
also	a	“full	democracy”	according	the	2015	Democracy	Index	(The	Economist	2016).	Essentially,	
German	citizens	are	saying	that	they	have	accepted	the	ethnocultural	basis	of	their	citizenship,	
or	are	at	least	satisfied	enough	that	they	are	not	calling	for	politicians	to	reexamine	the	laws.	
These	signals	are	continuing	in	the	face	of	Chancellor	Angela	Merkel’s	recent	push	for	
extending	dual	citizenship	to	the	children	of	immigrants.	A	call	that	has	received	significant	
criticism	across	the	political	spectrum	(Huggler	2016).	
To	return	to	Egypt’s	citizenship	law,	one	sees	a	similar	emphasis	on	group	membership.	
Also,	the	patriarchal	nature	of	citizenship	in	the	state	is	revealed	at	greater	length.	While	much	
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of	the	language	outlining	the	process	of	naturalization	is	common	to	other	documents—length	
of	legal	residence,	the	applicant	being	in	good	health	and	not	committing	any	crimes,	etc.—
there	some	specific	stipulations.	First,	in	point	three	of	Article	4	of	the	Egyptian	law	(1975),	the	
following	statement	regarding	who	may	be	granted	Egyptian	nationality	is	presented:	
To	any	foreigner	born	in	Egypt	of	a	foreign	father	who	was	also	born	in	it,	if	such	a	foreigner	
belongs	to	the	majority	of	inhabitants	in	a	country	whose	language	is	Arabic,	or	religion	is	Islam,	
if	he	applies	for	the	Egyptian	nationality	within	one	year	form	the	date	he	attains	full	age.	[italics	
mine]	
	
A	second,	and	common,	prerequisite	for	naturalization	is	the	ability	to	speak	the	local	dominant	
language.	Point	four	of	Article	4	states	that	“…he	should	be	acquainted	with	the	Arabic	
language.”	(Egypt	1975).		
	 What	both	points	attempt	to	ensure	is	that	potential	citizens	will	be	able	to	assimilate	
into	the	dominant	culture	quickly.	Point	four—while	confirming	that	the	individual	will	be	able	
to	navigate	daily	life	in	Egypt—also	draws	upon	the	ethnic	basis	of	the	imagined	community.	By	
being	able	to	speak	the	dominant	language,	one	will	be	able	to	better	identify	with	the	
nationalistic	tendencies	and	practices	of	the	region	(Anderson	2006).	The	new	citizen	will	be	
able	to	learn	the	cultural	norms,	signals,	and	processes,	thereby	making	them	a	contributing	
citizen	faster	if	they	can	speak	Arabic,	compared	to	a	non-speaker.	Point	three	seeks	to	
maintain	a	monoethnic	state.	While	a	minority	of	Egyptians	speak	English	or	French	and	
approximately	10-percent	of	the	population	is	affiliated	with	Christianity	(Central	Intelligence	
Agency	2013),	the	citizenship	policy	in	place	actively	favors	dominant	norms.	Essentially,	the	
policy	is	claiming	that	if	one’s	father	grew	up	in	an	Arab	country,	they	will	understand	Egypt.	
This	emphasis	is	so	strong	that	there	is	a	single	line	in	Article	16,	outlining	the	revocation	of	
citizenship,	that	the	Ministers	Council	can	strip	Egyptian	nationality	from	an	individual	on	the	
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grounds	of	ethnic	allegiance.	“If	at	any	time	he	has	been	qualified	as	a	zionist	[sic]”	(Egypt	1975)	
an	Egyptian	can	lose	their	nationality;	so,	like	Germany,	Egyptian	citizenship	has	an	active	
ethnocultural	basis	in	its	law.	
Afghanistan’s	citizenship	law	has,	recently,	seen	a	shift	in	language,	while	attempting	to	
maintain	its	ideological	roots.	The	legal	basis	for	citizenship	in	Afghanistan	was	grounded	in	the	
1936	“Law	of	Citizenship	in	Afghanistan.”	This	document	was	designed	to	incorporate	the	
tenets	of	the	1930	Hague	Convention	into	national	law	to	create	space	for	women’s	citizenship	
status,	as	well	as	the	statuses	of	children	(Athayi	2017).	Like	the	other	legal	documents	cited	in	
this	work,	the	structural	similarities	to	other	items	are	easy	to	identify,	such	as	similar	wording,	
the	ordering	of	sections	(in	this	case	dividing	topics	into	“Articles”),	who	to	contact	with	any	
questions	regarding	one’s	rights,	and	a	date	of	ratification.	However,	there	is	a	notable	shift	in	
language	between	the	law	of	1936	and	the	most	recent	incarnation	of	2010:	the	inclusion	of	
ethnicity.	In	1936,	the	naturalization	process	was	open	to	anyone	who	could	share	basic	familial	
information—e.g.	names,	birthdates—and	accompanying	identifying	documentation,	provide	
reasons	for	leaving	their	former	state	and	plans	for	the	move,	local	occupancy	plans,	identifying	
photographs,	and	furnish	a	signed	statement	stating	that	he	did	not	have	a	criminal	past	
(Afghanistan	1936).	The	generalities	of	the	law	suggested	that	the	naturalization	process	was	
open	to	anyone	who	wanted	to	move	to	the	country	and	could	support	themselves.	
The	2010	law	saw	significant	linguistic	changes.	While	structurally	comparable	to	the	
earlier	mandate,	a	noticeable	change	is	in	the	title	of	the	document.	While	the	1936	law	simply	
stated	what	the	document	is	and	where	the	law	applied,	the	2010	update	injected	ethnicity	
into	the	law:	“Law	on	Citizenship	of	the	Islamic	Emirate	of	Afghanistan.”	By	marking	official	
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documents	using	this	title,	government	officials	are	stating	that	to	be	considered	Afghani,	one	
must	also	be	Muslim	and	follow	the	tenets	of	that	culture.	While	making	no	restrictions	on	
naturalization	based	on	ethnicity,	a	later	article	suggests	that	nationality	can	be	“…obtained	
according	to	the	norms	predicted	in	the	international	treaties	unless	they	contradict	the	tenets	
of	Islam.”	(Afghanistan	2010:5;	italics	mine).	This	leaves	interpretive	space	within	the	law.	
While	an	applicant	may	meet	the	basic	requirements,	if	they	are	deemed	a	threat	to	national	
security,	or	somehow	even	a	potentially	troublesome	individual,	they	can	be	barred	access	to	
citizenship.	
As	such,	the	2010	law	is	a	difficult	case	where	there	is	evidence	of	a	government	trying	
to	adhere	to	the	international	standards	of	citizenship,	especially	regarding	the	rights	of	women	
and	children,	but	have	ethnicity	written	into	the	text.	Athayi	(2017)	highlights	the	difficult	
history	in	the	region	and	its	effects	on	governmental	policy.	After	the	US	invasion	following	the	
terrorist	attacks	of	September	11,	2001,	the	Afghani	government	was	crippled.	With	the	
election	of	former	President	Hamid	Karzai,	the	government	began	to	rebuild	and	further	
pushed	toward	inclusive	citizenship	policies.	At	that	stage,	dual	citizenship	was	treated	as	an	
inevitability	due	to	the	large	numbers	of	Afghan	refugees	who	had	fled	the	country	during	the	
ongoing	violence	(Athayi	2017).	In	addition,	Afghanistan	has	also	been	dealing	with	national	
security	due	to	its	status	as	a	central	travel	hub	in	Asia.	In	general	terms,	the	geography	and	
political	environment	make	it	difficult	to	evaluate	all	individuals	seeking	to	cross	its	borders	
legally,	let	alone	prevent	those	who	cross	for	more	nefarious	means	(Athayi	2017).		
Given	the	storm	of	events	engulfing	the	region,	Afghanistan’s	citizenship	policy	and	its	
changes	have	accomplished	mixed	goals.	First,	there	is	an	institutional	push	toward	adhering	to	
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the	world	scripts	of	liberal	citizenship.	Dual	citizenship	has	been	adopted	and	language	has	
been	put	into	place	to	create	a	more	inclusive	population.	However,	there	is	also	concern	about	
what	such	policies	will	do	to	the	country.	If	the	doors	are	open	to	everyone,	will	Afghanistan	
still	be	for	the	Afghani	people?	The	language	regarding	ethnicity	in	the	2010	law	reflect	this	
concern.	This	concern	is	also	fueling	the	“open	door”	appearance	of	their	naturalization	process	
and	citizenship.	Policy	makers	want	to	allow	Afghans	who	fled	the	region	to	be	able	to	come	
home,	and	until	that	goal	is	accomplished,	the	law	on	the	books	will	be	useful.	
	
Certain	Uncertainty	
	 What	the	previous	examples	show	us,	is	that	there	are	wide	variations	present	in	
citizenship	norms.	While	this	is	not	a	surprising	fact,	their	presence	at	the	foundational	
elements	of	inclusion	suggest	that	political	regime	is	not	the	only	factor	dictating	whether	
citizenship	norms	are	adopted.	Whether	the	laws	at	hand	be	Egyptian,	Afghani,	or	German,	the	
citizenship	norms	codified	into	national	law	are	dependent	on	each	region’s	history,	their	
dominant	group,	and	culture.	This	complexity	will	be	further	examined	in	the	following	chapter,	
when	the	remaining	two	areas	of	liberal	citizenship	will	be	examined.	Dual	citizenship	and	CIPs,	
while	aligned	with	the	human	rights	norms	of	postnational	citizenship	or	cosmopolitanism,	are	
further	evidence	that	citizenship	scholars	cannot	consider	political	system,	alone,	when	
studying	how	citizenship	norms	have	spread.	I	argue,	that	such	complexity	should	inform	and	
drive	each	examination	to	provide	a	holistic	look	at	the	question	at	hand.	
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Chapter	5	
Unequal	Statuses:	Citizenship,	Social	Class,	and	Opportunity	
	
	 While	the	last	chapter	laid	out	how	regimes	have	dealt	with	the	most	basic	method	of	
inclusion—naturalization—what	follows	focuses	on	the	nation-state’s	loosening	grip	on	
citizenship.	What	do	norms	begin	to	look	like	when	they	begin	to	follow	Soysal’s	postnational	
hypothesis?	What	happens	when	one	is	free	to	choose	not	only	their	residencies,	but	also	their	
bundles	of	rights?	Dual	citizenship	and	CIPs	allow	many	individuals	to	make	such	choices,	but	
the	opportunities	are	not	universal.	As	shall	be	shown,	while	dual	citizenship	acceptance	is	
increasingly	common	on	the	national	stage,	but	how	do	states	deal	non-nationalist	stance?	
Further,	what	happens	when	people	are	free	to	buy	citizenship	in	places	they	may	have	never	
been?	I	posit	that	despite	these	pushes	for	a,	relatively,	deterritorialized	existence,	the	nation-
state	is	still	playing	a	significant	role	in	ensuring	rights	and	identifying	who	can	receive	them.	
In	the	first	of	these	situations,	dual	citizenship,	one	begins	to	see	a	dissociation	between	
the	nation-state	and	those	who	hold	more	than	one	status.	Within	the	context	of	this	research	
and	citizenship	literature,	dual	citizenship	occurs	when	an	individual	holds	citizenship	rights	
from	two	countries.	This	translates	into	situations	where	an	individual	could	hold	some	
influence	in	the	political	processes	of	two	distinct	nations,	participate	in	each	country’s	
economy,	and	gain	access	to	the	travel	rights	of	each	region.	While	this	mutable	status	holds	
increased	benefits	for	the	citizenship	holder,	it	creates	a	distrust	that	many	government	
officials	and	the	public,	have	toward	dual	citizens.	Those	with	“other”	citizenships	may	have	
their	allegiances	questioned,	as	those	in	power	question	how	an	individual	could	display	loyalty	
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to	more	than	one	nation	and	undertake	the	basic	institutional	concerns	of	guaranteeing	rights	
and	legal	protections	(Brand	2006;	Sassen	1999;	Spiro	2008).		
CIPs	are	the	loosest	attachment	to	place	within	the	spectrum	of	this	research.	These	
programs	are	increasingly	popular	with	three	groups	occupying	two	spheres	of	influence:	
dominant	groups	in	sending	countries,	those	same	groups	in	receiving	countries,	and	business	
elites	who	frequently	cross-national	borders.	Within	the	context	of	inequality,	the	sender-
receiver	relationships	between	dealing	states	can	be	indicative	of	the	states’	status	in	the	
international	economy.	In	the	case	of	sending	countries	who	are	seeking	to	expel	specific	
groups	from	their	borders,	affluent	states	dictate	the	“terms	and	conditions”	for	deals	to	
poorer	states,	thereby	creating	systems	of	dependence.	If	the	subordinate	state	wishes	to	be	
included	in	the	deal,	they	must	conform	to	the	demands,	or	face	replacement.	Within	this	
transnational	field,	CIPs	can	prove	to	be	beneficial	for	states	in	two	interrelated	realms.	First,	it	
can	aid	sending	countries	with	the	removal	of	“unwanted”	groups.	As	illustrated	in	the	second	
example	at	the	start	of	this	work,	the	UAE	sought	a	deal	with	the	Comorian	government	to	
purchase	a	larger	number	of	passports	for	their	stateless	workers.	In	short,	what	this	allowed	
the	UAE	government	to	achieve	was	the	legal	deportation	of	such	workers	from	their	country,	
while	simultaneously	acting	in	a,	superficially,	beneficent	way	by	giving	deportees	legal	
connection	to	a	state.	By	undergoing	deportation,	the	bidoon	could	gain	access	to	rights	and	
resources	that	they	could	not,	if	they	had	remained	in	the	UAE.	
CIPs	not	only	benefit	the	sending	state	by	removing	of	“other”	populations	from	within	
its	borders,	but	the	receiving	country—the	one	providing	the	citizenship	documentation—also	
can	garner	significant	financial	returns	during	the	transaction.	Prior	to	the	UAE’s	agreement	
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with	Comoros,	the	small	island	nation	was	experiencing	numerous	economic	hardships.	The	
government	was	unable	to	provide	many	basic	amenities	to	its	citizens,	including	a	reliable	
source	of	electricity,	due	to	its	outdated	infrastructure	(Abrahamian	2015).	The	passport	deal	
with	the	UAE,	then,	appeared	as	a	tool	to	do	some	social	good.	Ideally,	selling	a	set	number	of	
passports	to	the	UAE,	would	allow	Comorian	nationals	to	live	more	safe	and	enriched	lives	
(Abrahamian	2015).	The	economic	rationale	Comorian	officials	used	to	approve	their	deal	with	
the	UAE	is	not	hard	to	understand;	the	country	was	struggling,	and	they	wanted	to	help	their	
people.	However,	the	cultural,	ethical,	and	ideological	calculus	is	more	difficult	to	solve.	How	
does	one	justify	selling	a	set	of	rights	to	people	who	were	not	born	in	the	country	or	may	have	
never	been	there?	
The	final	group	of	beneficiaries	of	CIPs	are	the	transnational	business	workers	who	can	
now	traverse	boundaries	with,	relative,	ease.	As	Ong	(1999)	notes,	holding	multiple	passports	
not	only	allows	for	some	individuals	to	garner	economic	benefits	others	are	excluded	from,	but	
it	can	also	act	as	a	form	of	social	capital,	where	those	holding	the	largest	and	most	diverse	
passport	portfolios	may	be	more	effective	deal	makers	with	a	larger	and	more	international	
social	network.	Those	who	are	more	affluent	have	distinct	advantages	in	terms	of	moving	
capital,	traveling	between	regions,	and	the	status	that	comes	along	with	these	abilities.	
	
What’s	in	a	Title?	
The	previous	chapters’	discussion	on	the	promulgation	of	countries’	citizenship	laws	and	
naturalization	processes	help	illustrate	the	first	step	in	moving	towards	liberal	forms	of	
citizenship.	In	this	section,	I	direct	our	focus	to	the	second	and	third	signs	of	the	liberalization	
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process,	which	illustrate	a	further	deterritorialization	of	citizenship:	dual	citizenship	and	CIPs.	
Dual	citizenship	adds	a	level	of	flexibility	for	the	individual,	where	they	can,	potentially,	glean	
the	benefits	of	two	sets	of	rights.	They	may	be	able	to	influence	the	political	processes	of	two	
nations	by	their	dual	enfranchisement.	Dual	citizens	may	be	able	to	hold	property	and	open	
businesses	in	both	of	their	countries;	symbolizing	access	to	capital	and	banking	in	both	places,	
as	well.	Finally,	they	also	may	gain	the	“right”	to	pay	taxes	in	both	areas.	While	this	final	point	
may	not	be	a	particularly	positive	notion,	nonetheless	it	acts	a	symbol	of	allegiance	with	their	
countries.	
Holding	citizenship	in	two	or	more	countries	is	becoming	an	increasingly	accepted	
phenomenon.	Figure	2	shows	that	two-thirds	of	this	study’s	countries	(131	of	198)	have	
adopted	a	form	of	dual	citizenship	policy	or	allowed	some	sort	of	similar	existence.	However,	
this	number	does	not	completely	overlap	with	the	types	of	political	regimes	here.	Of	non-
authoritarian	regimes,	about	79-percent	(115	of	146)	have	implemented	dual	citizenship	
policies.	Non-authoritarian	regimes	are	not	the	only	ones	to	shy	away	from	the	citizenship	
norms	of	their	political	classification.	Authoritarian	regimes	electing	to	implement	dual	
citizenship	policies,	while	in	the	minority	in	accounting	for	30-percent	of	all	authoritarian	
regimes	(16	of	52),	account	for	approximately	12-percent	of	all	adoptees	(16	of	131)	(see	Figure	
3).	Given	these	results,	I	argue	that	while	political	regime	type	is	a	contributing	factor	when	
adopting	liberal	citizenship	norms,	it	is	not	the	only	factor	at	play.	
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Figure	2:	Summary	of	countries	adopting	or	eschewing	dual	citizenship	policy.	(n=198)	
	
	
Figure	3:	Adoption	of	dual	citizenship	policy	by	national	regime	type.	(n=198)	
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As	noted	earlier,	a	fundamental	conflict	within	the	dual	citizen	status	is	of	allegiance.	
Within	the	traditional	Westphalian	system	of	citizenship—born	from	the	development	of	the	
nation-state	in	Europe—dual	citizenship	is	an	unthinkable	status	(Brand	2006).	Not	only	due	to	
the	previously	mentioned	questions	of	allegiance	that	arise	from	dual	loyalties,	but	from	the	
logistical	concerns	over	which	state	is	responsible	for	providing	rights	to	the	individual.	The	
modern	state	was	developed	on	the	grounds	of	sovereignty,	and	its	citizens	were	expected	to	
show	their	allegiance	to	the	state	via	their	active	involvements	in	the	political	and	social	
systems	(Sassen	2006).	Further,	if	individuals	expressed	high	levels	of	nationalism	and	viewed	
their	rulers	as	legitimate,	they	were	less	likely	to	accept	the	possibility	of	dual	citizenship	(Brand	
2006).	When	this	link	between	the	ruler	and	the	ruled	begins	to	breakdown,	or	the	nationality	
and	naturalization	processes	become	disjointed	from	one	another,	one	is	more	likely	to	see	a	
rise	in	dual	citizenship	policy,	despite	federal	distaste	for	the	status	(Spiro	2008).	However,	in	
the	reality	of	the	post-Cold	War	global	world,	dual	citizenship	has	become	a	more	frequently	
occurring	status	(see	Figure	4),	with	the	number	of	countries	adopting	dual	citizenship	policies	
increasing	sharply	since	1990.	Not	only	are	states	legally	describing	the	status,	but	the	public	is	
also	beginning	to	see	it	as	increasingly	“normal.”	Further,	this	new	reality	is	falling	in	line	with	
liberal	(e.g.	cosmopolitan)	conceptions	of	citizenship—those	built	on	shared	definitions	of	
human	rights,	not	solely	on	one’s	birth	location	or	family	lineage—and	has	even	received	calls	
to	be	considered	a	human	right	(Spiro	2010).		
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Figure	4:	Trend	in	dual	citizenship	policy	adoption	among	practicing	countries.	(n=131)	
	
	
Unlike	the	legislative	policies	surrounding	naturalization	and	the	basic	definitions	of	
citizen,	dual	citizenship	laws	are	fairly	muddled.	Dual	citizenship	statuses	have	tended	to	exist	
as	bureaucratic	loopholes.	Early	forms	of	the	laws	often	surrounded	children	born	in	jus	soli	
regions	to	non-national	parents	and	being	forced	to	decide	which	country	they	“belonged	to.”	
Further,	these	decisions	were	intended	to	be	made	by	the	time	the	child	reached	the	legal	age	
of	adulthood.		As	such,	when	the	child	was	no	longer	a	dependent	of	their	parents,	they	were	
required	to	declare	their	allegiance.	However,	it	should	be	noted	that	in	these	cases,	the	dual	
citizenship	status	had	an	expiration	date.	States	recognized	that	children	were	tied	to	their	
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parents	and,	thereby,	subject	to	their	decisions,	but	also	that	the	norm	of	single-nation	
citizenship	should	be	upheld.	
A	second	state	of	dual	citizenship	relies	on	the	renunciation	of	former	statuses.	In	these	
cases,	individuals	can	become	dual	citizens	after	becoming	naturalized	into	a	country	that	does	
not	require	them	to	renounce	their	other	statuses	as	part	of	the	legal	process.	Once	that	
naturalization	process	is	complete,	the	individual	is	of	two	countries,	and	this	ambiguity	shows	
up	across	nations	without	stated	dual	citizenship	policies.	The	Philippines	(Philippines	2003),	
Egypt	(Egypt	1975),	Hong	Kong	(GovHK	2017,	Ong	1999)	and	the	US	(U.S.	Department	of	State	
Foreign	Affairs	2005)	are	among	world	countries	that	have	this	ambiguity	present	in	their	
policies.	While	dual	citizenship	may	not	be	officially	endorsed,	it	is	still	a	potential	reality	for	
those	living	in	these	regions.	In	the	case	of	Hong	Kong,	the	process	of	maintaining	dual	
citizenship	is	particularly	convoluted.	Hong	Kong	has	been	subject	to	China’s	citizenship	laws,	
which	explicitly	ban	dual	citizenship,	since	the	British	ceded	sovereignty	in	1997.	However,	
Hong	Kong’s	place	as	a	world	economic	and	business	center	allowed	it	some	freedom	as	to	how	
the	law	was	enforced.	As	such,	citizens	of	Hong	Kong	who	held	multiple	passports,	or	later	
gained	additional	ones,	would	only	lose	the	documents	if	the	they	filed	to	have	their	new	
nationality	formally	recognized	(Ong	1999).	This	allowed	for	the	proliferation	of	the	flexible	
citizens	Ong	(1999)	observed,	since	individuals	could	hold	numerous	passports,	as	long	as	they	
did	not	file	the	paperwork.	As	Ukrainian	governor	Ihor	Dniepropitrovsk	noted	when	asked	
about	holding	three	passports	despite	dual	citizenship	being	illegal	in	his	country,	“Yes	[it	is	
illegal].	But	it	[the	Ukrainian	constitution]	does	not	say	anything	about	triple	nationality.”	
(Abrahamian	2015:74).	
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However,	as	my	results	have	shown,	dual	citizenship	policies	have	begun	to	be	included	
in	updated	national	laws	and	public	statements	across	the	globe,	thereby	institutionalizing	the	
status.	Finland’s	immigration	service	webpage	(Finnish	Immigration	Service	2017)	notes	that	
dual	citizenship	is	acknowledged	by	the	government.	However,	it	does	warn	dual	citizens	that	
they	may	not	be	treated	as	a	Finnish	citizen	by	states	that	do	not	recognize	dual	citizenship.	In	
2012,	the	Haitian	government	struck	a	series	of	amendments	from	its	1987	constitution,	
making	a	path	through	which	dual	citizenship	became	law	(DiLeonardo	2012).	A	caveat	to	the	
Haitian	plan	is	that	dual	citizenship	holders	are	barred	from	running	for	“four	key	political	
positions—president,	prime	minister,	senator	or	member	of	the	lower	house	of	Parliament,	the	
[sic]	Chamber	of	Deputies”	(Delva	2012).		
	 Economic	concerns	are	also	at	play	when	countries	elect	to	adopt	dual	citizenship	
policy.	Table	1	outlines	the	top	ten	national	recipients	of	remittances	in	2016,	taking	into	
account	their	dual	citizenship	laws	and	government	type.	From	this,	eight	of	the	ten	countries	
have	some	sort	of	dual	citizenship	law	in	place,	and	the	same	number	are	classified	as	non-
authoritarian	regimes	(the	outliers	are	China	and	Egypt,	and	China	and	Nigeria,	respectively).	
When	considering	the	amount	of	foreign	direct	investment	(FDI)	in	each	country,	China	is	the	
highest	recipient	among	these	countries,	and	receives	the	third	highest	amount	of	monetary	
investment	worldwide,	behind	the	US	and	Germany	(Laudicina	&	Peterson	2017).	Taken	
together,	remittances	and	FDI	numbers	are	indicative	of	national	economies	that	benefit	from	
foreign-based	(or	earned)	money.		
The	billions	of	dollars	being	sent	home	from	foreign-based	workers	is	a	boon	to	the	local	
economies	receiving	the	funds.	Recipients	inject	money	into	local	businesses	via	their	
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purchases,	payments	for	housing,	and	the	national	government	via	sales	taxes	and	other	fees.	
From	a	Marxist	perspective,	easing	limits	on	the	amount	of	money	foreign-based	workers	send	
home	while	lowering	the	taxation	rate	of	these	transactions,	thereby	making	it	easier	for	
money	to	be	sent	“home,”	is	a	free	source	of	capital	for	the	government	and	capitalists	(Marx	
1972).	They	receive	the	benefits	of	a	worker’s	labor—in	this	case,	the	money	sent	to	family—
without	having	to	provide	the	capital	required	to	produce	anything.	Thus,	lowering	the	barriers	
to	getting	remittances	into	the	hands	of	local	consumers,	renters,	laborers	is	beneficial	to	the	
state’s	elite.	
Table	1:	Top	10	Recipients	of	Remittances	
Country	 Remittances	(in	
thousands	of	USD,	
2016)^	
Foreign	Direct	
Investment	
(2017)+	
Dual	
Citizenship	
Status	
Regime	Type	
India	 $62,745,000.00	 $44.2	billion	 Allowed	 Non-Authoritarian	
China	 $35,225,583.77	 $135.6	billion	 Not	Allowed	 Authoritarian	
Philippines	 $31,144,632.28	 $5.2	billion	 Allowed	 Non-Authoritarian	
Mexico	 $28,667,958.48	 $30.3	billion	 Allowed	 Non-Authoritarian	
France	 $24,220,419.13	 $42.9	billion	 Allowed	 Non-Authoritarian	
Pakistan	 $19,846,568.13	 $864.7	million	 Allowed	 Non-Authoritarian	
Nigeria	 $18,956,000.00	 $3.1	billion	 Allowed	 Authoritarian	
Germany	 $16,683,183.24	 $31.7	billion	 Allowed	 Non-Authoritarian	
Egypt	 $16,584,486.59	 $6.9	billion	 Not	Allowed	 Non-Authoritarian	
Bangladesh	 $13,679,834.11	 $2.2	billion	 Allowed	 Non-Authoritarian	
^	values	from	(World	Bank	2017),	+	values	from	(Heritage	Foundation	2017)	
While	the	previous	situations	highlight	the	actions	of	those	in	favor	of	dual	citizenship	
policies,	it	is	worth	remembering	that	there	are	still	nations	and	populations	that	have	come	
out	against	the	status.	Aside	from	explicitly	barring	individuals	from	gaining	the	status,	there	
are	public	political	debates	calling	into	question	the	goals	of	dual	citizens	and	their	legitimacy.	
In	addition	to	previously	mentioned	ongoing	debate	surrounding	German	dual	citizenship,	a	
brief	article	from	the	Kuwait	Times	(2015)	website	outlined	how	the	Kuwaiti	government’s	
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Nationality	and	Passports	Department	was	in	the	process	of	gathering	data	on	suspected	dual	
citizens.	While	the	information	discussing	why	the	individuals	were	selected	was	limited,	the	
government	was	contemplating	revoking	their	national	statuses.	Similarly,	ten	former	citizens	
of	Oman	were	stripped	of	their	citizenship	for	being	dual	nationals	(Al	Mukrashi	2016).	To	close	
some	of	the	bureaucratic	loopholes,	Russia—which	allows	dual	citizenship—made	hiding	dual	
citizenship	a	criminal	offence	in	2014	(Vityazeva	2014).	Those	failing	to	report	theirs,	or	their	
children’s,	second	passport	within	two	months	of	receiving	it	would	be	subject	to	a	monetary	
fine—estimated	to	be	between	$14	and	$28—and	if	it	was	proven	that	the	status	was	
intentionally	hidden,	offenders	would	be	fined	approximately	$5,530	“or	be	obliged	to	perform	
400	hours	of	compulsory	community	service”	(Vityazeva	2014).		
Certainly,	what	one	sees	in	these	examples	is	the	push	back	of	agents	against	liberal	
citizenship	norms	and	the	increasingly	popular	script	of	dual	citizenship.	As	such,	it	is	necessary	
to	remember	that	while	world	society	theory	exists	within	a	world	culture	that	seems	
unavoidable	and	all	encompassing,	bureaucracies	also	have	mechanisms	in	place	to	allow	for	
limited	agentic	action,	or	deviance	from	the	norm.	Simply	because	an	individual	is	in	a	powerful	
position	and	is	confronted	with	a	script	others	have	adopted	does	not	mean	that	they	will	
unthinkingly	put	it	into	place.	Instead,	their	position	is	tied	to	the	authority	and	legitimacy	
granted	by	the	system;	it	is	limited	by	the	history	of	the	region	and	who	has	ruled	before.	One’s	
connection	to	history	is	where	script	non-adoption	can	occur,	and	countries	go	against	other	
similar	states.	Essentially,	this	is	what	can	allow	a	non-authoritarian	regime	to	eschew	dual	
citizenship	norms,	or	even	liberal	naturalization	policies,	while	some	authoritarian	regimes	
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embrace	liberal	citizenship	policies	while	their	allies	buttress	their	borders	with	exclusionary	
rules.	
The	rise	of	CIPs	stem	from	the	growing	acceptance	of	dual	citizenships,	but	the	
accessibility	of	these	programs	and	the	ethicality	of	selling	citizenship	has	become	focus	for	
scholarly	debate	(Shachar	&	Bauböck	2014).	In	general,	selling	citizenship	is	seen	as	negative	
due	to	its	trivializing	the	status	by	making	it	accessible	to	those	who	can	afford	it	(Armstrong,	
2014;	Berton	2014;	Spiro	2014),	thereby	exacerbating	the	already	classist	connections	group	
membership.	However,	there	is	a	line	of	thinking	that	suggests	that	nations	should	be	able	to	
treat	citizenship	as	a	commodity;	something	to	sell	or	give	away	as	they	deem	fit	(Hidalgo	2015;	
Paskalev	2014).	Ultimately,	the	state	is	the	body	granting	and/or	limiting	access	to	their	set	of	
rights,	so	the	sale	of	these	rights	is	just	the	state	further	extending	its	reach	in	this	realm.	
Given	the	open	marketplace	for	“golden	passports,”	those	with	the	financial	means	to	
undertake	the	process	gain	a	significant	advantage	over	those	who	have	limited	funds.	For	the	
right	price,	an	individual—and	sometimes	their	family—can	gain	the	travel	rights	and	access	the	
financial	institutions	of	a	participating	country.	Essentially,	if	one	can	afford	to	pay	the	
application	and	processing	fees	and	meet	the	basic	requirements	for	application,	they	can	gain	
access	to	a	new	set	of	rights.	From	the	perspective	of	citizenship	research,	this	area	has	
received	little	attention.	Apart	from	the	ethical	discussions	surrounding	whether	countries	
should	be	selling	a	status	that	others	access	via	birth,	scant	research	has	investigated	the	
development	of	policies,	spread	of	the	programs,	and	the	social	implications	of	their	use.	It	is	
within	these	areas	that	this	writing	can	add	insight.	Holistic	data	surrounding	CIPs	is,	generally,	
lacking.	It	is	difficult	to	find	accurate	estimates	of	how	many	people	are	annually	acquiring	
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citizenship	this	way,	the	demographics	of	CIP	applicants	(locale	of	birth,	income	level,	etc.),	and	
if	they	have	held,	or	currently	hold,	any	other	citizenships.	Internet	searches	for	CIPs	and	
countries	that	offer	them	often	lead	to	business	articles	summarizing	which	countries	are	the	
cheapest,	or	which	country’s	citizenship	has	the	“best	value”	for	the	investment.	In	addition	to	
these	lists,	one	can	easily	locate	law	firms	or	other	contractors	that	act	as	representatives	for	
CIP	applicants.	Essentially,	applicants	pay	these	firms	a	set	fee	(in	addition	to	the	CIP	
requirements)	and	they	will	complete	the	process.	
	 Superficially,	this	lack	of	general	data	can	be	troublesome.	How	do	researchers	gain	
insight	into	a	global	process	if	one	cannot	get	basic	information	about	who	is	utilizing	these	
programs	and	how	many	people	already	have?	Despite	such	uncertainties,	I	argue	that	
shedding	light	on	these	process,	even	in	the	broadest	forms,	will	help	future	work.	According	to	
the	extant	research	focusing	on	the	types	of	people	who	utilize	these	programs	(Altan-Olcay	&	
Balta	2016;	Ong	1999),	they	are	mainly	of	the	economic	elite.	Holding	multiple	citizenships	has	
become	a	sign	of	social	status	among	Southeast	Asian	businessmen	(Ong	1999)	and	gaining	
access	to	more	than	one	set	of	rights	can	give	children	a	substantive	advantage	over	their	
contemporaries	(Altan-Olcay	&	Balta	2016).	As	such,	I	would	not	be	surprised	to	see	possessing	
multiple	citizenships	as	a	modern	marker	of	one’s	membership	in	the	power	elite.		
Mills	(2000a)	noted	how	members	of	the	power	elite	not	only	live	a	lifestyle	that	many	
people	cannot	imagine—residing	in	mansions,	holding	memberships	in	exclusive	social	clubs,	
etc.—but	that	their	lifestyles	also	grant	them	privileged	access	to	various	institutions.	One	of	
the	fundamental	concerns,	was	that	members	of	the	elite	could	gain	influence	over	political	
leaders,	that	the	average	citizen	could	not,	thereby	having	their	concerns	viewed	as	more	
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important	than	the	general	population’s.	Within	this	thread,	flexible	citizens,	too,	could	gain	
influence	on	a	global	scale.	They	can	more	easily	traverse	national	borders	without	the	
restrictions	others	face	due	to	their	access	to	multiple	sets	of	rights.	They	can	be	active	in	
numerous	national	banking	systems	by	holding	property	and	business	interests	in	multiple	
countries.	Paired	with	the	prestige	of	having	a	“rights	portfolio,”	holding	multiple	citizenships	
creates	individuals	who	are,	in	some	ways,	“superior”	to	the	rest	of	society.		
My	central	focus	in	the	CIP	realm	is	how	these	programs	exacerbate	inequalities	
(Abrahamian	2015;	Ong	1999).	As	part	of	my	examination,	a	comprehensive	list	of	extant	CIPs	
has	been	compiled,	including	the	requirements	for	applying	for	citizenship	and	what	can	be	
gained	with	membership	(Table	2).	Ultimately,	those	who	can	afford	to	purchase	additional	
statuses	hold	a	significant	advantage	over	those	who	cannot.	Further,	parents	have	begun	to	
actively	seek	out	these	advantages	for	their	unborn	children	via	the	process	of	“birth	tourism”	
(Altan-Olcay	&	Balta	2016).	“Birth	tourism”	seeks	to	take	advantage	of	the	ambiguities	in	many	
countries’	citizenship	laws	by	creating	situations	where	children	are	born	as	dual	citizens;	
gaining	jus	soli	citizenship	by	being	born	in	a	specific	country	and	jus	sanguinis	based	citizenship	
from	their	parental	heritage.	These	children	are,	thus,	born	with	two	sets	of	rights,	whereas	
most	children	are	born	with	a	single	set.	
Such	economic	transactional	relationships	associated	with	citizenship	are	a	relatively	
new	phenomenon.	The	earliest	program	in	place	was	enacted	in	1984	by	St.	Kitts	&	Nevis.	For	a	
non-refundable	donation	of	$250,000	to	the	St.	Kitts	&	Nevis	Sugar	Industry	Diversification	
Foundation	or	$400,000	investment	in	local	real	estate,	applicants	could	gain	the	rights	
afforded	to	any	St.	Kitts	&	Nevis	birth	citizen	(Gittleson	2014).	Further,	these	rights	were	
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available	as	soon	as	an	applicant	had	been	approved,	guaranteeing	immediate	benefit	from	
their	donation.	The	travel	rights	associated	with	St.	Kitts	&	Nevis	citizenship	have	been	
particularly	alluring	to	certain	nationalities.	For	example,	Middle	Eastern	investors	can	gain	the	
ability	to	travel	to	the	United	States	without	having	to	undergo	the	normal	visa	process.	Instead	
of	waiting	for	months	to	be	approved	for	a	travel	visa,	Middle	Eastern	born	St.	Kitts	&	Nevis	
passport	holders	could,	instead,	produce	their	purchased	passport	for	their	identification,	
thereby	skipping	the	wait	period.	St.	Kitts	&	Nevis	citizenship	is	additionally	attractive	to	
investors	since	there	is	no	formal	period	of	required	residency	for	investors	to	maintain	their	
citizenship	status.	This	means	that	investors	could,	potentially,	have	the	entire	application	
process	taken	care	of	by	their	representatives	(e.g.	lawyer,	banker,	or	other	advisor)	and	
become	citizens	without	setting	foot	on,	or	residing	in,	the	islands.	
As	of	this	writing,	42	nations	have	implemented	some	form	of	CIP,	with	most	programs	
being	founded	after	2010.		While	the	St.	Kitts	&	Nevis	plan	is	among	the	least	expensive	and	
minimally	restrictive	policies	in	place,	it	does	not	represent	what	many	programs	look	like.	For	
most	policies,	there	are	government	mandates	on	how	the	application	investment	will	be	used	
and	a	residency	period	is	required	to	become	eligible	for	application.	In	addition,	some	period	
of	residency	is	often	required	to	maintain	one’s	citizenship	status.	For	example,	Spain’s	CIP	
requires	that	investors	spend	at	least	185	days	per	calendar	year	in	Spain,	or	risk	forfeiting	their	
citizenship	documents	(Lobel	2015).	Further,	CIPs	are	not	only	attractive	to	countries	who	may	
be	struggling,	as	was	the	case	with	Comoros	discussed	earlier.	Post-industrial,	modern	nation-
states,	such	as	the	United	States	and	Austria,	have	elected	to	have	some	variation	of	CIP	in	
place	to	help	attract	valuable	immigrant	groups	(Business	Investor	Immigration	2016;	
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Henderson	2016;	U.S.	Citizenship	and	Immigration	Services	2016).	Within	these	systems,	
instead	of	a	financial	donation	leading	directly	to	citizenship,	it	acts	as	a	“point”	in	the	numeric	
scoring	system	designed	to	rate	incoming	migrants	(Walsh	2011).	Such	scoring	allows	for	the	
neoliberal	values	of	profit	and	economic	value	to	be	attached	to	each	immigrant,	and	those	
who	score	higher	in	their	assessments—business	creators,	higher	educated	applicants,	etc.—
are	more	likely	to	be	granted	access	(Ong	2006;	Walsh	2011,	2012).	So,	even	when	access	to	
economic	capital	cannot	directly	purchase	group	membership,	it	can	buy	credits	toward	
attaining	the	status.	
Despite	the	variability	present	in	CIPs,	one	shared	thread	is	that	these	systems	exploit	
the	increasingly	influential	world	scripts	that	hold	citizenship	rights	should	be	less	based	on	
geography	and	more	on	transnational	rights	regimes.	In	this	sense,	CIPs	are	the	most	liberal	
form	of	modern	citizenship	since	it	can	free	individuals	from	geographic	land	lock	and	allows	
them	to	select	from	the	rights	and	accesses	that	best	suit	them.	Yet,	this	freedom	of	choice	is	
not	available	to	everyone.	As	previously	noted,	the	high	price-tag	associated	with	these	
programs	make	them	a	reality	for	a	select	class	of	individuals.	Those	who	already	experience	
higher	rates	of	local	freedom	due	to	their	decreased	dependencies,	stand	to	gain	international	
movement	and	increased	access	to	foreign	tools.	As	such,	CIPs	are	not	a	remedy	to	Shachar’s	
(2009)	concerns	surrounding	citizenship	as	an	unearned	birthright.	If	anything,	these	programs	
further	exacerbate	issues	of	inequality	by	giving	the	affluent	a	decided	advantage	over	other	
social	classes.	
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Table	2:	Summary	of	World	Citizenship-by-Investment	Programs	(CIPs)	
Country	(Year)	 Required	Investment	 Type	of	
Visa/Document	
Summary	of	Additional	Qualifying	Requirements	
Antigua	&	
Barbuda	(2013)	
	
$	200,000	-	$	300,000	 CIP	 Contribution	to	the	National	Development	Fund	(NDF),	5	days	spent	in	country	
during	period	of	5	years	
Australia	(2014)	 $	200,000,	$	1.5million,	$	
15million	AUD	
	
Business	Innovation	
&	Investment	
Must	score	at	least	65pts	during	application	evaluation	to	qualify	
Austria	(n/a)	 €	2	-	€10	million	 Direct	Citizenship	 Austrian	government	must	approve	of	charitable	organization	receiving	
donation	
	
Belgium	(n/a)	
	
€	500,000	 Investor	Visa	 Continuous	residence	fast-tracks	naturalization	process	
	
Brazil	(2012)	 $	65,000	 Investor	Visa	 Must	reside	in	country	for	at	least	18months	over	4	years	to	apply	for	full	
citizenship	
	
Bulgaria	(2009)	 €	250,000	-	€	1	million	 Investor	Program	for	
Residence	&	
Citizenship	
Eligible	to	apply	for	full	citizenship	in	2-5	years,	depending	on	investment	
Canada	*	(2015)	 $	800,000	-	$	1,600,000	
CAN	
Investor	Program	 Possess	management	experience	in	farming,	commercial,	or	industrial	business	
and	plan	to	employ	at	least	one	national	in	business	(depending	on	investment)	
	
China	**	
(2012-2015)	
	
$	10	million	HKD	 Capital	Investment	
Entrant	Scheme	
Investment	must	go	toward	CIES	eligible	group	
Colombia	(n/a)	
	
$	89,000	 TP-7	Visa	(Residency	
Investor)	
Real	estate	investment	worth	100,	350,	or	650	times	the	local	minimum	wage	
(depending	on	length	of	visa)	
	
Cyprus	(2013)	 €	2.5	-	€5	million	 Cyprus	Citizenship	
by	Investment	
Program	
	
Investment	must	go	towards	purchase	of	real	estate	
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Dominica	(n/a)	 $	100,000	
	
Dominica	Economic	
Citizenship	
	
An	in-person	interview	must	be	performed,	in	addition	to	monetary	investment	
and	application	
Ecuador	(2013)	
	
$	30,000	 Visa	9-II	 Investment	must	be	in	made	in	agriculture	or	export	commerce	industries	
	
France	^	 n/a	 Investment	Type	
Visa	
	
Make	a	qualifying	investment	in	a	French	business	
Germany		
(2009-2012)	
	
€	250,000	 n/a	 Investment	must	go	toward	a	German	company	and	create	at	least	10	jobs	
Greece	(2013)	 €	250,000	 Law	4146/2013	 Investment	must	go	towards	real	estate	
	
Hungary	(2013)	 €	300,000	 Residency	Bond	
Program	
	
Investment	in	Hungarian	government	bonds	
India	^	 $	1.5	Million	 n/a	 Investments	totaling	between	100-250	million	Rupees	over	3	years	and	create	
20	Indian	jobs	
	
Iran	^	 n/a	 n/a	 n/a	
	
Ireland	(2012)	 €	450,000	-	950000	 Immigrant	Investor	
Programme	
	
Investment	in	government	hybrid	bonds	and	personal	real	estate	
Italy	(2014)	 €	300,000	 Golden	Visa	
	
Engage	local	chamber	of	commerce	approved	self-employment	entrepreneurial	
activity	
	
Latvia	(2010)	 €	250,000	 Residency	Visa	 Investment	in	Latvian	company,	real	estate	purchase,	or	bank	deposits	(as	
outlined	in	policy)	
	
Lithuania	(2014)	
	
$	19,000	 Investment	Visa	
	
Start	company	with	minimum	capital	start-up	of	$19,000	
Malaysia	(2010)	
	
$	32,700	-	$	327,000	 MM2H	 Investment	in	real	estate	
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Malta	(2014)	 €	150,000	-	€	650,000	 Individual	
Investment	
Programme	
	
Investment	in	property,	bonds,	and/or	the	local	economy	
Mexico	(n/a)	
	
$	86,000	 Investment	Visa	 Unspecified	business	investment	
	
Netherlands	
(2013)	
	
€	1.25	Million		
	
Golden	Visa	 Investment	in	Dutch	business	
New	Zealand	
(n/a)	
	
$	1.5	-$	10	Million	NZD	
	
Investor	2	Category	 Investment	must	be	made	over	a	4-year	period	
Nicaragua	(n/a)	 $60,000		 Pension	Visa	 Investment	must	be	made	to	a	Nicaraguan	charity	or	go	towards	a	local	
business	start-up	
	
Panama	(n/a)	 $	40,000	-	$	150,000	 Reforestation	or	
Person	of	Means	
	
Investment	toward	reforestation	program	or	to	create	local	business	to	employ	
at	least	3	Panamanians	
Paraguay	(2012)	 $	8,576	-	$	25,729	 Sistema	Unificado	de	
Apertura	y	Cierre	de	
Empresas	
	
Investment	towards	starting	a	business	in	the	country	
Philippines	
(2006)	
	
$	72,000		 Special	Investors	
Residence	Visa	
	
Investments	must	be	made	via	a	nationally	accredited	depository	bank	
Portugal	(2012)	 €	500,000							LLLLLLLL	 Residency	Visa	
	
Investment	must	go	towards	real	estate	purchase	and/or	a	business	that	
creates	at	least	10	jobs	
	
Singapore	
(2012)	
$	2.5	million	SD	 Global	Investor	
Programme	
	
Invest	in	an	existing	business	or	fund	a	new	local	company	
South	Africa	
(2014)	
	
5,000,000	ZAR	
	
Business	Visa	 Investment	must	go	towards	a	business	where	at	least	60%	of	staff	are	South	
Africans	
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South	Korea	
(n/a)	
	
$	5	Million	 D8	Visa	 Invest	in	business	start-up	
Spain	(2013)	 €	500,000	-	€	1	million	 Residency	Visa	
	
Invest	in	Spanish	real	estate,	buying	shares	in	local	businesses,	or	national	bank	
deposits	
	
St.	Kitts	&	Nevis	
(1984)	
	
$	250,000	-	$	400,000	 CIP	 Investment	must	be	in	real	estate	or	charitable	donation	
	
	
Switzerland	
(n/a)	
	
$	250,000	 Immigrant	Investor	
Program	
	
Investment	must	go	towards	a	business	start-up	that	will	employ	Swiss	citizens	
Thailand	(2014)	
	
10	Million	THB	 Investor	Visa	 Invest	in	government	bonds	or	a	condominium	unit	
	
UAE	(n/a)	
	
10,000	-	20,000	AED	 Investor	Visa	 Business	investment	
	
United	Kingdom	
(2008)	
	
£	50,000	-	£1	million	
	
UK	Tier	1	
(Investor	Visa)	
	
Invest	in	a	government	approved	industry	
United	States	
(1990)	
	
$500,000		 EB-5	 Invest	in	US	businesses	that	will	produce	at	least	10	local	jobs	per	investor	
	
*CIP	only	available	in	Quebec.		
**Policy	in	place	in	Hong	Kong	prior	to	UK	withdrawal.		
^Policy	is	in	development
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Buying	Your	Way	to	Freedom	
The	results	of	this	research	suggest	that	while	adoption	of	liberal	citizenship	policies	is	
on	the	rise,	they	are	not	uniformly	adopted	at	present.	What	factors	may	be	influencing	those	
who	are	making	such	decisions?	First,	and	as	outlined	earlier	in	the	chapter,	a	country’s	political	
regime	plays	a	role	in	policy.	Generally,	within	authoritarian	nations,	public	discussion	of	policy	
is	closed,	thereby	giving	the	leader	independence	to	form	policy	in	an	environment	free	from	
backlash.	In	addition,	scholars	associate	liberal	citizenship	norms	with	non-authoritarian	
regime,	and	expect	to	see	democracy	and	liberal	norms	paired	with	one	another	frequently	
(Hampshire	2013;	Joppke	1998;	Spiro	2008).	Second,	a	country’s	distinct	history	has	an	
influence	on	its	policy	adoption.	Whether	the	country	has	broken	away	from	a	former	colonial	
power	(Bendix	1977)	or	been	formed	by	the	influx	of	immigrant	groups	(Bloemraad	2005)	
affects	future	relationships	with	immigrant	groups.	While	countries	founded	on	immigration	
may	be	more	likely	to	welcome	new	(potential)	citizens,	those	who	had	dealt	with	forced	
occupations	may	be	more	likely	to	seek	a	single	ethnocultural	state.			
Third,	modern	views	of	immigrant	groups	influence	policy	makers,	and	this	relationship	
goes	two	different	ways.	It,	first,	is	a	behavior	transmitted	to	the	masses	from	influential	
individuals	in	that	they	can	access	the	means	of	communication	and	make	their	beliefs	
known—via	interviews,	press	releases,	etc.	Conversely,	the	masses	can	also	influence	policy	by	
calling	for	those	in	power	to	augment	policy	or	to	focus	on	a	specific	issue.	As	such,	the	modern	
view	of	immigrants	is	subject	to	not	only	affect	how	elites	dictate	discussions	about	them,	but	
can	also	be	driven	by	mass	opinions	on	such	groups.	Finally,	I	posit	that	a	country’s	connections	
to	other	nations	play	a	role	in	policy	adoption.	Activity	in	any	international	forum	increases	
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contact	between	states,	and	thereby	the	exchange	of	ideas	(Rogers	2003).	Further,	these	
interactions	are	more	likely	to	result	in	policy	adoption	by	subordinate	countries	if	influential	
states	are	using	the	ideas,	institutions,	and	structures	(Meyer	&	Rowan	1983).		
Prior	to	further	elucidating	these	four	areas	of	influence	in	policy	adoption,	one	should	
remember	the	fundamental	processes	outlined	within	world	society	theory	for	policy	
transmission.	These	scripts—whether	they	be	about	citizenship,	educational,	or	financial	
policies—are	exposed	to	states	via	their	acceptance	by	other	actors.	Therefore,	the	more	states	
that	enact	a	given	institution	or	rule,	the	more	legitimacy	it	gains.	As	the	levels	of	legitimacy	
surrounding	a	process	increase,	it	also	gains	authority	as	a	greater	number	of	states	adopt	it.	
Finally,	in	this	work,	states	are	seen	to	adopt	policies	via	the	isomorphic	mechanisms	(coercive	
and	mimetic)	described	by	DiMaggio	&	Powell	(1983).	
A	recent	study	(Mirilovic	2015)	adds	quantitative	support	to	my	qualitative	findings	and	
sheds	light	into	the	mechanisms	at	play	here.	The	results	of	the	study	found	that	authoritarian	
and	non-authoritarian	regimes	were	more	likely	to	accept	dual	citizenship	due	to	differing	
levels	of	emigration,	and	what	that	emigration	population	looked	like.	Generally	speaking,	high	
levels	of	emigration	were	indicative	of	a	higher	likelihood	to	enact	dual	citizenship	policies	
among	non-authoritarian	regimes,	while	authoritarian	regimes	experiencing	high	levels	of	
emigration	were	less	likely	to	embrace	such	policies.	These	results	were	still	supported	when	
considering	the	educational	levels	of	the	emigrant	population.	Losing	highly	educated	citizens	
motivated	non-authoritarian	states	to	enact	dual	citizenship,	thereby	keeping	those	individuals	
enmeshed	in	the	national	landscape.	
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While	Mirilovic’s	(2015)	findings	effectively	highlight	the	statistical	effects	of	political	
regime,	diaspora	population,	remittances,	and	emigrant	demographics	on	policy	adoption,	it	
lacks	in-depth	discussion	of	other	external	factors	that	may	not	be	measureable	using	
quantitative	methods.	While	his	analysis	includes	a	variable	considering	the	historical	status	of	
a	country	(former	colony	or	not),	it	would	be	difficult	to	quantify	how	a	country	developed	its	
citizenship	policies.	Did	it	follow	the	Marshallian	timeline	or	did	the	country	“skip	ahead”	to	
consider	universal	human	rights	prior	to	establishing	civil	rights?	Did	the	country	in	question	
“evolve”	as	Marshall’s	process	suggests?	Further,	there	is	no	consideration	of	the	popular	
feelings	towards	immigrants.	As	previously	noted,	and	as	will	be	discussed	in	greater	length	
next	chapter,	popular	opinion	about	immigrants	has	a	significant	influence	on	who	is	deemed	a	
“worthy”	immigrant	group,	and	which	is	excluded.	It	is	within	these	numeric	blind	spots	that	I	
seat	my	policy	influence	processes.	The	qualitative	evidence	adds	credence	to	the	quantitative	
claims,	and	vice-versa,	thereby	creating	a	more	holistic	view	of	the	policy	adoption	process.	
The	second	factor	influencing	citizenship	policy	adoption	is	based	in	the	local	historical	
context.	A	country’s	relationship	with	and	conceptions	of	citizenship	guide	local	understandings	
of	the	status.	Within	the	Marshallian	process,	modern	citizenship	is	something	that	arose	in	
Western	Europe	at	the	end	of	the	feudal	era	(Bendix	1977;	Marshall	&	Bottomore	1992).	The	
French	Revolution	provided	the	groundwork	for	the	modern	Western	understanding	of	citizen,	
where	an	electorate	could	be	trusted	to	guide	their	country’s	future	via	free	elections,	and	
receive	legal	protections	from	state	action	(Brubaker	1992).	Instead	of	the	populous	being	
labeled	subjects	and	existing	at	the	whim	of	the	elite,	citizenship	attempted	to	extend	rights	
across	the	group	with	a	goal	of	increasing	freedom.		
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Simultaneously,	the	concept	of	the	nation-state	was	gaining	ground.	Instead	of	lands	
being	divided	into	fiefdoms,	states	developed	as	sovereign	regions	under	the	control	of	
identifiable	leadership.	Geographic	boundaries	gave	distinct	borders	to	a	state’s	reach,	thereby	
allowing	for	a	simple	delineation	between	“us”	and	“them.”	Further,	within	states,	citizens	
were	now	allowed,	given	their	new	citizenship	statuses,	to	push	for	expanded	rights	coverage.	
Benhabib	(2005),	channeling	Kant,	suggests	that	sovereignty	is	dependent	on	society,	while	the	
republican	form	of	constitution	provided	the	blueprint	for	future	national	documents.	Further,	
the	logistics	of	the	nation-state	and	definitions	surrounding	who	received	rights,	procedures	for	
crossing	borders,	and	expectations	from	neighboring	regions	were	all	developed	during	this	
period.	During	colonialism,	these	conceptions	of	the	nation-state	and	citizenship	were	
transferred	to	an	empire’s	colonies.	Ramirez	and	Meyer	(1998)	note	that	these	scripts	were	
“aggressively	exported”	(60),	instead	of	selectively	copied	via	isomorphism.	Therefore,	Western	
definitions	of	“citizen”	and	“nation-state”	were	forced	on	other,	non-Western,	regions.	
Adherence	to	these	scripts	was	required,	regardless	of	the	prior	cultural	and	social	mechanisms	
in	place.	
Such	aggressive	export	of	norms	to	a	region	could	produce	a	myriad	of	local	responses,	
but	for	our	purposes	generalities	should	be	the	focus.	Cases	arise	where	the	receiving	country,	
or	colony,	adopt	the	system	and	it	is	kept	in	place	after	the	region	gains	independence.	One	
sees	these	sorts	of	outcomes	in	various	post-colonial	settings	where	naturalization	processes	
adhere	to	the	world	script—such	as	Gabon	(French),	South	Africa	(Dutch	and	British),	and	Chile	
(Spain).	However,	the	reverse	is	also	true.	The	GCC	countries	are	prime	examples	where	their	
historical	existences	as	colonies—primarily	British—or	parts	of	the	Ottoman	Empire	created	
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citizenship	norms	running	counter	to	the	prevailing	scripts.	This	regional	cleavage	will	be	the	
topic	of	next	chapter.	
The	third	area	of	concern	is	immigrants’	status.	As	noted	earlier	in	this	work,	the	
conceptualization	of	the	“other”	affects	how	group	members	view	them.	If	immigrants	are	
viewed	as	hard	working	and	valued	members	of	society,	the	public	and	officials	may	be	more	
likely	to	support	inclusive	citizenship	policies	(Joppke	2010).	However,	if	the	immigrants	in	
question	are	viewed	as	flawed,	stricter	policies	may	be	employed.	What	is	true,	in	both	the	
adoption	and	rejection	of	such	policies,	is	that	perception	matters.		
My	findings	support	others	(Aktürk	2012;	Joppke	2003,	2005;	Sassen	1999;	Sejersen	
2008)	who	have	suggested	that	views	on	ethnicity	play	a	significant	role.	Germany’s,	the	UAE’s,	
and	Afghanistan’s	restrictive	naturalization	laws	emphasizing	membership	in	the	dominant	
ethnic	group	harkens	back	to	a	group’s	concern	over	“the	other.”	A	fear	over	other	ethnicities	
somehow	polluting	the	whole	can	drive	policy	decisions	to	select	one	group	over	another,	or	to	
bar	non-native	ethnicities	completely	(Aktürk	2012;	Appadurai	2006;	Brand	2006;	Brubaker	
1992).	Allowing	a	small	number	of	“outsiders”	into	the	fold	could	cause	the	whole	nation	to	
become	tainted,	thereby	fundamentally	changing	who	“we”	are	(Douglas	1994).		Notions	that	
ethnicity	acts	as	a	foundational	element	of	the	nation	can	mean	that	groups	are	less	likely	to	
accept	outsiders.		
Finally,	a	country’s	status	on	the	world-stage	and	relationships	to	other	nation-states	is	
at	play.	As	world	society	theory	suggests,	one	expects	heavily	integrated	countries	to	be	
exposed	to	world	scripts	at	higher	rates	than	unincorporated	states	(Meyer	2010).	Further,	
these	scripts	gain	legitimacy	and	authority	through	their	repetition,	thereby	aiding	to	their	
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influence.	Influential	individuals	can	act	within	the	freedoms	of	their	bureaucratic	station.	As	
such,	if	their	title	and	responsibilities	grant	them	the	space	to	decide,	it	can	be	made.	If	they	are	
unable	to	enact	policy	alone,	perhaps	they	could	become	influential	in	the	process.	
But	what	does	one	make	of	scholars’	(Isin	2000;	Moeller	2006;	among	others)	claims	
that	the	state	is	withering?	If	world	scripts	hold	such	great	influence	and	there	are	indications	
that	liberal	citizenship	norms	based	in	universal	human	rights	are	becoming	the	norm,	is	the	
state	destined	to	die?	At	this	stage	in	history,	I	would	assert	that	while	there	has	been,	indeed,	
a	change	in	our	formulations	of	citizenship,	both	it,	and	the	nation-state,	are	on	firm	footing.	
Instead	of	a	rusted	and	broken	iron	cage	of	bureaucracy,	what	exists	is	a	remodeled	one	that	
considers	our	increased	mobility	and	global	connections.	However,	despite	these	new	confines,	
humanity	must	still	contend	with	our	“old	problems”	of	unequal	opportunity	and	economic	
freedom;	and,	oftentimes,	rely	on	the	state	to	remedy	them.	Until	there	are	IGOs	and	INGOs	
possessing	the	authority	to	enforce	global	rights	regimes,	there	is	little	other	choice.		
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Chapter	6	
The	Case	of	the	Gulf	Cooperation	Council	
	
	 In	previous	chapters,	the	transmission	of	the	liberal	norms	of	citizenship	have	been	
examined.	As	I	have	outlined,	the	acceptance,	or	non-adoption,	of	world	scripts	is	based	on	an	
expanded	system	of	geographic	and	cultural	factors	that	unequally	affect	decision	making	
actors.	The	first	factor	influencing	the	state’s	decision	to	adopt	liberal	citizenship	policies	to	
consider,	as	I	mentioned	earlier,	is	the	type	of	political	regime	in	power.	The	quantitative	data	
of	Mirilovic’s	work	(2015)	and	my	qualitative	findings,	with	some	important	caveats,	support	
this	statement.	While	non-authoritarian	regimes	are	more	likely	to	adopt	inclusive	
naturalization	and	dual	citizenship	policies,	Mirilovic	(2015)	notes	that	the	size	and	education	
level	of	the	emigrant	group	in	question	can	have	significant	effects	on	a	country’s	dual	
citizenship	policy.	While	I	agree	that	a	country’s	diaspora,	relationship	with	immigrant	
populations,	and	political	regime	affect	dual	policy	adoption,	I	add	to	his	conclusion	by	
including	substantive	factors—local	history,	national	economy,	and	views	held	towards	
outsiders—that	have	not	been	included	in	similar	studies	and	that	may	be	hard	to	measure	
with	traditional	quantitative	methods.	
	 The	second	possible	factor	to	consider,	is	the	history	of	the	region.	In	the	broader	cases	
highlighted	in	the	last	two	chapters,	a	nation-state’s	history	can	lead	to	governments	adopting	
dual	citizenship	policies	based	on	their	understandings	of	citizens’	rights,	role	of	the	nation-
state	in	providing	such	rights,	and	historical	status.	Third,	views	of	the	“other”	must	be	
considered.	If	influential	actors	view	immigrant	populations	as	fundamentally	different	from	
the	general	population,	policies	calling	for	equal	treatment	are	likely	to	fall	on	deaf	ears.	
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Further,	if	the	general	population	views	immigrants	as	“less-than,”	they	will	be	less	likely	to	
pressure	political	actors	to	adopt	liberal	citizenship	policies.	Finally,	the	fourth	factor	
influencing	policy	adoption	considers	international	connectivity.	World	scripts	pass	more	easily	
between	countries	if	they	are	in	frequent	contact	with	international	bodies	or	other	countries;	
thus,	highly	enmeshed	countries	are	more	likely	to	have	frequent	contact	with	predominant	
norms,	and	have	more	reason	to	adopt	them,	when	compared	to	more	independent	nations.		
	 While	it	is	beyond	the	scope	of	this	work	to	measure	the	direct	influence	of	each	of	the	
previous	factors’	influences	on	national	policy	adoption,	I	present	a	case	where	a	series	of	
countries	that	are	active	in	the	international	economy	have	eschewed	liberal	citizenship	norms,	
subscribing	exclusively	to	the	ascriptive	forms	of	blood	and	soil:	the	GCC.	After	providing	a	brief	
history	of	the	GCC	and	its	membership,	I	will	discuss	how	the	countries’	authoritarian	
autonomy,	ideological	disagreements	based	in	the	nation-state	and	local	history,	economic	
status,	and	views	on	guestworkers	have	affected	the	region.	Within	these	characteristics,	one	
can	observe	a	group	of	countries	that	have	shown	strength	in	their	resolve	by	standing	against	
the	scripts	of	liberal	citizenship	norms.	However,	this	stand	has	created	significant	economic	
and	social	issues	surrounding	citizenship	and	human	rights	for	populations	of	workers.		
	 A	final	introductory	note	must	address	prior	issues	found	in	many	Western-based	
evaluations	of	Middle	Eastern	countries.	Western	researchers	have,	historically,	treated	the	
Middle	East	as	a	cultural	and	political	monolith	(Said	1993,	1994;	Sick	1994;	Vogel	1994).	Too	
frequently,	the	subtleties	of	local	variation	were	lost	in	efforts	to	exoticize	a,	seemingly	
“homogenous”	people.	“Middle	Easterners”	were	so	disparate	from	“Westerners”	that	there	
was	no	way	they	could	ever	understand	one	another,	fully,	let	alone	account	for	the	variety	of	
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histories	present	in	the	distant	region.	Further,	as	these	attitudes	took	hold,	not	only	in	
academia	but	also	in	various	other	cultural	items—such	as	literature,	art,	and	theater—,	a	
chasm	opened	between	the	West	and	Middle	East,	creating	an	absolute	boundary	between	
those	deemed	“Western”	and	everyone	else	(Said	1993).	As	Edward	Said	(1993)	noted,	
imperialism	and	colonization	created	“different	species”	(p.108)	who	required	different	
treatments;	the	colonizer	to	rule,	and	the	colonized	to	serve.		
	 Westerners	justified	this	taxonomic	evolution	by	stressing	an	inherent	dominance	in	
their	history.	The	Industrial	Revolution	had	modernized	Europe,	and	countries	that	had	not	
undergone	a	similar	process,	were	viewed	as	“backwards”	due	to	their	differing	beliefs.	Further,	
the	fruits	of	the	Revolution	became	justification	for	marginalization.	Noting	the	self-
aggrandizing	echo	chamber	of	many	Western	powers,	Said	(1993)	posited	that	in	such	thinking:		
There	is	an	impressive	circularity	here:	we	are	dominant	because	we	have	the	power	(industrial,	
technological,	military,	moral),	and	they	don’t,	because	of	which	they	are	not	dominant;	they	
are	inferior,	we	are	superior…and	so	on	and	so	on.	(p.106)	
	
As	such,	non-Western	or	preindustrial	groups	were	seen	as	missing	some	basic	characteristics	
to	make	them	“like	us,”	and	since	these	things	were	lacking,	they	will	never	be	our	equals.	
	 Thankfully,	modern	scholarship	considering	the	development	of	the	nation-state,	
applicability	of	democracy,	and	citizens’	rights	in	the	Middle	East	have	sought	to	chip-away	at	
such	generalities	and	stereotypes.	Instead	of	Middle	Eastern	countries	failing	to	adopt	
democracy	due	to	some	inherent	cultural	incompatibility,	non-adoption	became	a	product	of	
regional	history	(Sisk	1992).	A	more	holistic	approach	was	adopted	that	required	researchers	to	
account	for	history	and	culture	in	their	analyses,	not	only	the	economic	and	political	basis	for	
implementation.	This	research	is	seated	within	such	a	holistic	vein.	While	the	data	and	findings	
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in	the	following	pages	can	only	be	applied	to	the	GCC	countries,	it	tries	to	consider	citizenship	
script	adoption	from	all	angles.		
	
Characteristics	and	Composition	of	the	GCC	
	
Figure	5:	Map	of	GCC	Member	Countries	
	
	
	
	 The	founding	documents	for	the	establishment	of	the	GCC	were	authored	over	
approximately	three	months	in	1981	after	numerous	discussions	between	officials	dating	back	
to	the	late	1970s.	Representatives	of	the	six	participating	countries—Bahrain,	Kuwait,	Oman,	
Qatar,	the	KSA,	and	the	UAE—signed	the	agreement	on	May	26,	1981	(Nakhleh	1986;	Ramazani	
1988).	While	the	basis	for	the	agreement	was	in	the	religious,	social,	economic,	and	
demographic	similarities	among	the	nations,	there	is	some	disagreement	on	the	official	reasons	
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for	founding	the	Council	(Nakhleh	1986).	Experts	supporting	the	Council’s	founding	at	the	time	
noted	that	its	incorporation	would	accomplish	a	long-held	desire	of	a	united	Gulf	region,	based	
on	cultural	and	historical	similarities	(Ayubi	1995;	Nakhleh	1986).	However,	others	more	
skeptical	of	the	Council’s	goals	have	viewed	it	as	a	response	to	ongoing	contention	between	
neighboring	Iran	and	Iraq,	thus	creating	a	degree	of	national	security	for	the	members.	Within	
this	skepticism	have	been	claims	that	the	GCC	would	be	a	Middle	East-based,	armed	wing	of	the	
North	Atlantic	Treaty	Organization	(NATO).	This	meant	that	the	alliance	would	be	a	tool	to	
accomplish	US	goals	in	the	region	(including	increased	access	to	oil),	and	that	it	would	act	as	the	
“stalking	horse	of	Saudi	Arabia”	(Ramazani	1988:2),	making	it	an	instrument	to	be	used	in	some	
sort	of	future	military	conquest.	
	 Despite	experts’	disagreements	on	reasons	for	the	GCC’s	founding,	national	
representatives	who	signed	the	founding	declaration	cited	four	main	assumptions	about	the	
region	as	justification	for	the	coalition:	the	existence	of	a	naturally	ongoing	cooperation	of	the	
member	nations,	presenting	a	united	front	to	protect	their	region’s	interests,	maintaining	an	
autonomous	zone	and	preventing	foreign	influence,	and	a	belief	that	peace	in	the	Middle	East	
could	only	be	attained	with	a	“just”	resolution	of	the	Palestinian	conflict,	which	included	the	
formation	of	an	independent	Palestinian	state	(Nakhleh	1986).	However,	despite	the	Council’s	
aversion	to	outside	influence,	Vora	(2013)	notes	how	these	countries	are	rentier	states,	
garnering	most	of	their	national	income	from	the	renting	of	land	to	foreign	investors.		
	 Due	to	the	GCC’s	emphasis	on	attracting	foreign	investment	and	interest	in	expanding	
the	local	economies,	member	countries	have	formed	a	dependence	on	foreign	workers.	
Workers	are	needed	to	not	only	fill	low-skill	jobs	(e.g.	manual	labor	or	service	positions),	but	
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also	to	manage	these	groups	once	they’re	within	the	country.	The	opportunity	for	work	and	
existing	social	networks	in	the	receiving	country,	have	convinced	large	numbers	of	migrants	to	
come	to	the	Gulf	region.	While	numerous	countries	and	regions	have	experienced	similar	flows	
of	migrants	during	times	of	economic	boom	or	local	strife—be	it	famine,	war,	or	oppression—
the	demography	of	the	GCC	is	interesting	and	creates	a	unique	study.	As	outlined	in	Table	3,	
below,	in	the	period	between	2010	and	2014,	only	two	member	GCC	nations	had	more	than	50-
percent	of	their	total	populations	registered	as	nationals:	Oman	and	the	KSA.	Considering	the	
entire	Council,	nationals	make	up	a	slim	numeric	majority	of	the	region’s	population	(52-
percent)	(GLMM	2014).	
Table	3:	Total	population	and	percentage	of	nationals	and	non-nationals	in	GCC	countries.	(reproduced	from	
GLMM	2014)	
	 	 	 %	in	total	population	
Country	 date/period	 Total	
population	
Nationals	 Non-Nationals	
Bahrain	(1)	 June	2011	 1,195,020	 48.9	 51.1	
Kuwait	(2)	 End	October	2014	 4,079,698	 31.5	 68.9	
Oman	(3)	 mid-2014	 3,992,893	 56.6	 43.4	
Qatar	(4)	 April	2010	 1,699,435	 14.3	 85.7	
Saudi	Arabia	(5)	 mid-2013	 29,994,272	 67.6	 32.4	
United	Arab	Emirates	(6)	 mid-2010	 8,264,070	 11.5	 88.5	
Total*	 	 49,225,388	 52.0	 48.0	
*	Provides	the	sum	of	population	numbers	at	different	dates	between	April	2010	and	October	2014.	It	is	
representative	of	the	combined	total	population	at	all	the	listed	dates.	
	
Given	the	observed	multinational	demography	of	the	Council	and	its	dependence	on	
foreign	investment,	it	would	stand	to	reason	that	they	would	employ	more	liberal	approaches	
to	citizenship.	However,	the	opposite	appears	to	be	occurring,	where	very	few	individuals	meet	
the	basic	criteria	to	apply	for	naturalization.	In	addition,	some	of	those	in	power—for	example	
Sheikh	Mohammed	of	the	UAE—do	not	see	a	link	between	an	internationally	integrated	
economy,	or	status	as	a	global	city	as	a	threat	to	its	national	identity	(Vora	2013).	Following	this	
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thinking,	a	country	could	be	made	up	of	any	number	of	different	groups,	as	long	as	a	
homogenous	and	exclusive	dominant	group	remains	in	power.	
	 GCC	countries	not	only	share	similar	demographic	statistics,	but	also	hold	similar	ratings	
in	the	2015	Democracy	Index	(The	Economist	2016).	All	six	countries	are	classified	as	
authoritarian	states,	placing	them	in	the	most	restrictive	third	of	the	list.	As	noted	in	Chapter	3,	
within	the	Democracy	Index’s	system,	authoritarian	regimes	are	those	which	place	obstructions	
in	press	reporting	with	many	media	outlets	being	state	controlled,	if	elections	are	held	they	are	
not	free	with	candidates	representing	a	single	party,	and	public	protest	is	barred.	As	such,	GCC	
countries	are	governed	via	autocratic	rule,	and	foreign	watch-dog	groups	voice	significant	
concerns	regarding	the	various	countries’	human	rights	records	(Human	Rights	Watch	2006,	
2015;	Human	Rights	Watch	&	Varia	2008).	While	much	of	the	focus	has	been	placed	on	the	
UAE’s	troubled	record	with	guestworkers,	given	the	country’s	status	as	a	world	economic	
center	(Abdi	2015;	Kanna	2011),	the	treatment	of	foreign	workers	should	be	a	regional	concern	
as	foreign	workers	drive	a	variety	of	industries.	Further,	the	region’s	political	stance	suggests	
that	the	countries	are	more	likely	to	resist	dual	citizenship,	as	a	sign	of	liberal	citizenship.	The	
qualitative	results	are	echoed	by	Mirilovic’s	(2015)	quantitative	findings	that	authoritarian	
countries	that	experience	high	numbers	of	low-skilled	foreign	immigrants	are	less	likely	to	
adopt	dual	citizenship.	Thus,	the	first	aspect	of	script	adoption—type	of	political	regime—favors	
ascriptive	citizenship	norms,	in	this	case.	
		 However,	before	delving	deeper	into	the	human	rights	records	of	GCC	countries,	one	
must	first	discuss	the	basis	of	treatment:	the	citizenship	laws	in	the	region.	
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Ascriptive	Dominance	
	 Lending	support	to	the	“authoritarian-ascriptive	norms”	argument	are	the	citizenship	
laws	in	place	in	the	region.	As	the	GCC,	itself,	was	founded	based	on	national	similarities,	the	
general	citizenship	processes	for	the	member	countries	are	very	similar,	thereby	allowing	me	to	
make	some	generalizations.	Each	country	uses	a	jus	sanguinis	approach	to	citizenship	
transmission.	Within	this	system,	national	membership	is	passed	to	an	individual	via	the	
patrilineal	line.	The	patriarchal	nature	of	citizenship	is	further	illustrated	in	the	Kuwaiti	
citizenship	law,	as	it	states	that	“Any	person	born	in,	or	outside,	Kuwait	whose	father	is	a	
Kuwaiti	national	shall	be	a	Kuwaiti	national	himself”	(Kuwait	1959).	Citizenship	is	only	inherited	
from	one’s	mother	if	the	identity	of	their	father	is	unknown.	While	this	caveat	is	present	in	
other	national	citizenship	laws,	such	as	the	Egyptian	case	presented	in	Chapter	4,	Tétreault	
(2000)	has	suggested	that	this	rule	is	a	holdover	from	Islamic	law.	Within	this	legal	realm,	one’s	
status	is	directly	tied	to	their	rights,	with	different	statuses	ascribed	to	someone	who	is	
married,	divorced,	or	their	spouse	has	died.	The	KSA	articles	surrounding	spousal	citizenship	
show	a	loosening	within	this	claim,	noting:	
If	an	individual	lost	his	Saudi	Citizenship,	the	following	terms	apply	to	his	wife	and	children:	
	
a-	Wife	of	the	individual	who	have	lost	his	Saudi	Citizenship	according	to	the	Article	(13)	
[acquiring	foreign	citizenship	without	permission,	working	with	foreign	government	or	military	
without	permission,	taking	a	role	against	the	Kingdom	during	armed	conflict,	or	refusing	to	quit	
a	foreign	post]	have	the	right	whether	to	follow	her	husband’s	new	nationality	or	to	keep	her	
Saudi	Nationality,	and	she	has	the	right	to	recover	her	Saudi	Citizenship	in	case	of	divorce.	
However,	children	residing	outside	the	Kingdom	have	the	right	to	acquire	the	Saudi	Citizenship	
when	they	reached	the	legal	age.	
	
b-	If	an	individual	lost	his	Saudi	Citizenship	according	to	the	Article	(11)	[acquiring	foreign	
citizenship	without	permission],	his	wife	and	children	will	not	lose	their	Saudi	Citizenship	as	a	
result.	(Saudi	Arabia	1953)	
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As	such,	girls	are	born	into	the	status	of	their	fathers,	but	married	women’s	statuses,	at	least	in	
the	KSA’s	case,	provide	a	modicum	of	liberalization	if	her	husband	has	been	found	to	be	in	
violation	of	national	law.		
	 Bolstering	the	regional	preference	toward	ascriptive	norms,	naturalization	processes—
the	second	indicator	of	liberal	citizenship	norms—have	been	restricted.	GCC	countries	limit	
who	can	apply	for	citizenship	due	to	ethnocultural	factors,	thereby	creating	monoethnic	states	
(Aktürk	2012),	like	the	Egyptian	and	German	examples	from	Chapter	4.	Oman’s	Royal	Decree	
addressing	citizenship	(Oman	2014)	provides	a	useful	example	of	this	limiting	process.	While	
the	ethnic	basis	of	citizenship	is	not	overt,	in	this	case,	language	and	cultural	assimilation	
processes	are	present	in	Article	15	of	the	law:	
1.	He	should	have	resided	in	Oman	for	at	least	20	continuous	years,	or	15	years	if	married	to	an	
Omani	woman	provided	that	their	marriage	shall	have	taken	place	after	obtaining	approval	of	
the	Ministry	of	Interior…and	he	shall	have	a	son	from	his	Omani	wife.	
	 2.	Fluency	in	Arabic…	
	 6.	Written	consent	to	relinquish	current	nationality	and	proof	of	such	(Oman	2014)	
	
The	extended	period	of	residency	required	prior	to	applying	for	naturalization	assures	that	
approved	candidates	have	become	accustomed	to	Oman’s	culture.	Further,	the	common	
language	requirement	is	present	to	aid	in	one’s	incorporation	into	the	imagined	community.	
Despite	the	link	to	local	culture	being	downplayed	in	the	updated	law	above,	the	1983	law	
highlights	the	importance	of	one’s	ethnicity	that	continues	in	the	country.	During	the	process	of	
acquiring	citizenship,	applicants	must	publicly	state	that	“I	swear	by	Almighty	God	to	be	loyal	to	
the	Sultante	[sic]	of	Oman	and	to	respect	the	laws,	costumes,	traditions,	and	be	a	good	citizen	
as	God	is	my	witness”	(Oman	2010).		
	 While	Oman’s	updated	citizenship	law	provides	an	example	of	limited	reliance	on	
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ethnicity	as	a	component	of	naturalization,	Kuwait’s	naturalization	policy	provides	explicit	
ethnic	requirements	surrounding	the	acquisition	of	citizenship.	Point	five	in	Article	4	states	that	
citizenship	applicants:	
…be	an	original	Muslim	by	birth,	or	that	he	has	converted	to	Islam	according	to	the	prescribed	rules	
and	procedures	and	that	a	period	of	at	least	5	years	has	passed	since	he	embraced	Islam	before	the	
grant	of	naturalization.	Nationality	thus	acquired	is	ipso	facto	lost	and	the	Decree	of	naturalization	
rendered	void	ab	initio	if	the	naturalized	person	expressly	renounces	Islam	or	if	he	behaves	in	such	a	
manner	as	clearly	indicates	his	intention	to	abandon	Islam.	In	any	such	case,	the	nationality	of	any	
dependant	[sic]	of	the	apostate	who	had	acquired	it	upon	the	naturalization	of	the	apostate	is	also	
rendered	void.	(Kuwait	1959)	
	
Religion,	here,	is	inextricably	tied	to	citizenship.	To	be	Kuwaiti,	one	must	be	Muslim	and	follow	
the	tents	of	Islam.	Further,	if	someone	renounces	Islam,	they	also	effectively	renounce	their	
citizenship.	Individuals	cannot	be	one	without	the	other.	
	 Despite	the	naturalization	processes	employed	by	GCC	countries	showing	signs	of	a	
liberalization	of	citizenship,	they	are	in	an	inchoate	form.	The	ascriptive	norms	of	citizenship,	
based	in	one’s	bloodline,	are	the	dominant	script	in	the	region,	and	while	naturalization	is	an	
option,	it	is	not	an	opportunity	that	is	accessible	by	all.	This	limiting	of	access	is	evident	in	the	
universal	prohibition	of	dual	citizenship	in	the	GCC.	Homogenously	worded	statements	to	the	
following	examples	of	dual	citizenship’s	illegality	are	found	across	the	region.	Article	15,	point	C	
in	UAE	Federal	Law	of	1972—which	is	still	the	“law	of	the	land”—notes	that	a	citizen	can	have	
his	status	revoked,	“If	he	has	adopted,	voluntarily,	a	nationality	of	another	country”	(UAE	
1972:5).	Qatar’s	law	supports	the	“single	nationality”	policy	noting	that	an	individual	can	lose	
their	nationality	if	he	or	she	“Acquires	the	nationality	of	another	country”	(Qatar	2005:3).	
Within	these	ascriptive	systems,	one	can	only	hold	allegiance	to	a	single	state,	thereby	limiting	
outsiders’	access	to	each	country’s	bundle	of	rights.	Further,	as	highlighted	in	this	piece’s	
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opening	vignettes	of	Nour	Miyati	and	the	bidoon	in	the	UAE,	legal	classification	can	significantly	
affect	how	one	navigates	their	daily	lives.	Citizens	can	gain	the	benefits	of	institutional	
protection	from	the	state’s	legal	and	judicial	systems,	whereas	non-citizens	may	risk	
deportation	for	seeking	help.	This	difference	puts	non-nationals	in	precarious	positions	where	
their	well-being	could	be	dependent	on	their	status.	
	
A	More	Complete	Picture	of	the	GCC	
	 While	the	previous	section	outlines	the	relationship	between	political	regime	and	liberal	
norms	in	the	GCC,	the	legal	examples	provided	use	a	language	of	exclusion	which	hint	at	other	
mechanisms	at	play.	As	such,	it	would	be	reductionist	to	assume	that	the	GCC	countries	reject	
the	liberal	citizenship	model	and	human	rights	based	citizenship	purely	based	on	authoritarian	
power.	While	despots	wield	significant	power	in	their	homelands,	they	are	not	invincible,	as	the	
Arab	Spring	and	other	uprisings	have	shown.	Instead,	I	posit	that	the	regional	interpretation	of	
citizen	and	group	membership	are	housed	in	the	local	histories,	economies,	and	popular	views	
toward	non-nationals.	The	influences	of	these	variables	allow	us	to	locate	the	regional	rejection	
of	popular	world	citizenship	scripts,	and	see	the	justifications	into	why	this	occurs.	Despite	the	
council’s	almost	40-year	existence,	it	cannot	explain	the	development	of	a	semi-ubiquitous	
cultural	belief	systems	in	the	region.	It	is	within	the	regional	developments	before	the	GCC’s	
founding—located	in	religion,	socioeconomic	situations,	and	popular	views—where	one	can	
find	a	more	complete	explanation.	
	 A	basis	for	many	scholarly	debates	concerning	liberalism	in	the	Middle	East	lies	in	an	
examination	of	Islam	and	democracy.	The	Middle	East,	itself,	is	dominated	by	authoritarian-
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republican	regimes	that	justify	their	places	via	the	Western	concept	of	divine	right	(Mernissi	
1992;	Sisk	1992).	Telhami	(2013)	suggests	that	the	prevalence	and	general	acceptance	of	
authoritarian	regimes	by	Arab	groups	is	because	they	
have	never	fully	divorced	the	authoritarianism	of	their	rulers	from	the	Western-dominated	
international	order	that	they	see	as	having	cultivated	and	entrenched	these	rulers	in	power	
from	the	very	inception	of	the	modern	political	system	in	the	Arab	world	at	the	end	of	World	
War	I.	(p.19)	
	
As	such,	authoritarianism	is	a	direct	link	from	the	colonial	past	of	these	countries.	Further,	the	
bubble	vacated	by	the	abrupt	end	of	colonization	allowed	for	authoritarian	leaders	to	come	to	
power.	They	were	supported	by	the	most	organized	groups,	so	they	were	the	first	to	fill	the	gap	
(Hudson	1977).		
	 From	these	authoritarian	ties,	the	Middle	East	has	been	painted	as	a	landscape	
intolerant	to	democracy,	and	simultaneously	at	odds	with	it	(Said	1993;	Sick	1994).	As	Sisk	
(1992)	notes,	the	modern	Islamist’s	view	of	God’s	will	as	sovereign	can	help	explain	this	
perceived	friction.	Within	a	democratic	system,	the	people	are	the	mechanisms	of	government.	
The	will	of	the	people	is	heard	and	applied	via	elections,	public	discourse,	and	the	like.	Instead,	
within	the	modern	Islamist	system,	God	is	sovereign,	and	as	such,	humans	cannot	question	His	
will.	Further,	democracy	could	only	be	achieved	by	adhering	to	the	“shari’a	paradigm”	(Sisk	
1992:23).	While	popular	outcries	against	socioeconomic	problems	are	not	unheard	of	in	the	
Middle	East,	powerful	individuals	have	used	cultural	uncertainty	and	specific	interpretations	of	
the	Koran	to	maintain	their	positions.	
	 This	argument	of	“God’s	will”	as	justification	for	a	political	regime’s	existence	has	been	
weaponized	by	the	ruling	elite.	In	creating	an	unbridgeable	gap	between	the	Middle	East	and	
West,	leaders	created	literal	and	figurative	boundaries	from	the	unknown.	Within	the	regional	
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concept	of	the	hudud,	boundaries	are	solidly	designed	objects	intended	to	be	comforting	and	
protecting	to	those	feeling	fear	(Mernissi	1992).	By	regulating	who	could	enter	or	exit	an	area,	
visit	a	city,	or	do	business	in	a	region,	boundaries	helped	minimize	intergroup	conflicts;	gaining	
their	legitimacy	via	Koranic	passages	(Mernissi	1992).	Anything	outside	of	the	borders,	
particularly	those	areas	to	the	West,	took	on	the	symbolic	embodiment	of	fear	and	fright.	
“Gharb,	the	Arabic	word	for	the	West,	is	also	the	place	of	darkness	and	the	incomprehensible,	
always	frightening.	Everything	we	don’t	understand	is	frightening”	(Mernissi	1992:13).	While	
this	quote	is	in	direct	conversation	with	how	the	Middle	East	views	the	West,	it	also	applies	to	
the	West	while	looking	East.	Uncertainty	breeds	fear,	fear	could	lead	to	generalizations	and	
footholds	for	those	wishing	to	gain	power.	Group	unity,	then,	helped	reduce	uncertainty.	
	 Thereby,	the	darkness	of	the	West	could	be	used	as	justification	for	eschewing	the	ideas	
originating	there.	Further,	differences	can	be	used,	from	a	functionalist	perspective,	to	bring	us	
together.	Charismatic	leaders	know	this,	and	can	base	their	successes	off	it.	Legitimacy	is	
gained	through	the	effective	wielding	of	ideas.	As	such,	elites	in	the	Middle	East	have	used	
religious	doctrine,	uncertainty,	and	“otherness”	to	maintain	their	positions,	as	have	Western	
elites.	Within	the	case	of	the	GCC	and	rest	of	the	Middle	East,	the	difference	between	East	and	
West	has	fueled	differing	interpretations	of	how	society	should	be	run.		
	 In	addition	to	the	reliance	on	religion	as	a	social	adhesive,	discussed	above,	ideologies	
can	be	used	a	mechanism	of	resistance.	Consider	the	Western	concepts	of	modernity	and	
modernization.	The	philosophical	underpinnings	of	modernity	are	found	in	the	humanist	basis	
of	Western	Enlightenment	thinking	(Mernissi	1992;	Said	1993).	The	rise	of	individualism	was	
predicted	to	take	place	concurrent	with	the	declining	influence	of	religion.	As	such,	the	rights	of	
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the	individual	were	to	take	center	stage.	This	process,	now,	sees	the	rise	of	universal	human	
rights	regimes.	Gone	are	the	tribal	specifics	of	individual	nations,	as	states	now	turn	to	an	all-
encompassing,	universal	form	of	citizen.	
	 However,	in	the	GCC’s	case,	this	process	has	not	occurred.	According	to	Mernissi	(1992),	
the	rise	of	individual	responsibility—via	democracy,	rights	regimes,	etc.—frightens	the	elites	in	
the	Middle	East.	Personal	opinions	are	seen	to	“always	bring	violence”	(Mernissi	1992:19)	as	it	
indicates	group-level	disharmony.	Disagreeing	factions	are	harder	to	control.	To	prevent	this	
sort	of	breakdown,	regional	elites	highlighted	the	primordial	nature	of	differences	between	
groups,	as	noted	above,	but	also	restricted	access	to	the	ideas	modernism	was	based	in	
(Hudson	1977).	However,	to	placate	citizens,	they	were	allowed	access	to	certain	benefits	of	
modernization	via	selective	modernity	(Mernissi	1992;	Sisk	1992).	Individuals	can	buy	and	use	
modern	consumer	goods	(TVs,	cellphones,	automobiles)	without	adopting	the	ideologies	from	
the	countries	that	produced	them	(Ibrahim	1982).	While	modernist	ideas	may	be	largely	absent	
from	the	region,	the	products	of	modernization	are	widely	available	and	easily	adopted.	
	 What	has	taken	hold	in	the	place	of	modernism	are	some	regionally	based	ideologies	
intended	to	bring	groups	together.	Intended	to	minimize	interstate	skirmishes	and,	ultimately,	
culminate	with	the	founding	of	a	single	Arab	state,	Pan-Arabism	sought	to	emphasize	ethnicity	
over	nationality	or	geography	(Ayubi	1995;	Telhami	2013).	While	a	laudable	goal,	the	plan	was	
cast	aside	as	regional	differences	came	to	dominate	any	discussions	about	unification	(Ayubi	
1995).	The	GCC	can	be	thought	of	not	as	an	extension	of	the	Pan-Arabist	push,	but	as	an	
agreement	based	on	necessity.	As	noted	above,	the	GCC	countries	founded	their	allegiance	in	
shared	cultural,	economic,	and	social	characteristics.	Of	note	is	the	shared	oil	wealth	found	in	
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each	country,	as	these	discoveries	created	the	severe	inequities	between	nationals	and	non-
nationals,	as	has	been	shown	throughout	this	work.	
	 The	national	economies	of	GCC	members	are	run	based	on	landownership	and	granting	
foreign	companies	paid	access	to	those	areas	and	resources.	Referred	to	as	rentier	states,	these	
economies	are	characterized	by	not	only	relying	on	“substantial	external	rent,”	(Beblawi	
1987:51)	but	in	situations	where	rental	agreements	predominate;	a	limited	number	of	
individuals	or	groups	generate	the	rent,	with	most	individuals	involved	in	the	distribution	of	it,	
and	the	government	is	the	primary	recipient	of	the	money	from	rents	(Beblawi	1987).	This	
unique	economic	situation	is	thought	to	have	been	developed	in	GCC	countries	during	the	early	
to	mid-20th	century.	Kuwait	was	first	to	adopt	the	system	in	the	1950s,	which	later	spread	to	
Qatar	and	the	UAE.	Saudi	Arabia	had	a	similar	system	in	place	in	the	1920s	and	1930s	centered	
around	series	of	“land	gifts”	that	were	given	to	individuals	and	groups	that	the	regime	sought	
favor	with	(Beblawi	1987).	
	 In	the	GCC’s	case,	what	was	being	offered	by	the	governments	was	access	to	the	
region’s	oil	reserves.	Using	a	kafil,	or	sponsor,	land	deals	were	struck	where	laborers,	storage	
and	transportation	of	crude,	and	security	were	established.	As	such,	kafils	made	themselves	
indispensable	in	these	deals	since	they	could	bridge	the	uncertainties	between	the	local	and	
foreign	groups	and	arrange	for	the	proper	travel	documents	to	be	completed	(Ibrahim	1982).	
Without	access	to	a	local	sponsor,	many	visas	requests	were	likely	to	be	rejected	since	most	of	
the	region’s	countries	were—and	are—unlikely	to	grant	tourist	visas	(Ibrahim	1982).	
	 Despite	deals	being	in	place	for	land	access	and	shipping,	a	significant	resource	was	
missing:	workers.	To	minimize	costs,	kafils	began	to	act	as	recruiters	and	managers	of	workers.	
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Given	the	high	demand	for	the	region’s	oil,	companies	were	unable	to	locate	enough	workers	
to	staff	their	operations.	Further,	many	of	the	local	workers	who	were	available	were	not	
trained	to	manage	the	business	(Abdi	2015).	Given	these	constraints,	the	GCC	began	to	recruit	
laborers	to	fill	these	vacancies;	giving	birth	to	the	modern	guestworker	status.	Many	sponsors	
confiscated	legal	documents	as	part	of	the	hiring	process,	essentially	holding	workers	in	
temporary	slavery	until	their	contract	was	complete,	a	tactic	that	remains	until	today	(Ibrahim	
1982).	
	 While	such	an	overtly	exploitative	situation	seems	unethical	and	institutionally	
troublesome,	the	kafils’	existence	has	been	supported	in	two	significant	ways.	First,	they	have	
the	support	of	the	local	governments.	As	shown	with	domestic	guestworkers,	contracted	
workers	have	little	recourse	if	they	are	being	swindled	by	unethical	sponsors.	Further,	sponsors	
have	little	legal	motivation	to	treat	workers	humanely.	National	laws	and	regulations	support	
the	sponsors’	actions	as	they	are	doing	a	significant	service	for	the	government	(Beblawi	1987;	
Ibrahim	1982).		
	 Second,	given	the	institutional	support	of	sponsorship	practices	and	virtually	assured	
profitability	of	the	rentier	state,	the	beneficiaries	of	the	system	begin	to	see	themselves	as	
fundamentally	different	from	the	scores	of	workers.	A	“rentier	mentality”	(Beblawi	1987:52),	
develops	due	to	a	breakdown	between	the	reward-causation	relationship	in	work.	Instead	of	
the	financial	rewards	of	work	being	dependent	on	the	amount	of	risk	an	individual	takes	on,	the	
rewards	are	doled	out	based	on	situation.	As	such,	groups	that	are	entitled	to	the	financial	
profits	from	a	deal	see	themselves	as	deserving,	even	if	their	only	“contribution”	was	being	
born	into	that	position.	While	superficially	minor,	this	mental	splitting	between	deserving	and	
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non-deserving	groups	can	lead	to	justifying	different	treatment.	Guestworkers	and	other	non-
national	groups	were	not	born	into	citizenship,	so	their	having	to	perform	labor	is	an	indicator	
of	group	membership.	Citizens	garner	the	benefits	of	the	rent	relationships	in	a	variety	of	
forms,	including	payments,	access	to	interest	free	loans,	and	access	to	state	sponsored	
institutions	(Longva	2000).	While	the	national	economy	depends	on	the	work	of	non-nationals,	
they	are	not	granted	access	to	the	fruits	of	that	labor,	purely	based	on	citizenship	status.	
	 Further,	the	GCC’s	reliance	on	foreign	workers	has	caused	some	problems	aside	from	
the	accusations	of	worker	abuse	outlined	throughout	this	piece.	As	previously	shown,	when	the	
rentier	economy	was	established,	it	required	large	populations	of	workers	that	were	recruited	
from	outside	national	borders.	While	that	policy	worked	well	to	get	the	number	of	hands	
needed	to	fill	the	staffing	needs	of	invested	companies,	the	reliance	on	these	workers	has	kept	
many	nationals	out	of	the	job	market.	As	a	result,	some	GCC	countries	are	developing	programs	
to	increase	the	numbers	of	national	workers	in	the	workplace,	thereby	making	them	less	reliant	
on	the	benefits	associated	with	the	rentier	system.	One	notable	example	can	be	found	in	the	
Saudi	Nitaqat	program	that	was	implemented	in	2011	to	incentivize	the	hiring	of	Saudi	
nationals	by	Saudi-based	companies	(Sadi	2013).	The	plan	was	largely	supported	by	ICT	
investors	and	used	e-tools	to	track	workers,	with	a	goal	to	marry	the	needs	of	the	government’s	
desire	to	track	where	workers	were	and	the	people	who	were	looking	for	gainful	employment.	
However,	the	program	has	run	into	logistical	roadblocks	that	revolve	around	the	national	
economy’s	dependence	on	foreign	labor	and	the	government’s	desire	to	provide	more	jobs	for	
nationals.	
	 The	program	uses	a	four-classification	color-coded	system	according	to	how	many	
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Saudis	the	companies	employ.	Each	color	(high	to	low:	platinum,	green,	yellow,	and	red)	is	
awarded	according	to	the	field	(or	activity)	the	company	is	involved	in	(e.g.	wholesale	and	retail	
trade)	and	size	of	the	company,	with	higher	rankings	going	to	those	companies	whose	
workforce	is	composed	of	a	larger	percentage	of	Saudi	nationals.	However,	the	smallest	
companies	(1-9	employees)	are	exempt	from	the	Nitaqat	coding	system,	but	are	legally	
required	to	have	at	least	1	Saudi	national	(Massoud	2013).	
	 The	hiring	of	marginalized	groups	(such	as	disabled	job	seekers)	is	incentivized	within	
the	current	system.	For	example,	the	hiring	of	a	disabled	Saudi	male	or	female	counts	“as	four	
people	in	the	nationalization	equation”	(Massoud	2013:2),	thus	providing	greater	incentives	to	
include	these	individuals	in	the	workforce.		However,	within	the	program,	hiring	students	is	
penalized	as	they	count	as	0.5	people	in	the	equation.	Ideally,	this	move	encourages	the	hiring	
of	full-time	professionals,	as	opposed	to	temporary	workers.	Linked	with	the	Nitaqat	policy’s	
concern	over	worker	inclusion	is	the	importance	of	wage	equity	within	the	field.	Any	employee	
earning	less	than	3,000	Riyals	counts	as	less	than	one	person	within	the	calculation.	If	they	
make	under	1,500	Riyals,	they	are	excluded	from	the	equation	all-together	(Massoud	2013).	
	 While	the	Nitaqat	program	makes	sense	when	considering	the	Saudi	working	force,	the	
situation	begs	the	question:	Why	should	employers	bother	adhering	to	the	program’s	
guidelines?	Further,	why	should	they	turn	away	from	relying	on	guestworkers	who	will	work	for	
less?	In	short,	observing	the	program’s	guidelines	provides	employers	with	the	opportunity	to	
hire	additional	foreign-born	workers	(Massoud	2013).	If	a	company	earns	a	green	or	platinum	
rating,	they	can	gain	access	to	an	expedited	online	process	for	renewing	foreign	employee	work	
permits,	adjust	foreign	employees’	professions,	and	hire	foreign	workers	from	red	and	yellow	
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rated	businesses	without	receiving	the	previous	employer’s	approval.	Beyond	these	benefits,	
there	are	restrictions	to	poorer	performing	businesses.	Yellow	rated	employers	are	only	
allowed	to	renew	visas	for	foreign	employees	with	less	than	six	years	of	service	in	the	KSA.	
Further,	these	employers	can	only	apply	for	a	new	visa	after	the	permanent	departure	of	two	
expatriate	workers.	Red	employers	are	unable	to	hire	new	expatriate	workers,	renew	current	
work	permits,	or	open	new	business	branches	within	the	KSA	until	their	status	improves	
(Massoud	2013).	These	restrictions,	added	to	the	potential	of	employees	being	poached	from	
higher	ranking	firms	is	thought	to	provide	an	effective	motivation	to	employ	nationals	as	
employees.	
	 However,	while	this	system	will	focus	on	limiting	expatriate	employment	within	the	
Kingdom	and	has	been	running	relatively	smoothly	since	its	implementation	in	2011,	it	has	run	
into	recent	roadblocks.	In	early	2015,	the	third	phase	of	the	program,	focusing	on	the	
“Saudization”	of	businesses	by	drastically	increasing	the	localization	quotas	of	the	program	was	
scheduled	to	be	implemented.	According	to	a	news	report	by	Mary	Sophia	(2015),	the	phase	
would	increase	“retail	and	wholesale	firms…quotas	from	29	per	cent	to	44	per	cent	while	other	
major	commercial	firms	are	required	to	increase	the	limits	from	29	per	cent	to	66	per	cent.”	
This	drastic	increase	drew	concern	from	the	Council	of	Saudi	Chambers	who	requested	that	the	
phase	be	put	into	practice	over	“two	to	three	years”	(Ghafour	2015)	for	more	qualified	job	
candidates	to	be	created.	The	lack	of	suitable	national	candidates	would	have	a	negative	effect	
on	Saudi	companies	as	they	would	be	subject	to	the	stipulations	outlined	in	phase	three,	but	
unable	to	find	enough	quality	job	candidates	to	fill	the	openings	(Naffee	2015).	Because	of	
these	concerns,	the	phase’s	start	has	been	delayed	for	three	years.	
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	 This	delay	is	particularly	beneficial	to	the	construction	industry,	which	employs	large	
numbers	of	expatriate	workers.	In	a	piece	outlining	the	impact	of	the	delay	on	Saudi	firms,	an	
anonymous	Indian	worker	suggested	that	if	the	third	phase	went	ahead	as	scheduled,	it	would	
mean	that	“nearly	50	percent	of	expatriate	workers	would	have	to	leave	the	kingdom”	(Naffee	
2015),	leaving	more	job	openings	than	there	are	job	seekers.	
The	Nitaqat	example	is	illustrative	of	the	complex	nature	surrounding	guestworkers	and	
the	economies	that	depend	on	them.	While	national	policies	seek	to	marginalize	the	groups,	
oftentimes	denying	any	path	to	citizenship,	national	economies	have	developed	around	the	
availability	and	need	of	cheap	labor.	As	such,	when	efforts	to	increase	the	numbers	of	
employed	national	workers	are	implemented,	they	run	up	against	a	reality	that	many	national	
workers	may	not	know	how	to	do	the	jobs	that	become	available.	Further,	as	many	expatriates	
are	employed	in	positions	that	many	nationals	would	rather	not	do—such	as	sanitation	or	
construction—there	is	little	that	can	be	done	to	attract	“affluent	Saudis”	to	these	positions	
(Sophia	2015).	By	dismissing	various	jobs,	in	general,	as	“below”	one’s	station,	the	prominence	
of	the	rentier	mentality	is	on	display.	
Turning	to	the	UAE,	one	can	see	how	a	non-national	group	can	be	kept	outside	of	the	
citizenship	process	despite	making	significant	contributions	to	the	national	culture.	Within	this	
intricate	relationship	between	Indian	expats,	migrants,	and	guest-workers	and	UAE	nationals	is	
an	issue	surrounding	culture	and	context,	as	well	as	economics.	Considering	the	economic	
context,	Vora	(2013)	has	shown	how	despite	being	excluded	from	the	naturalization	process,	
Indians	in	Dubai	have	successfully	integrated	themselves	into	the	national	economy.	Not	only	
do	Indian	migrants	occupy	manual	labor	positions	that	one	tends	to	expect	from	migrant	
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workers	(e.g.	construction,	housekeeping,	etc.),	but	they	have	incorporated	themselves	into	
more	prestigious	positions,	with	individuals	becoming	successful	businessmen	and	IT	workers.	
Further,	the	connections	between	the	Indian	diaspora	in	Dubai	and	the	global	city,	itself,	extend	
beyond	the	economic	realm.	Indian	sections	of	the	city	have	been	established	and	Indian	
cuisine	is	commonly	available	(Vora	2013).		
	 Migrant	groups	have	also	contributed	to	the	culture	of	Dubai,	as	well.	Local	restaurants	
cater	to	the	needs	of	foreign	workers	by	serving	items	from	their	homelands	(Vora	2013;	Vora	
&	Koch	2015)	and	shops	carry	custom-printed	fabrics	that	women	use	to	make	dresses	(Abdi	
2015).	This	cultural	integration	has	become	so	complete	that	shopkeepers	in	the	Dubai	Gold	
Market	in	Deira	frequently	call	to	shoppers	in	their	native	tongues.	This	is	especially	impressive	
when	the	shopkeepers	use	Somali,	which	has	about	10-million	speakers	worldwide	(Abdi	2015).		
Yet,	within	this	scope	and	despite	some	families	living	in	Dubai	for	multiple	generations,	
non-nationals	in	Dubai	and	the	rest	of	the	GCC	are	“impossible	citizens”	since	they	have	a	
significant	impact	on	the	region,	yet	are	actively	kept	outside	the	status	of	citizen.	To	help	
legitimize	this	exclusion,	the	UAE	government	has	delineated	various	categories	of	individual	as	
part	of	the	process	to	implement	neoliberal	policies	in	the	nation.	Among	these	are	citizen,	
expat,	and	worker.	Citizens	experience	the	greatest	amount	of	economic	opportunity	in	the	
country,	while	often	garnering	the	highest	paying	jobs,	despite	sometimes	being	unqualified	to	
fill	those	roles	(Vora	2013).	In	the	UAE,	this	group	is	in	the	extreme	numerical	minority	with	
only	an	estimated	10	to	20-percent	of	all	residents	being	in	the	category	(GLMM	2014;	Vora	
2013:44).	Freedom	of	residence,	length	of	stay	in	Dubai,	and	cross	city	movement	is	then	
increasingly	restricted	until	reaching	the	lowest	rank:	workers.	Many	times,	workers	reside	in	
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work	camps	segregated	from	the	city’s	center.	This	geography	of	status	is	familiar	to	many	of	
Dubai’s	residents	as	they	can	identify	which	groups	live	in	which	region	and,	further,	what	skin	
colors	are	welcome	where	(Vora	2013).	
	
Limits	to	Inclusion	
	 What	the	case	of	the	GCC	illustrates	is	the	complexities	tied	to	script	acceptance.	While	
the	Council’s	members	are	in	close	contact	with	foreign	investors	via	the	rentier	system,	many	
of	whom	have	adopted	liberal	citizenship	norms,	they	have	still	elected	to	rely	on	ascriptive	
norms	of	membership.	While	this	decision	is	partly	based	on	the	authoritarian	political	regimes	
held	by	the	countries,	it	is	not	solely	on	the	shoulders	of	politics.	As	I	have	shown,	the	seeds	of	
exclusivity	were	sown	during	the	region’s	colonial	past.	During	this	period,	tribalism	and	group	
membership	were	used	to	create	safety.	Those	coming	from	“other”	groups	or	regions	were	
viewed	with	suspicion,	as	is	the	case	of	any	other	geographic	region	or	cultural	group.	However,	
this	skepticism	was	effectively	harnessed	by	powerful	elites	seeking	to	gain	power	in	the	post-
colonial	era.	By	highlighting	the	differences	between	the	West	and	Middle	East,	elites	could	
construct	a	society	steeped	in	religious	belief,	while	avoiding	the	Enlightenment	and	humanist	
thinking	which	had	gained	traction	in	Europe	and	other	parts	of	the	world.		
	 By	being	able	to	minimize	the	influence	of	an	ideologically	humanist	turn,	national	
leaders	could	also	dictate	the	language	surrounding	membership,	and	who	could	become	“one	
of	us.”	Citizenship,	in	these	terms,	was	not	based	upon	a	set	of	universal	human	rights,	as	
observed	in	countries	that	have	adopted	liberal	citizenship	norms,	but	on	an	indestructible	link	
between	ethnic	membership	and	citizenship.	Monoethnic	states	were	created	using	this	
	 	
	 125	
rationale,	and	only	those	who	had	come	from	other	similar	states,	or	converted	to	the	
dominant	ethnic	group,	could	hope	to	gain	access	to	citizens’	rights.	After	the	founding	of	the	
rentier	system,	citizenship	also	meant	access	to	economic	stability.	Being	a	citizen	meant	that	
one	was	entitled	to	a	portion	of	the	money	that	the	government	received	from	providing	access	
to	the	local	resources.	Further,	citizenship	allowed	individuals	to	act	as	sponsors	in	other	
ventures,	thereby	guaranteeing	additional	income	by	acting	as	a	go-between	for	foreign	
workers	and	local	companies.	The	rentier	mentality	was	born	from	this	situation.	Citizens	
became	viewed	as	rightful	recipients	of	rights,	while	non-citizens’	exclusion	was	justified.	They	
have	to	work	because	they	are	different	from	us.	
	 While	the	baskets	of	local	rights	that	GCC	citizens	access	are	significant,	the	rights	are	
only	open	to	a	small	number	of	people.	The	swaths	of	foreign	guestworkers	the	region	relies	on	
are	barred	from	ever	gaining	citizenship.	Despite	workers	raising	families	in	their	adoptive	
homes,	spending	their	lives	working	for	local	companies,	and	their	cultures	being	integrated	
into	cities’	landscapes,	they	cannot	ever	be	“one	of	us.”	Sponsors	limit	workers’	movements	by	
confiscating	legal	documents,	and	abuse	is	tolerated	by	the	authorities.	Further,	there	is	little	
public	call	to	change	the	existing	system.	Generally,	the	citizens	are	benefitting	by	keeping	non-
nationals	marginalized	and	out	of	the	rewards	system.	Leadership	has	no	cause	to	change	since	
they	are,	relatively,	immune	to	criticism	or	public	recourse.	Further,	the	public,	many	times,	
cannot	sympathize	with	the	workers.	“No	one	puts	a	gun	to	the	[expatriates’]	heads.	If	they	
don’t	like	[the	working	conditions]	here,	they	can	go	elsewhere”	(Kanna	2011:44).	
	 As	such,	what	the	case	of	the	GCC	shows	us	is	that	norm	adoption	is	contingent	on	the	
social,	economic,	and	political	environment	of	a	place	as	well	as	its	history	and	culture.	What	
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ideologies	dominate	the	region?	Who	is	in	charge	and	how	did	they	get	there?	How	does	the	
local	population	view	the	issue	at	hand?	These	things	come	together	to	help	agents	evaluate	
the	applicability	of	available	scripts.	While	the	scripts	of	liberal	citizenship	norms	may	be	
prevalent	and	influential,	there	is	still	space	for	resistance	against	them,	and	this	resistance	
cannot	be	identified	using	a	single	variable.	To	understand	what	has	happened,	one	must	
consider	the	whole	country	or	region	in	its	historical	and	cultural	contexts.	
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Chapter	7	
A	Rocky	Landscape	
	
	
This	work	has	addressed	the	question	of	citizenship	in	a	few	different	ways.	First,	it	
attends	to	the	traditional	understanding	of	citizenship	as	primarily	an	exclusive	form	of	
membership	in	a	polity.	Within	this	scope,	one’s	status	as	a	member	means	that	one	is	part	of	a	
limited	group	who	has	exclusive	access	to	membership	benefits	available	from	the	state	after	
the	Marshallian	schema	of	civil,	political,	and	social	rights.	The	exclusivity	of	national	citizenship	
is	designed	via	the	ascriptive	transmission	of	membership,	thus,	limiting	its	availability	to	those	
who	can	be	connected	through	blood	or	soil.	Second,	I	have	also	analyzed	the	emerging	forms	
of	citizenship	with	increasingly	plastic	membership,	including	postnational	forms,	deriving	
legitimacy	from	an	extension	of	universal	human	rights	as	well	as	monetary	forms	based	on	CIP	
schemes.	The	second	manner	of	gaining	citizenship	rights	has	transnational	origins	as	opposed	
to	the	ones	stemming	from	one’s	tight	coupling	with	national	territory	or	ancestry.		
	 Instead	of	solely	relying	on	citizenship	as	an	heirloom	to	be	passed	down	through	
generations,	the	liberalization	processes	outlined	here	have	shown	that	citizenship	is	becoming	
post-	or	transnational.	No	longer	do	one’s	ties	to	a	geographic	region	act	as	the	sole	
determinant	of	one’s	future.	Individuals	have	gained	the	ability	to	cast	off	their	birth	
nationalities	for	citizenships	from	other	places,	as	one	can,	in	principle,	hold	memberships	in	
multiple	locales,	and	some	can	even	go	as	far	as	to	collect	passports	to	create	personal	
advantages	in	business	and	travel.	Further,	the	rights	that	are	tied	to	each	status	can	be	
similarly	traded.	If	one’s	birth-state	makes	business	travel	difficult,	thereby	impeding	their	
career,	they	can	now	have	options	to	gain	the	rights	of	others	and	avoid	those	circumstances.	
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	 This	ability	to	pick-and-choose	rights	and	memberships	brings	me	to	the	final	main	
incarnation	of	citizenship	in	this	piece:	inequity.	The	differences	between	the	“haves”	and	
“have	nots”	have	been	a	topic	of	concern	for	sociologists,	and	other	social	scientists,	since	the	
field’s	inception.	Vast	bodies	of	literature	have	examined	how	different	racial	groups	
experience	different	social	realities,	dependent	on	the	educational	and	socioeconomic	
opportunities	available	to	them.	Those	groups	with	access	to	the	most	opportunities	had	
comparatively	better	chances	to	“succeed”	in	life,	by	getting	an	education,	landing	more	
prestigious	jobs,	and	accessing	the	wealth	that	both	achievements	can	yield.	Those	with	little	
access	to	the	same	institutions	and	choices,	may	not	be	as	equipped	to	succeed.	For	example,	
they	may	be	forced	to	shorten	their	time	in	school	to	take	on	low-paying	work	to	support	their	
family,	thereby	limiting	their	access	to	wealth	and	the	freedoms	that	come	along	with	it.	
	 While	interest	in	inequality	has	included	inter-state	comparisons	after	the	rise	of	
globalization,	which	saw	some	countries	benefit	more	than	others,	one	can	use	these	same	
metrics	to	consider	citizenship.	Because	not	all	citizenships	are	created	equal,	one’s	life	chances	
and	opportunities	are	tied	to	one’s	ability	to	access	citizenships	with	higher	dividends	(Shachar	
2009).	While	inequity	persists	within	the	nation-state,	one	must	now	consider	the	differences	in	
rights	gained	via	group	membership.	The	locale	of	one’s	birth,	and	the	identification	papers	
they	gain	at	that	point,	can	have	a	significant	impact	on	whether	they	can	conduct	international	
business	deals,	access	other	educational	opportunities,	avoid	persecution,	exercise	various	
freedoms,	or	travel	safely	across	borders	in	times	of	distress.	Further,	being	born	without	those	
papers	can	mean	that	individuals	may	not	be	protected	by	local	laws,	could	be	targeted	for	
abuse,	or	subject	to	arbitrary	expulsion	from	the	state,	even	if	they	were	born	there.	As	such,	
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citizenship	can	act	as	protection	for	the	individual,	but	those	protections	differ	according	to	
where	someone	is	and	what	papers	they	carry.	
	 However,	as	citizenship	becomes	disentangled	from	the	nation-state,	as	shown	by	the	
liberalization	of	membership.	Citizenship	has	moved	away	from	the	exclusivity	of	strict,	birth-
based	membership,	often	employing	a	more	inclusive	set	of	norms.	The	first	step	in	this	
separation	is	through	the	process	of	naturalization.	Through	naturalization,	individuals	born	
outside	of	a	given	state	can	apply	to	gain	citizenship.	Further,	this	process	of	formal	inclusion	
also	helped	extend	the	goals	of	republican	citizenship:	bring	more	individuals	into	the	imagined	
community	with	popular	sovereignty	(Leydet	2014;	Walzer	1989).	Once	individuals	had	
successfully	navigated	the	requirements	to	gain	group	membership,	they	had	access	to	the	
rights	of	the	area.	Naturalization,	then,	was	a	first	step	in	allowing	citizenship	to	become	
focused	on	the	individual	and	what	their	needs	and	preferences	were.	
	 The	second	important	trend	in	the	liberalization	of	citizenship	norms	pertains	to	the	
increased	acceptance	of	dual	citizenship.	This	study	found	that	dual	citizenship	policies	have	
been	enacted	by	131	countries,	essentially	meaning	that	131	countries	now	allow	their	citizens	
to	access	multiple	sets	of	rights	inside	and	outside	the	national	territory.	However,	dual	
citizenship	also	calls	into	question	what	a	citizen	should	be.	Critics	of	the	process	note	that	
individuals	cannot	hold	allegiances	to	multiple	states.	By	being	a	legal	member	of	two	groups,	
how	are	the	responsibilities	of	the	individual	distributed?	What	this	criticism	leads	to	is	a	
question	of	trust:	How	does	the	state	know	that	they	are	one	of	“us?”	Many	recent	political	
arguments	against	dual	citizenship	have	taken	this	tone.	In	addition	to	the	criticisms	leveled	at	
German	Chancellor	Angela	Merkel’s	call	for	extending	dual	citizenship	noted	in	Chapter	4	
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(Huggler	2016),	the	status—and	those	holding	it—has	been	a	frequent	target	of	conservative	
politicians	across	much	of	the	world.	In	the	United	States,	the	Trump	administration’s	
attempted	ban	on	various	immigrant	groups	also	sought	to	ban	dual	citizenship	holders	from	
targeted	nations	(Seipel	2017).	Zimbabwe’s	Registrar	General	Tobaiwa	Mudede	has	proposed	
eliminating	dual	citizenship	from	the	country’s	new	constitution,	citing	security	concerns	
(Chronicle	2017).	Lastly,	a	Sri	Lankan	member	of	parliament	lost	her	seat	due	to	failing	to	
renounce	her	Swiss	citizenship	(Outlook	2017).	What	one	learns	from	these	cases	is	that	while	
dual	citizenship	policies	are	becoming	more	common,	they	are,	by	no	means,	universally	
accepted.	
	 As	a	final	sign	of	the	growing	separation	between	the	state	and	citizenship,	a	
comprehensive	list	of	CIPs	was	created.	What	CIPs,	effectively,	do	is	allow	individuals	to	
purchase	access	to	other	sets	of	rights,	thereby	gaining	the	ability	to	increase	the	ease	of	travel	
between	nations,	become	active	in	foreign	economic	markets,	and,	also,	gain	social	capital	
among	their	colleagues	and	competitors.	Within	these	programs,	the	increasing	inequity	of	
citizenship	is	fully	exposed.	No	longer	does	one	only	need	worry	about	their	passport	being	
worth	more-or-less	than	a	foreign	colleague’s,	but	now,	those	who	can	afford	the	application	
processes	and	investments	can	gain	access	to	completely	new	sets	of	rights,	giving	them	
substantive	advantages	over	others	in	the	region.	Ong’s	(1999)	study	of	flexible	citizens,	having	
access	to	the	most	passports	can	be	a	symbol	of	a	better	businessperson.	As	such,	having	more	
passports	than	a	competitor	could	equal	more	lucrative	deals,	since	it	is	assumed	multiple	
holders	have	a	wider	menu	of	choices.	In	addition,	CIPs	also	allow	countries	to	expel	unwanted	
populations	by	buying	them	documents	from	other	regions,	then	deporting	them	to	those	
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locales.	As	Abrahamian	(2015)	noted,	the	bidoon	in	the	UAE	were	stateless	people,	so	the	
government	purchased	individuals	Comorian	citizenship	as	a	superficially	benevolent	gesture,	
then	deported	those	same	individuals	to	Comoros,	a	country	most	had	never	been	to.		
	 Again,	while	these	three	arcs	of	liberal	citizenship	illustrate	a	separation	between	the	
state	and	citizenship,	they	are	also	marked	by	inequality.	CIPs	function	along	the	traditional	
lines	of	inequality	by	allowing	those	with	higher	socioeconomic	statuses	to	gain	access	to	
opportunities	lower	ranked	individuals	cannot.	They	are	using	their	status	to	increase	their	
levels	of	access.	Dual	citizenship	allows	a	more	expansive	group	to	gain	access	to	multiple	sets	
of	rights,	thereby	not	tying	holders	to	a	specific	geographic	realm.	For	both	CIP	users	and	dual	
citizens,	if	their	home	country	is	experiencing	violence,	they	have	the	ability	and	means	to	avoid	
harm.	While	naturalization	could	allow	for	a	similar	safety	net,	it	is	one	that	is	not	open	to	all	
and	often	fraught	with	institutional	requirements.	To	change	one’s	citizenship,	they	may	need	
to	reside	in	the	area	for	an	extended	period,	adopt	the	dominant	culture,	and	renounce	their	
previous	nationality.	Within	this	trade-off,	there	are	tangible	benefits,	but	it	is	not	something	
that	can	be	done	quickly,	for	most	people.	I	argue	that	citizenship,	and	the	associated	regimes,	
are	seated	in	these	inequalities.	The	types	of	rights	groups	can	access,	who	can	access	them,	
and	how	quickly	one	can	gain	access	helps	set	them	apart	from	others;	thereby	gaining	new	
opportunities	blocked	for	some.	
	 However,	as	Chapter	6’s	case	study	notes,	not	all	countries	and	regions	are	embracing	
the	liberal	citizenship	norms	discussed	here.	The	GCC’s	history,	economic	arrangements,	and	
social	attitudes	towards	non-national	groups	creates	an	interesting	look	at	how	transnational	
scripts	can	be	adopted.	World	society	theory	helps	to	explain	the	dispersion	of	citizenship	
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norms,	but	a	dispersion	that	deeply	depends	on	the	state’s	political	type	(authoritarian	or	non-
authoritarian)	or	the	type	of	workers	present	(Mirilovic	2015).	This	research’s	qualitative	
approach	adds	support	to	other	quantitative	conclusions	that	regime-type	plays	a	role	in	dual	
citizenship	policy	adoption.	However,	this	study	adds	the	substantive	variables	of	culture,	
economy,	and	public	perception	to	the	script	tool-kit.	Within	the	GCC	example,	one	sees	that	a	
specific	reading	of	religion	and	culture	has	created	symbolic	situations	favoring	in-groups.	
Those	born	outside	of	the	region	cannot	be	trusted	or	incorporated,	due	to	these	long-held	
beliefs.		
Further,	while	the	democratic	norms	often	associated	with	liberal	citizenship	scripts	are	
absent	in	the	region,	it	is	not	due	to	some	fundamental	incompatibility	between	the	GCC	and	
democracy.	Instead,	I	posit	that	elite	focus	on	local	tribalism,	bolstered	by	their	restrictive	
reading	of	the	Koran,	was	used	to	justify	their	position.	A	position	that	was	further	supported	
when	oil	deposits	were	discovered	in	the	region,	leading	to	the	formation	of	the	rentier	state.	
This	allowed	the	economies	of	the	GCC	to	influence	social	situations	via	the	creation	of	entitled	
classes,	and	the	“others.”	Nationals	directly	benefit	from	the	rentier	arrangements,	and	see	
little	reason	to	include	non-national	workers	in	profits	and	entitlements.	Here,	citizenship	
grants	one	access	to	economic	gain.	Being	left	out	of	the	status	means	that	not	only	does	a	
worker	not	gain	wealth,	but	they	are	also	viewed	as	disposable	commodities,	regardless	of	their	
cultural	and	economic	contributions.	
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Limitations	and	Future	Work	
	 My	use	of	the	GCC	leads	to	one	notable	limitation	of	this	work,	it’s	limited	applicability	
outside	of	the	region.	As	I	note	in	Chapter	6,	the	conditions	surrounding	the	GCC’s	rejection	of	
liberal	citizenship	norms	cannot	be	effectively	extended	to	other	situations.	The	histories,	
economic	arrangements,	and	cultural	influences	are	specific	to	the	member	countries.	While	
similarities	may	be	observed	in	other	authoritarian	regimes	or	monoethnic	states,	the	path	to	
script	rejection	is	based	in	local	experience.	
	 Despite	the	drawbacks	of	cultural	peculiarities,	this	study	provides	tools	that	can	be	
used	in	future	global	policy	assessments.	First,	the	holistic	approach	used	to	analyze	script	
adoption	is	useful	in	identifying	the	local	intricacies	at	play.	The	political,	economic,	social,	and	
cultural	influences	in	government	policy	cannot	be	explained	away.	While	bureaucracy	allows	
for	agents	to	make	policy	decisions	according	to	their	own	beliefs,	those	beliefs	are	founded	in	
personal	experience.	Each	agent	is	the	product	of	past	and	present	experiences.	Further,	the	
station	they	occupy	within	the	bureaucratic	system	limits	their	power.	While	a	Minister	of	
Immigration	in	one	country	may	be	able	to	effectively	stop	movement	into	the	country,	an	
individual	with	the	same	title	in	another	region	may	not	be	allowed	to	take	that	action.	Thus,	
these	holistic	factors	can	affect	national	offices	and	their	practices.	
	 A	second	novel	contribution	of	this	research	concerns	CIPs.	While	the	exact	number	of	
individuals	taking	advantage	of	CIPs	is	unknown,	this	work	is	among	the	first	to	create	a	
complete	list	of	the	type	of	programs	available.	By	identifying	the	enacted	programs,	
researchers	can,	then,	shift	their	focus	to	who	is	using	what	program,	and	begin	to	address	
many	of	the	assumptions	around	golden	passports.	Do	CIP	users	represent	a	new	power	elite?	
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How	often	are	these	programs	used	to	expel	unwanted	groups?	What	are	the	experiences	by	
these	groups	once	they	are	deported?	These	questions	provide	opportunities	for	both	
quantitative	and	qualitative	avenues	of	inquiry,	where	one	can	learn	the	breadth	of	CIP	
influence	through	demographic	tracking	and	see	the	lived	experience	via	personal	interviews.	
	 Such	research	opportunities	also	highlight	some	specific	areas	of	inquiry	that	I	would	
like	to	see	take	shape.	The	first	concern	is	tied	to	the	aforementioned	logistics	of	movement.	
While	there	are	various	sources	of	data	to	assess	traditional	immigration	and	refugee	
movements,	there	is	not	a	similar	source	for	privileged	movement	methods,	aside	from	
“formal”	systems	like	the	United	States’	EB-5	Visa.	I	suspect	that	this	is	due,	in	part,	to	the	
profiles	of	those	obtaining	CIPs.	Most	CIPs	are	only	open	to	the	highest	economic	strata	of	
society,	as	such,	these	individuals	can	also	afford	privacy.	As	noted	earlier	in	this	work,	when	
performing	internet	searches	for	details	on	CIPs,	I	encountered	numerous	websites	for	brokers	
offering	their	services.	All	a	client	must	do	to	gain	a	new	passport	is	to	pay	the	firm	and	they	
will	take	care	of	the	actual	process.	This	affords	applicants	a	level	of	anonymity	since	they	may	
not	be	required	to	sign	forms	as	these	firms	can	act	as	legal	representatives.	Essentially,	one	
could	gain	a	new	citizenship	without	divulging	the	process	to	any	outside	group.	Further,	some	
countries	highlight	the	economic	benefits	of	their	CIPs.	By	purchasing	citizenship	in	some	
countries,	one	can	then,	use	them	as	a	tax	haven	and	avoid	paying	the	local	rates	(Gittleson	
2014).	To	ensure	this	benefit	is	viable,	those	countries	must	protect	the	identities	of	their	
passport	holders,	providing	a	specific	level	of	anonymity.	
	 The	second	area	of	inquiry	that	could	benefit	in	the	coming	years	is	in	the	realm	of	
public	opinion.	Telhami’s	(2013)	survey	of	public	perceptions	toward	democracy	in	the	Middle	
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East	is	among	the	only	modern	substantive	works	to	consider	how	the	people	feel.	While	there	
is	a	litany	of	works	available	to	assess	Western	perceptions	of	Middle	Eastern	immigrants,	I	was	
unable	to	locate	a	single	study	asking	similar	questions	to	Middle	Eastern	populations.	This	
could	be	due	to	the	difficulties	associated	with	gaining	approvals	for	surveys	in	many	of	the	
countries	(Telhami	2013),	but	it	would	be	useful	to	ask,	“How	do	you	feel	about	immigrants?”	
Limited	anecdotal	evidence	suggests	that	many	individuals	are	indifferent	toward	non-nationals	
in	the	region	(Abdi	2015;	Abrahamian	2015;	Kanna	2011),	but	there	is	no	broader	data	
available.	I	suspect	that	in	the	GCC’s	case,	that	many	respondents	may	view	non-nationals	with	
indifference,	but	without	public	opinion	data	to	show	this,	I	cannot	be	certain	and	nor	can	other	
researchers.	
	
Closing	Thoughts	
	 While	inequality	is	a	constant	in	our	everyday	lives,	how	humanity	navigates	those	lives	
varies	greatly	according	to	our	basic	status	our	citizenship.	As	Milanovic	(2013)	points	out	that	if	
one	knew	nothing	else	about	any	given	individual	in	the	world,	they	could,	with	a	reasonable	
amount	of	confidence,	predict	their	income	just	from	the	knowledge	of	their	citizenship.	
Certainly,	inequality	is	a	relative	term,	as	one	nation’s	middle-class	may	be	comparable	to	
another’s	wealthy	elite,	but	I	argue	that	the	different	opportunities	afforded	by	our	citizenships	
can	be	equally	impactful.	Membership	in	a	wealthy,	“developed”	country	could	mean	that	
citizens	will	be	able	to	get	an	advanced	education,	remain	safe	during	their	daily	lives,	and	voice	
dissent	openly.	Others	with	citizenships	in	authoritarian	or	“undeveloped”	areas	may	see	their	
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life	expectancies	shortened,	any	public	disagreements	quashed,	and	limited	opportunities	for	
movement.	
	 To	limit	the	impact	of	global	inequality,	one	must	continue	to	debate	the	citizenship	
question.	Are	systems	based	on	universal	human	rights	the	right	decision?	If	so,	who	will	ensure	
those	rights	are	equally	distributed?	Who	is	considered	a	citizen	here?	Who	can	be	protected?	
Who	can	be?	Our	problems	are	increasingly	global	with	refugee	populations	flowing	in-and-out	
of	foreign	lands.	How	do	statuses	affect	them?	What	of	the	East	Asian	domestic	workers	and	
construction	crews	in	Dubai?	Citizenship	is,	not	only,	tied	to	us,	but	it	becomes	our	reflection.	
People	with	“good”	passports	don’t	think	about	them	much.	But	people	with	“bad”	passports	
think	of	them	a	great	deal.	To	the	wealthy,	this	is	particularly	insulting:	A	bad	passport	is	like	a	
phantom	limb	that	won’t	stop	tingling	no	matter	how	much	money,	power,	or	success	they’ve	
accumulated—a	constant	reminder	that	the	playing	field	is	never	truly	level,	and	that	life	for	
your	average	Canadian	billionaire	will	be	easier	than	for	a	billionaire	from	Botswana	or	Peru.	
(Abrahamian	2015:73)	
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Appendix	A:	Ascriptive	Citizenship	Norms	
	
	
The	following	list	outlines	the	use	of	ascriptive	citizenship	norms	by	modern	nation-
states.	While	all	countries	use	some	form	of	the	jus	sanguinis—blood—form	to	pass	on	
citizenship	between	generations,	variations	of	the	jus	soli—soil—method	are	less	frequent.	The	
countries	that	rely—at	least,	in	part—on	the	location	of	one’s	birth	as	an	indicator	of	group	
membership	are	outlined	below,	and	delineated	according	to	the	type	of	political	regime	in	
power	in	the	given	country.	
	
Authoritarian:	Azerbaijan,	Cuba,	Gambia,	Guinea-Bissau,	Rwanda	
	
	
Non-Authoritarian:	Albania,	Antigua	&	Barbuda,	Argentina,	Austria,	Barbados,	Belize,	Bolivia,	
Brazil,	Canada,	Chile,	Costa	Rica,	Curaçao,	Dominica,	Dominican	Republic,	Ecuador,	El	Salvador,	
Grenada,	Guatemala,	Guyana,	Honduras,	Ireland,	Jamaica,	Lesotho,	Mauritania,	Mauritius,	
Mexico,	Nepal,	Nicaragua,	Pakistan,	Panama,	Paraguay,	Peru,	Saint	Kitts	&	Nevis,	Saint	Lucia,	
Saint	Vincent	&	The	Grenadines,	South	Africa,	Spain,	Trinidad	&	Tobago,	United	States,	
Uruguay,	Venezuela,	Zambia	
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Appendix	B:	Codebook	
	
The	following	list	of	codes	used	in	this	research	was	based	on	Marshall’s	(2006)	framework	of	
citizenship	rights.	All	codes	existed	in	a	binary	of	whether	the	language	for	each	code	was	
present	or	absent	in	the	source	material.	When	present	the	intricacies	of	the	language	was	also	
observed.	
	
Rights	codes:	
• Presence	or	absence	of	legal	rights	for	dual	citizens	
• Economic	rights:	
o Right	to	own	private	property	for	a	business	
§ Rural	business	
§ Urban	business	
o Right	to	make	investments	in	stock	market	
o Employment:	is	additional	documentation	needed	for	the	dual	citizen?	
§ Visa	
§ Work	Permit	
§ None	
o Right	to	own	private	property	(home)	
§ Rural	
§ Urban	
o Taxes:	which	country	is	responsible	for	withholding	tax?	
§ Primary	(sending)	country	
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§ Secondary	(receiving)	country	
§ Both	
• Political	rights	
o Running	for	political	office	
o Allowed	to	run	for	local	office	
§ Primary	country	
§ Secondary	country	
o Allowed	to	Run	for	National	Office	
§ Primary	country	
§ Secondary	country	
o Allowed	to	make	political	contributions	
o Barred	from	running	for	office	
§ Federal	
§ Local	
o Voting	Rights	
§ Primary	country	
§ Secondary	country	
§ None	
• Social	Rights	
o Movement	within	or	between	countries	
§ Free	
§ Limited	
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o Medical	Care	
o Government	Assistance:	who	provides	assistance?	
§ Primary	
§ Secondary	
§ Both	
o Religion:	is	adoption	of	a	national	religion	required	for	citizenship?	
§ Required	
§ Not	required	
	
Strong	Citizenship	codes:	
• jus	sanguinis	
• jus	soli	
• Other	method	
	
Weak	Citizenship	codes:	
• Naturalization	process	
o Military	service	required	
o Ethnic	group	membership	
o Exemption	from	process	(either	individuals	or	groups)	
o Familial	ties	
o Has	employment	
o Has	not	committed	crimes	
	156	
o Land	occupation	(e.g.	living	in	an	area	when	it	is	incorporated)	
o Child’s	choice	(child	has	a	choice	whether	to	apply)	
o Minimum	age	for	to	start	process	
o Oath	or	Proclamation	of	allegiance	required	to	complete	process	
o Period	of	residency	
o Personal	health	(free	of	disease)	
o Religious	affiliation	
o Renounce	original	citizenship	
o Speaks	dominant	language	
• Dual	Citizenship	(presence	or	absence)	
• Merit-based	citizenship	
• Multiple	citizenships	
• Spousal	citizenship	
	
Regime	codes:	
• Liberal	democracy	
• Constitutional	monarchy	
• Emirati	
• Communist	
	
Revocation	of	Citizenship	(how	is	citizenship	lost?):	
• Denial	of	citizenship	(who	is	excluded)	
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